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Introduction 
 
Despite the decisive role and active participation of the young generation in the uprisings in North 
Africa and the Middle East, and in particular in those countries, where the old regimes were 
overthrown (Tunisia, Egypt, and Libya), it remains underrepresented in the new political (dis)orders, 
political institutions, political parties and decision-making processes of these countries. In other 
countries in the Southern and Eastern Mediterranean (e.g. in Morocco, Algeria and Jordan) young 
people do not feel sufficiently represented or recognised either and opportunities for political 
participation often remain limited. At the same time, the future and the perspectives of this young 
generation will be decisive for the future of the on-going transition processes in the Middle East and 
North African (MENA) region. Youth unemployment in the MENA countries oscillates between 20% 
and 35%, in some regions it has reached 40% - and the labour markets are unable to absorb the high 
numbers of young job seekers. Although this is a highly skilled generation, with many possessing an 
academic education and university degrees, their qualifications are often not adapted to the needs 
and challenges of the rapidly changing labour markets and globalized economies (e.g. in terms of 
technology and innovation), be it in the public or in the private sector. In addition to the political and 
demographic challenges, and the difficulties in integrating into the labour markets, this young 
generation faces numerous further obstacles within society.  
The objective of this edited volume is to analyse - from a political science, interdisciplinary and 
comparative perspective - old and new forms of political participation, mobilization and protest, as 
well as the challenges currently facing young people in the political and social systems in different 
Southern and Eastern Mediterranean countries. Case studies from Tunisia, Egypt, Libya and Turkey 
will present the regional and transnational character of these protest movements. Many of the 
young “revolutionaries” have since retreated from politics, dissapointed at the developments that 
followed the “revolutions” of 2011. But this does not mean that they are apolitical or disinterested in 
politics and society. They are looking for other places, other forms and means to express their 
displeasure over inequality, injustice, the lack of professional opportunities and the resulting lack of 
prospects in their private lives (waithood): Be it in social movements, civil society organisations and 
initiatives, in street art and culture, or on the internet. Be it in personal retreat, drug consumption, 
increasing religious fervour, quietist (moderate) Salafism, or, in extreme cases, radical Salafism (e.g. 
jihadi fighter in Syria). Others in turn, who do not see a future for themselves in their own countries, 
are waiting, bored, for a better life elswhere and are literally leaning against the walls (hittistes), or 
they decide to emigrate (harraga). Limited mobility and restrictive migration policies rather increase 
the desire for freedom and mobility. Here, the frustration of an entire generation at the 
unattainability of alternative paths of life, or the freedom to move to other places becomes visible – 
including the related dreams, projections, imaginations and physical dangers of migration.    
The “Arab Spring” of 2011 raised many hopes for a generational change, a replacement of old 
entreched power structures, for a fundamental transformation and change of political structures, 
and even for a social revolution, opening up new opportunities and alternatives for the young 
generation. Since the Arab Spring, pessimists and neoconservatives have been trying to minimise or 
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negate the strong potential of the 2011 revolts. The political situation in the different Southern and 
Eastern Mediterranean countries has developed very differently since then: in Libya and Syria civil 
wars have broken out, in Egypt an authoritarian backlash has taken place, in Tunisia, a more or less 
peaceful and democratic transition process brought 88-year-old president Beji Caid Essebsi to power. 
However, the frustration and protest potential of the young generation continues to exist. However, 
within the societies of the Southern and Eastern Mediterranean region, the ruptures, frictions and 
conflicts between generations are very diverse and multifaceted. This publication approaches the 
youth and revolt phenomenon in the Southern and Eastern Mediterranean area from different 
angles and looks for answers to the overarching questions: Where have the young “revolutionaries” 
of 2011 gone? Were all their hopes for change, justice, social equality and freedom deceived or has 
something changed for the positive after all? Does the great international visibility in 2011 of young 
people in the streets, on social media and in the civil society sector contrast with little political 
participation and representation? Which ways out and what kind of means of expression do young 
people look for, in order to vent their anger and displeasure? The different contributions provide 
some insights into the current situation of the young generation in the Southern and Eastern 
Mediterranean countries during and after “the Arab Spring”, by approaching these issues from 
different thematic perspectives, including qualitative case studies, partially based on field research 
on the ground.  
In Part I, Valeska Henze provides a theoretical overview of the notion of youth (in general) - a 
contested analytical category in social sciences. The contribution gives indications which are also 
valuable for the analysis of youth in a North African or Middle Eastern context, for instance with 
regard to the mechanisms of normative expectations of society on youth, the attribution of the 
“hero” role, youth as a necessary component in the social system, and the structural and institutional 
restrictions in the integration process of youth into adult society. In this publication “youth” is, of 
course, not understood as a monolithic bloc or homogenous unit, but rather as a process, as a phase 
of transition between childhood and adulthood, as many forms of youth with many faces and facets. 
This is within the context of Asaf Bayat’s concept of “youthfulness”, which means a disposition of 
attitudes, behaviour and knowledge that are associated with “being young”. Each article in this 
publication approaches “youth” and its meaning from a different theoretical angle, but they all share 
the common objective to explore „what it means to be young“ in different societal contexts today 
around the Mediterranean sea, in particular in the context of the uprisings of 2011 and after. 
Part II focuses on the political dimension. Carolina Silveira considers youth in its role as political actor 
in Tunisia, analyses questions of political participation in the Tunisian transition process, and the 
underrepresentation of “young revolutionaries” in the newly founded political parties and in the 
wider political landscape. Anna Lührmann looks at the situation of the young generation in the 
upheavals in Libya, under the aspects of youth political participation, forms of mobilization, self 
organisation and continued exclusion from the newly established political structures, which were 
already dissolved again in 2014. Charlotte Biegler-König asks whether or why political Islam 
represents an alternative political society and way of life for young people in search for their 
identities. By analysing examples from the Egyptian and Tunisian transition processes, her 
contribution examines the causes of the new wave of religiosity among young people, and the 
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attractiveness of Islamist parties or Salafist groupings for young people. Daniel Farell explores the 
role of art in the protest movements in the context of the Egyptian revolution. Hereby he looks in 
particular at street art, artistic protest actions, and the use of artistic creativity for political activism 
as well as the emergence of new forms of expression. Gözde Böcu considers the protest movement in 
Turkey and the role of the “Gezi-Generation”. Situated in the Eastern Mediterranean, Turkey is 
directly concerned by the developments in the neighbouring Arab states, as the current Syria-Iraq-IS 
conflict shows. The political constellation in Turkey differs from the situations in the neighbouring 
states, marked by uprisings, civil wars or failing state structures. But the forms and objectives of the 
protests, or the slogans and means of the young generation render visible certain parallels. The 
protests of the Gezi Generation were part of a larger transnational protest dynamic, which started in 
Tunisia in 2011, and flamed up later on in different places around the Mediterranean Sea. 
In Part III, which focuses on the socio-economic dimension, in terms of migration and 
unemployment, Inken Bartels analyses changes in the migration politics of Tunisia after the Tunisian 
revolution. Emigration is a sort of outlet for many young people who see few prospects in their own 
countries and who dream of a better life in Europe. In parallel to the increasing emigration from the 
country itself, Tunisia faces increasing immigration pressures, especially from Libya since 2011, but 
also by continued transit migration from Sub-Saharan Africa. Outside of the governmental migration 
policies, civil society organisations and actors are increasingly committed in this sector - some of 
these organisations or initiatives have been founded by young activists. Bachir Hamdouch explores 
recent changes in the situation of migration in Morocco, and observes three major tendencies: a 
decrease in Moroccan emigration towards Europe, increasing return migration towards Morocco 
(especially by highly skilled young graduates), and increasing immigration to Morocco from Sub-
Saharan Africa. These developments have also had an impact on the changing profiles of Moroccan 
emigrants, including an increasing proportion of (young) female migrants and higher education 
levels. Emigration remains an important economic and social alternative option for young people in 
Morocco; Moroccan migration policies are currently being redefined. Wai Mun Hong addresses the 
the difficulties faced by young people in accessing and integrating into the MENA labour markets. 
Her statistical analysis of youth unemployment, youth labour force, demography, human 
development and educational systems problematizes the current challenges and obstacles of the 
young generation, in particular of young educated graduates. 
The different contributions to this publication that all express the personal opinions of the authors 
show how relevant the issue of youth in the Mediterranean area remains. Discontent and protest 
potential still exists in many countries in North Africa and in the Middle East. How this protest 
potential will develop is open, and will depend on different social, economic and political factors, as 
well as on the upcoming decisions made by the old and new political classes. The causes for the 
perceived and real inequality, injustice and exclusion of youth in the MENA region are multiple and 
diverse and need further social science analysis. 
The contributions to this collective volume go back to a German-French-North African Research 
Atelier, supported by the Franco-German University (FGU), and an international workshop (in 
cooperation with the ISW’s International Masters Program Office), both organised by the 
“Mediterranean Institute Berlin (MIB)” project (www.mib.hu-berlin.de), affiliated to the Institute of 
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Social Sciences (ISW) at Humboldt-Universität zu Berlin. My special thanks go to Silvia von 
Steinsdorff, Claudia Matthes, Florian Kühn, Klaus Eder and Leyla Dahkli for their scientific and 
institutional support, to Maher El-Zayat, Daniel Farrell, Carolina Silveira, and Kelly Bescherer for 
proofreading and technical support, and to the voluntary team of young researchers of the project 
“Mediterranean Institute Berlin (MIB)”, especially to Jannis Grimm and Moritz Schneider. My thanks 
go also to Thomas Müller, Thomas Möbius, and the team of the journal Berliner Debatte Initial for 
good cooperation on the German version of this publication, which was published as a thematic issue 
of Berliner Debatte Initial under the title “Jugend und Revolte – Um- und Aufbrüche im südlichen und 
östlichen Mittelmeerraum”, vol. 25, no. 4, 2014. Last but not least, I would like to thank Bauke 
Baumann, Michaela Birk and Sandra Nenninger for the opportunity to discuss these youth issues and 
scientific findings with young political activists from North Africa during a public panel discussion at 
the Heinrich Böll Foundation in March 2015.  
 
Berlin, March 2015 
Isabel Schäfer 
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Part I – Theoretical Perspectives 
On the Concept of Youth – Some Reflections on Theory 
Valeska Henze 
Introduction 
Youth, in a very general definition, is a period of life in-between childhood and adulthood. It is 
described as a time of experimenting with roles and identities, still void of the burden of social norms 
and obligations, yet slowly preparing the youngsters for their lives as full members of the social 
collective. During this process of social integration young people find themselves in a complex social 
system, composed of such elements as tradition, history, social demands, hopes, and individual 
future prospects, all of which they have to incorporate into a coherent picture in order to build a 
proper foundation for their personal life. Step by step they have to obtain new social roles and 
extend their range of social performances. This passage into society is guided by various socially 
defined norms and demands that serve the reproductional functions of society while conditions of 
economic and social integration set the framework for the political socialisation of the future 
citizens.  
What do these implications of growing up mean for the young and for society? The following 
contribution surveys shortly different conceptualisations of youth and how they relate to 
requirements of society and its future. Theoretical considerations on the notion of youth shall help to 
understand why youth is rebellious, unsatisfied etc., as their acting always is a response to their own 
experiences with social realities and to expectations society imposes on their young generations.1 
Youth as we speak of today is a product of modernity. It developed as a middle class project during 
industrialisation, hence at a time when social orders were shaken by fast and confusing transitions.2 
Youth since has become an object of pedagogical and psychological expertise. Youth is 
conceptualised in two ways: as a stage model of individual development on the one hand, and as an 
element of social integration processes on the other hand. One usually can detect aspects of one and 
the other to varying extent in different concepts of youth. Thus the modern image of youth 
integrates elements of a pedagogic view of youth as a shapeable object, with the demand for an 
unproblematic integration into adult society. Pedagogy and education shall direct the individual 
through a process of cultural and civic maturation, which complements the biological development 
of a human being, as it were a natural way of growing up with culturally given implications and 
objectives that will result in a valuable, civilised person. This implicates a clear normative 
understanding of the way youth should develop. To the contrary the mainstream sociological views 
set out from the goal of social stability, to which youth, as all social groups, has to contribute. In this 
perspective youth is a functional item of the social structure. 
                                                            
1  For a detailed elaboration please see Henze, Valeska (2014): Improving Future(s). Youth Imagery as Representations of the Political 
Cultures in Sweden and Poland. Berlin: Berliner Wissenschafts-Verlag (Nordeuropäische Studien 25). 
2  An often quoted statement by Frank Musgrove parallels the invention of the steam engine in 1765 with the ‘discovery’ of youth by 
Jean Jacques Rousseau in 1762 with the publication of Émile, in: Musgrove, Frank (1998): Youth and the social order. London: 
Routledge (The international library of sociology, 12), p. 33.  
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Modern youth adopts an own status and captures an own social room with claims, such as to live 
their newly acclaimed energies and possibilities, and test different social roles without immediately 
being confronted with the heavy weight of adult life and regulations. Although these new evolving 
demands and hopes are connected to the ideas of general freedom and renewal, which still contain 
plenty references to the ideals of a romanticised youth as for instance in Rousseau’s works on 
education3, the overall goal of youthful freedom remains directed by existing social structures. The 
family as centre of one’s life conduct and its guiding patriarchal principles have been replaced by a 
juvenile principle, which was articulated through the idolisation of assumed youthful attributes.4 The 
juvenile principle corresponded perfectly to the dynamics of modernisation and could be applied to 
the societal development goals of modernity. Youth, hence, ended up in the middle of a highly 
ambivalent process oscillating between conservative claims of preservation and moderation and the 
radical demands of (leftist) revolutionist ideas: The youthful power of renewal was either needed in a 
fight against society or for the protection of society as well as for expansive plans of imperialistic 
states. In contrast to the romanticist world of a Rousseauean youth the centre of attention switched 
from the beauty of a youthful and innocent mind to the physical strength that will advance into a 
new and accelerated time. In doing so youth and its attributions, its expectable, shapeable and 
projectable prefixes for the future of society more and more became objectified by scientific 
methods.  
Societal standardisation of youth 
By the beginning of the 20th century the youth age had evolved as a general societal norm which was 
dominated by the bourgeois ideals of juvenility, to which other social classes had to adapt to. 
Nonetheless the fundaments of conceptualising youth never could abandon its romanticist roots 
entirely. The norm was set by psychological and pedagogical efforts to define stages of personal 
development, assign age cohorts to social groups5 and ascribe so called tasks of development.6 Tasks 
of development structure individual biographies along socially defined transitions and determine 
temporary, sequenced life-stages. This grouping of personal and social lives shall for instance assure 
social stability at the critical point of generational transition. The complete range of developmental 
tasks thus structure the whole life. Yet, the concept intermingles descriptive and normative 
elements, so that the process is more or less designated and its results can be ‘anticipated’ or even 
demanded. During the years developmental tasks, especially those for adolescence, have been 
adjusted to the furthermore changing social structures by shifting or expanding the stages on a time 
                                                            
3 Rousseau, Jean-Jacques (1993): Emile oder über die Erziehung. Paderborn: Schöningh. 
4 Such as rejuvenation, renewal, energy, creativity, enthusiasm, to some extent also rebellious attitudes. Cf. Gillis, John R. (1974): 
Youth and History. Tradition and Change in European Age Relations 1770 - Present. New York, London: Academic Press. pp. 113, who 
comprehensively develops the concept of youth from a socio-historical point of view. He describes a complex process, in which he 
explicitly accounts for the role of more or less organised youth groups as well as he recognises the implications of social class. 
Nonetheless the dominating modern view of youth stems from mainly bourgeois circles. 
5  See especially Erikson, Erik H. (1989): Identität und Lebenszyklus. Drei Aufsätze. 11. Aufl. Frankfurt am Main: Suhrkamp (Suhrkamp-
Taschenbuch Wissenschaft, 16) and G. Stanely Hall (1904): Adolescence; its psychology and its relations to physiology, anthropology, 
sociology, sex, crime, religion and education. New York: D. Appleton and Company. 
6 A concept elaborated by Robert Havighurst, who defines developmental tasks as “tasks which if fulfilled during an individual stage of 
life will lead to happiness and success with upcoming tasks, while if failed will make the individual unhappy and cause social 
disapproval and difficulties with the upcoming tasks.” Havighurst quoted in: Abels, Heinz (1993): Jugend vor der Moderne. 
Soziologische und psychologische Theorien des 20. Jahrhunderts. Opladen: Leske + Budrich, p. 259. Developmental tasks were thus 
not specifically related to the youth age. Yet, the developmental tasks of youth have been in the centre of attention more than any 
other tasks.   
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scale, which resulted in the prolongation of the period of youth. Nonetheless their substantial claims 
– leaving the parents, choosing a profession, developing a gender role and living in a relationship 
with a partner – remained the same, together with the overall goal: securing social stability through a 
smooth integration into society. The completion of the adolescent development tasks designates a 
clear break in both the individual and the social life, as social status becomes the main structural 
feature for people and society, while age had been the primary criterion during childhood and 
adolescence.7 Youth has thus become a subject of social responsibility and protection. It had to be 
taken care of, advised against the dangers of youthful freedom while at the same time its valuable 
and idolised qualities have to be fostered. The endeavours of the academic world resulted in a 
standard of youth who allowed for progress as well as for the preservation of traditions, with more 
emphasis on one or the other depending on the ideological background. Concepts of youth that 
among others were reproduced in ideas of education and socialisation therefore developed as 
structures of social control.8 
The romanticised youth as a bodily creature, that once was instinctively acting, displaying soulful 
attitudes and carrying the morals of innocence and purity has been turned into an object of 
measurable personal and social qualities, which could be optimised by the right treatment, i.e. 
education. Although all this is put into a rhetoric of youthful freedom – own spaces, moratorium and 
the like – the clearly set goals of development broke down life into certain, ex-ante scientifically 
defined stages which imply an adjustment to the ruling habits, attitudes, modes of action and 
traditions. Thus the clear order of life-stages structured the social processes of hierarchisation and 
generational transition as well as they replaced the traditional rites of passage and forms of 
transferring authority.9 Contradictions and ambivalences of modernisation are to be overcome by 
standardising and objectifying the social category age, by turning youth into a social status and a set 
of social roles.  
Adopting roles in present time 
Social roles link a personal development directly to social institutions which take over tasks of 
socialisation and influence the shaping of adult roles. Assigned roles are the functional playground on 
which society and individual intersect, as they attach modes of action to corresponding (sub-) 
systems, i.e. social spaces and times.10 Moreover roles are ordering elements of the social structure, 
for they are generally expressing certain normative expectations of society. These expectations in 
turn are derived from their desired functional contribution to the social system. Hence, social 
                                                            
7  The social definition of a person in childhood is e.g. “8-year old pupil” and for an adult “full-time worker at the car factory”. 
8 “The invention of the developmental and ‘spatial moratorium’ of youth implies the invention of a structure of social control for 
socialisation processes, in which relief and freedom are paid back with a continuous and effective social control. This social control is 
organised of professional supervisors and mirrors the structure of social inequality, as it is focused on middle class perspectives. It 
aims at learning and maintaining individual self-control mechanisms within the framework, that is given by the dominant, 
bureaucratic-rational organisation of society.” Trotha, Trutz von (1982): Zur Entstehung von Jugend. In: Kölner Zeitschrift für 
Soziologie und Sozialpsychologie (KZfSS) 34 (3), p. 269, who asserts a turn in the social organisation of age during the 19th century 
which distinguished itself from the time before through among others the fact that dependence now was shaped by pedagogic and 
psychological concepts, youth got excluded from the social realm of work, the introduction of age limits for certain stages of 
development and education.   
9  Cf. Erdheim, Mario (1982): Die gesellschaftliche Produktion von Unbewußtheit. Eine Einführung in den ethnopsychoanalytischen 
Prozess. Frankfurt/Main: Suhrkamp; cf especially chapter 4, pp.284-295. 
10 Both, time and space have got rid of their ‘natural’ or biological measures since the enlightenment. Koselleck speaks of a 
“denaturalisation” of geographical rooms and biological time courses, cf. Koselleck, Reinhart (2003): Zeitschichten. Studien zur 
Historik. Frankfurt am Main: Suhrkamp (Suhrkamp-Taschenbuch Wissenschaft, 1656), pp. 78. 
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relations and social interaction become part of normative role models, which define rules of social 
selection and hierarchy and become necessary conditions for social stability. The role-model concept 
fits perfectly well to the structural functionalist approach,11 which for a long time dominated the 
sociological perspective on youth and their integration into society. Samuel Eisenstadt has been one 
of the structural functionalist sociologists who introduced age as a functional category of the social 
system and assigned youth a specific position within the social order, by linking age to role 
expectations and by that to specific social tasks. Age thus has become one necessary feature to hold 
together the differentiated social systems and to assure the structural continuation of the system, 
i.e. society.  
Eisenstadt views youth as a necessary component within in the social system. He focuses on the 
emergence of distinct youth groups which take over parts of the socialisation process from the 
traditional institutions family and school – the peer-groups. Yet, also Eisenstadt defines age culturally 
by ascribing specific expectations:  
[The biological process] serves as basis for the specification of the people, for the development of 
their mutual relations and activities and for the differentiation along social roles. Although the 
meaning of age as well as the span of years, that form a relative consistent category or stage of age, 
vary in each society, we do not know of any society that does not at all differentiate between distinct 
‘life-ages’ and defines them according to norms and values of their cultural tradition. In each society 
a number of cultural definitions that ascribe certain fundamental characteristics to each age group – 
or more technically said life-stage – are modelled after basic and general biological facts.12 
Those characteristics define role expectations which again only can be understood if they are set in 
relation to other existing age groups. This means that the social structure here essentially is built 
upon a constructed age hierarchy, which has vital functions for the persistence of the social system.13 
In addition Eisenstadt observes that peer-group socialisation more and more takes over the 
transitional functions of dissolving family-bonds and diminishing ties between families and social 
institutions respectively. Furthermore the transition to adult status is perceived as the most critical 
and essential moment for social stability which attracts special attention to youth and youth groups 
and clearly emphasises the problematic youth that does not comply with measurable performance 
goals (i.e. developmental tasks). The perception of youth as a problem thus is inherent to the 
structural-functional perspective for it binds compliance with the existing structure to certain social 
functions and the overall social stability which turns a specific alertness to all non-functional 
elements. Consequently, the mal-functioning of youth automatically is related to the system. Youth 
usually turns into a systemic problem in structural-functionalist concepts.14 Yet it is missed that the 
                                                            
11 Structural-functionalist theory has been the dominating sociological theory for conceptualising society, its constituents, their 
relations and its overall operation focussing on the functional aspect and aiming at social stability. Its main representatives with 
broad influences on youth studies and political science respectively were Talcott Parsons, David Easton and Samuel Eisenstadt. 
12 Eisenstadt, Samuel Noah (1966): Von Generation zu Generation. Altersgruppen und Sozialstruktur. [From Generation to Generation - 
Age Groups and Social Structure.]. München: Juventa, p. 14. 
13 “The roles each individual adopts throughout his life, have to be defined in such a way, that they clearly specify his relations to the 
fellow members of society, who find themselves at their specific, different stage of individual development – in his role of carrier or 
recipient of the cultural and social heritage. The position of the individual in this continuity is decisive for the definition of his own 
roles, his behaviour and his expectations towards the others.” Eisenstadt, Samuel Noah (1966): Von Generation zu Generation. 
Altersgruppen und Sozialstruktur. München: Juventa, p. 17  
14 One example for such a perception provides Hornstein, Walter (1999): Jugendforschung und Jugendpolitik. Entwicklungen und 
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problematic youth often mirrors the perceived and assumed social problems which intrinsically 
belong to the general social structure or rather the system itself – for which youth in return, for 
better or for worse, has to stand in.15 Youth becomes either problem or chance, while the problem 
discourse is the dominant one. Thus youth becomes a publically well-observed and commented 
object of research and media on both prevailing and prospective problems. It is a social factor that 
not yet is a problem but inherits the potential to become one.16  
Youth without past 
The less fixed social status makes youth a proper field for testing, as it not yet has a social past and 
thus is unloaded – at least that is assumed – which makes it an optimal playground for reloading, i.e. 
reinterpretation of meanings. This is the reason why the assumption of an axiomatic educability and 
a specific need for education has despite various theoretical reconceptualisations remained the 
primary basis of any existing youth image. Its core still is stuck in structural-functionalist thinking and 
developmental approaches of socialisation and integration, as the forming of the people according to 
functional role requirements can generate social stability. Furthermore the continuous evocation of 
youth as problem is a guarantee for the future existence of the system as the ‘problem’ calls for 
social mechanisms of disciplining and control.17 
Hence any attempt to define youth has to struggle with the growing complexity of social structures 
and its conceptualisations. The ideas of the youth age, its length, character, course and forms, have 
been adapted to the transformations of an industrialised working society towards a post-modern and 
globalised service society, so that also theories on youth got split into countless short-living “ad-hoc 
theories”18 and attempts to generally reconceptualise social biographies. The idea of a clear-cut life 
stage youth does not fit any longer to our times. Social biographies more and more got blurred and 
permeable which above all seem to affect the youth period: their position appears most fragile in 
between the dependent, to be cared of child and the working, responsible adult so that the 
transition to the adult world becomes more and more insecure, unpredictable, while the time of 
education stretches to enormous length and the sphere of labour becomes confusingly diversified. 
                                                                                                                                                                                          
Strukturen in der zweiten Hälfte des 20. Jahrhunderts. Weinheim: Juventa-Verl. (Materialien zur historischen Jugendforschung), p. 
158: “There is much evidence, that youth similar to environment, peace, the Third World itself is a systemic problem, that does not 
any longer appear as solvable with the usual instruments of political governance due to the conditions of late capitalism – not least 
because the state is no longer able to really relate to the situation of youth. This would only be possible by way of the social 
institutions, yet that would require that youth accepts those institutions as ‘theirs’ – in other words: if the institutions are able to 
response to the needs, problems and interests of the young. Yet, this is barely experienced by the young generations, so that the 
institutions are not really able to generate the identification and inner loyalty and commitment that are needed as basis for any form 
of ‘reasonable’, i.e. argument based, discourse.”  
15 Cf. the repeatedly occurring moral panics, which most often are attributed to a dangerous youth but actually stand for a general 
anxiety due to severe changes, experiences of crisis and the like. See for instance. Springhall, John (1998): Youth, Popular Culture and 
Moral Panics. Penny Gaffs to Gangsta-Rap, 1830-1996. London: Macmillan. 
16 Cf. Mansel, Jürgen; Griese, Hartmut M.; Scherr, Albert (Eds.) (2003): Theoriedefizite der Jugendforschung. Standortbestimmung und 
Perspektiven. Weinheim: Juventa-Verl. (Jugendforschung), p. 22: “Society represented by politics, media and interest groups by way 
of a permanent ‘youth discourse’ tries to assure its present situation and future. That means discourses of youth research are used as 
‘early warning system’, mirror and seismograph of social problems. Theoretical debates on youth therefore often tend to adopt a 
substitute function. Youth research replaces or rather steps in as social research on problematic topics and the future, for youth on 
the one hand always points to future (‘youth as anticipatory activity’) and on the other hand is constructed ‘as social problem’.” 
17        Foucault, Michel (1977): Discipline and Punish. The Birth of the Prison. London: Allen Lane Penguin Books Ltd. 
18 Griese, Hartmut M. (1982): Sozialwissenschaftliche Jugendtheorien. Eine Einführung. Weinheim/Basel: Beltz. who tries to grasp the 
phenomenon of the 1970s/80s youth research, which was keen to grasp every ‘new’ form of youthful articulation as a new social 
movement, reality and the like – but was outlived rather shortly by the next youth phenomena. Those youth cultures were clearly 
responses to social developments but could not provide for long lasting reconceptualisations. 
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The dissolution of class society and binding age structures has unfolded of a variety of life-options 
and possible biographies which opened up various, individualised ways to become an adult.19 
Individualisation here means that the biographies of the people are dissolved from given fixations 
and handed over as an individual task to decide openly and independently. The share of those life-
options that in principle are not open for an own decision diminishes while the share of the openly 
decided and self-produced biographies increases. That means individualisation of biography here 
stands for the transformation of socially given biographies into biographies that are and have to be 
self-made, so that the single individual becomes the ‘creator of his life’ and by that also has to take 
the blame for his failures.20 
Yet, although the expansion of when and how to fulfil developmental tasks and go further in life has 
resulted in an enormous variety of possible life-courses, the fundamental requirements of 
developmental tasks remained stable and moreover became complemented by the demand to not 
only construct one’s own biography but also to constantly reassure and renew it. All life-goals and 
tasks, however, in some way remain to be bound to the conditions of the labour market, which still 
are the dominant parameters of the temporal structure of both society and the individual life. And 
even if the variety of options has dispersed the socially given roles with the result of hardly 
recognisable role models, for which age seem to have lost its structuring function; it still is failure and 
success of accomplishing a role and the respective developmental tasks that determine the individual 
life courses.21 This in the end promotes the capitalisation of life-courses, whose values and assets 
(education, qualifications) then are broken down to social resources, one of which being youth. The 
romanticised youthful attributes such as power, creativity and freedom have finally turned into 
capitalised social assets.  
Thus youth has in some way lost its significant meaning as a special condition of growing up while at 
the same time age still has the same structuring and regulating functions with regard to the systems 
of education and socialisation.22 The diffusion of social roles as it is represented in segmented images 
of modern, post-modern, globalised etc. youths, has been turned into an instrument of diagnosing 
social prospects and testing strategies to cope with changes. This advances the probability of 
perceiving youth as a potential problem (problems usually stir more easily societal debates than the 
                                                            
19 Social science speaks of a destructuring of the youth period. A further characteristic of a destructuralisation of the youth age are 
diversified life-courses: youth is not bound to the fact of going to school any longer, age norms have lost their ordering power, 
generational relations have become a matter of negotiation and are no longer determined by elder authority. “Young people do not 
claim a moratorium nor certain age-related rights, but define themselves by a social status … It is not of importance, whether they 
feel as adult or adolescent, nor if the adults award them with a specific status. With regard to their social self they are adult and 
adolescent at the same time.” In: Abels, Heinz (1993): Jugend vor der Moderne. Soziologische und psychologische Theorien des 20. 
Jahrhunderts. Opladen: Leske + Budrich, p. 518. 
20 Ulrich Beck quoted in Tillmann, Klaus-Jürgen (2000): Sozialisationstheorien. Eine Einführung in den Zusammenhang von Gesellschaft, 
Institution und Subjektwerdung. [Reinbek: Rowohlt (Rowohlts Enzyklopädie), p. 265.  
21  Even if age on the surface has no longer the importance of positioning someone in society, all social institutions are still structured 
along age-spans, e.g. schooling regulations, pension requirements etc. 
22 “One cannot miss the fact, that youth in social theory only has exemplary meaning: From the viewpoint of a macro-sociological 
reflection of processes of socialisation and differentiation youth becomes a subsystem, in which age no longer is a condition of 
socialisation but has turned into an institutional control mechanism.” Abels, Heinz (1993): Jugend vor der Moderne. Soziologische 
und psychologische Theorien des 20. Jahrhunderts. Opladen: Leske + Budrich, p. 339. Though one could also say that the meaning of 
youth also has gained attraction with regard to the idolisation of youth in commercial media. The tendency to transfer juvenility 
further into adult life is another phenomenon of destructuralisation, cf. the notion of “Puerilisierung” in: Trotha, Trutz von (1982): 
Zur Entstehung von Jugend. In: Kölner Zeitschrift für Soziologie und Sozialpsychologie (KZfSS) 34 (3), pp. 254–277, pp. 258.  
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positive correspondent). And since youth is related to future, or rather ideas of future its education 
and socialisation becomes a means to control the future. Psychological and sociological (i.e. 
structural-functionalist) conceptualisations of youth thus construct youth images as a social ideology 
within a functionalist theory.  
Youth and societal future 
To conceptualise youth as an active part in societal processes also requires going beyond the one-
dimensional socialisation into given role-models. It calls for an intentionally presuming and ahead 
looking individual actor that is continuously reinterpreting and reshaping social live and thus 
reconstructing social reality. The adoption of social roles is a reciprocal process, in which society is 
conceived of as a reality that is formed by interpretations, the allocation of meaning and the 
objectivation of experience, and eventually results in an institutionalisation of social structure and 
roles, order and orientation, which then are represented in socialisation processes.23  
Roles, as for instance understood by Berger/Luckmann, stand for institutionalised standardisations of 
behaviour which both represent social reality and communicate social knowledge. Social reality can 
only be experienced through the representation of roles and by experiencing and recognising other 
roles. Yet this process is subject to the course of time and hence change. Future then becomes a 
common point of reference which has to be guaranteed within the scope of individual social actions 
(in the present time)24 as the generational transmission of institutions would only be possible with 
this guarantee of an existing social reality. This in turn implies that social action has to be predictable, 
conceivable and reasonably distributed to social roles.  
The identification of youth with the future of its society is the representation of such a reciprocal 
process of constructing social reality. Youth does not only represent and guarantee the future 
existence of society but has the duty to actively contribute to this future, to upgrade social conditions 
yet without shaking its fundaments too heavy. Youth embodies future, not only in a metaphorical 
sense, but also as an actor who is bound to attributes such as hope, the possibility to redo decisions 
or to start better off. Those ascribed attributes thus are linked to certain values and even 
assignments or missions that would provide the young generation with a meaning, e.g. that of 
transforming or advancing society. The integration of the image and its social or rather national 
mission into a social and chronological order defines social power relations, creates societal values 
and sets hierarchies as if given by laws of natural growth. Youth becomes a matter of social power, as 
its image is at the adult’s command to legitimise their power. Yet this naturalisation of power 
collapses when confronted with the actual conditions of unpredictability. Hence the scientific and 
social occupation with youth has become an instrument of assurance for the adult society. The 
ambivalence of youth which is the result of the tension between ascribed images and experienced 
reality (of both actual and former young generations) opens up for several distinctive meanings and 
                                                            
23 Cf. Berger, Peter; Luckmann, Thomas (1999): Die gesellschaftliche Konstruktion der Wirklichkeit. Eine Theorie der Wissenssoziologie. 
Frankfurt/M. See also Weymann, Ansgar (1998): Sozialer Wandel. Theorien zur Dynamik der modernen Gesellschaft. Weinheim, 
München: Juventa (Grundlagentexte Soziologie), p. 58: “The internalisation of an objective reality as subjective reality of a person 
during the life-long socialisation process assures the understanding and the acquisition of the existing world anew, results in 
recognised and legitimated participation in society and counteracts alienation and individualisation.” 
24 Cf. Berger, Peter; Luckmann, Thomas (1999): Die gesellschaftliche Konstruktion der Wirklichkeit. Eine Theorie der Wissenssoziologie. 
Frankfurt/M., pp. 110. 
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it is an ambivalence that is well experienced by the young themselves. The real young people, the 
age group with own needs and wishes, are not yet to be taken seriously, while the constructed 
image, the generation, carries the acknowledged and awaited signature of future – conspicuously 
described in an article in a journal of the German Jugendbewegung in the first half of the 19th 
century: 
“The position of youth in the nation is basically determined by its twofold and even ambivalent 
constitution. So that youth and everything young always will be ambivalent: Youth is age group and 
generation. To make the difference clear one could stretch and simplify as follows: Youth as age 
group always is wrong, youth as generation always is right. They are wrong because the young age is 
a preliminary stage for the following, because the young still have to become men. As generation 
though, youth always is right, because it is foreshadowing and pre-shaping what is to come to reality. 
[...] Generation is the entity of those, who act during one period of time. Still a generation does not 
build a common project, it does not act according to a plan nor does it follow one will. As historical 
entity it is only conceivable when looking back. Still, also the current generation lives with a 
consciousness of being a generation of fate, like workers at a construction site that was assigned to 
them. And all humans that belong to one generation will recognise each other due to a secret 
language that only they would intuitively understand.”25  
In that retrospective generational legitimation youth appears as the awaited creator of history. 
However, although the image is retrospectively constructed it is applied to the present youth, which 
means that historical experience is objectified and generalised, exempt the conditions of the current 
time and circumstances. In such constructions and images, youth gets in touch with Promethean 
abilities, while societies are sequenced into an engine of progress. The idea of progress then more 
and more turns into a condition for the existence and stability of society and finally represents an 
ideal of social harmony.  
The social group youth thus is captured within an itself replicating circle of an ambivalent existence 
between wished and glorified attributes and assumed deficits and defects. Within that circle the 
glorification or even mythologisation of youth is confronted with a likewise exaggerated assumption 
of a critical condition of the current civilisation that has to be contained by rigid control and 
socialisation. This means each image is clearly related to a certain generation, to its conditions of 
living, learning and working as well as to its wishes, hopes and fears, so that one can observe waves 
of alerts about a threatening young generation and worships of the promising avant-garde, that take 
regular turns.26  
                                                            
25 Quote from Deutscher Freischar, 1928/29; quoted in Hafeneger, Benno (1995): Jugendbilder. Zwischen Hoffnung, Kontrolle, 
Erziehung und Dialog. Opladen: Leske und Budrich, p. 25.  
26 “The response to that challenge primarily is education, which also is understood as prevention, in order to avoid the ‘general evil’, 
the ‘revival of the evil’. The ‘black pedagogy’ is full of projections of fear onto children and young people. The allegation and 
description of an ‘essentially bad nature’ of man and of a seductive civilisation and the necessary domestication of youth (among 
others through strong public authorities, instruments of punishment and education) backs up two hypotheses: one about the alleged 
natural state of youth and society (as naturalisation, essential and eternal feature of being young, mythologisation), the other about 
the critical (threatened) condition of culture and civilisation.” Hafeneger, Benno (1995): Jugendbilder. Zwischen Hoffnung, Kontrolle, 
Erziehung und Dialog. Opladen: Leske und Budrich, p. 87. 
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Generation or hero 
Two conceptualisations of youth centre around the creation of change: the concept of generation 
and the building of hero systems in nation-building processes. 
With the concept of generation age-related groups are grouped together into a common 
Zeitheimat.27 Hence the forming of generations goes along with the chronological structuration of 
social relations. “Belonging” to a social structure is determined by the belonging to a certain social 
time and its experiences. Generations have become particularly interesting as a structural construct 
since the acceleration of social time led to increasingly diverging realms of experience and horizons 
of expectation28 – generations have become some kind of measuring instrument for societal progress 
and modernisation and thus for social transformation. 
The concept of generation helps to collectively perceive historical transformations within a 
biographically limited period of time and to connect it to the generational renewal of society. 
Individual lifetime, generational time and historical time are since mutually related categories of 
historical experience, which are fundamental for the understanding and structuring of history. This 
also implies that there exist ‘specific experiential terms and thresholds for each generation, which – 
once institutionalised or passed – can bring about a common history’. Generations are not only a 
social fact because people view themselves as members of a generation, but because the concept of 
generation is used to interpret and order the experiences of social transformations in modern 
society. Generation is a basic historical concept, because it provides a collective category of 
finitude.29  
Thus concepts of generation30 are meant to grasp social transformation as phenomenon of temporal 
acceleration. Furthermore these concepts altogether speak of the young generation without naming 
it.31 Hence, youth represents the dynamics of change and embodies a horizon of expectation, i.e. 
future or the starting off into another future, while at the same time a generation has the task of 
cultural accumulation and cultural creation which also comprises the gathering of experiences of 
former generations.32 It is anchoring these experiences in the present time and at the same time 
framing the unknown horizon of expectations. The young generations appear as agents of future, 
while their respective social images also have to incorporate the experiences of former generations. 
                                                            
27 The term was used by the German author W.G. Sebald and was taken over by social science as an expression of a generational 
affiliation and sense, cf. Jureit, Ulrike (2006): Generationenforschung. [Research on Generations]. Göttingen: Vandenhoeck & 
Ruprecht [u.a.] (Grundkurs neue Geschichte, 2856), p.7. 
28 “The idea of progress which has got to the heart by saying – if shortened – that old and new clash in the science, the arts, between 
countries and between status and classes, has become an everyday experience since the French Revolution. The generations lived in 
a common realm of experience, yet this was split open depending on the different perspectives of political generations and social 
positions. People knew since and still know they live in a period of transition, which scales experiences and expectations 
temporarily.” Koselleck, Reinhart (2003): Vergangene Zukunft. Zur Semantik geschichtlicher Zeiten. Frankfurt am Main: Suhrkamp 
(Suhrkamp-Taschenbuch Wissenschaft, 757), p. 367.  
29 Jureit, Ulrike (2006): Generationenforschung. [Research on Generations]. Göttingen: Vandenhoeck & Ruprecht [u.a.] (Grundkurs 
neue Geschichte, 2856), p. 9.   
30 Above all I refer to the concept of generation by Karl Mannheim: The Problem of Generations. In Karl Mannheim (Ed.): Essays on the 
sociology of knowledge. With assistance of ed. by Paul Kecskemeti. Second impr. London: Routledge & Kegan Paul (International 
Library of sociology and social reconstruction), pp. 276–320. 
31 Cf. for instance Niethammer, Lutz (2003): Sind Generationen identisch? In Jürgen Reulecke (Ed.): Generationalität und 
Lebensgeschichte im 20. Jahrhundert. With assistance of Elisabeth Müller-Luckner. München: Oldenbourg (58), pp. 1–16.  
32  Mannheim, Karl (1959): The Problem of Generations. In Karl Mannheim (Ed.): Essays on the sociology of knowledge. With assistance 
of ed. by Paul Kecskemeti. Second impr. London: Routledge & Kegan Paul (International Library of sociology and social 
reconstruction), pp. 276–320, see esp. pp. 292. 
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Thus a generation carries both conditions of a temporary passage, the actual continuation as long as 
there is human reproduction and the infinity of a horizon, that moves even farther into the distance 
the more one tries to reach it, as well as a cyclical movement.33 The former represents the finitude of 
youth as a period of transition, thus its own, imminent end, while the latter stands for the infinite 
repetition of the same in present time, where realm of experience and horizon of expectation 
converge without really colliding, so that the generational narrative runs the risk of ever repeating 
itself – youth is trapped within social times, as long as the agents are not able to crash the existing 
scope of experience, for a new horizon emerges only if that scope of experiences bursts.34  
Heroes generally are young and can only serve their duty while they are of young age. Mostly heroes 
die while they execute their duties and deeds. The hero, like youth, has to pass tests, an odyssey-like 
period of probation and the hero often is linked to a notion of sacrifice for a certain matter. So the 
hero as well as youth is connected to a certain place – a society – yet his agency is projected into 
another future of that place, which places him outside society. The hero is an outsider yet linked to 
the community through an ascribed function that will guarantee the continuity of that community. 
The core is a trip beyond the present condition towards a future 'somewhere else' led by a certain 
idea that is embodied by the hero or youth.35 
Conclusion  
After reviewing different approaches to conceptualise youth and its conditions of entering adult 
society one has to state that the integration process is subject to rather strict restrictions of existing 
structures and institutions. Political participation of the young generation is thus – even stronger 
than for adult cohorts – determined by, for example, experiences of dissatisfaction, injustice, or 
exclusion, and by people’s everyday routines and their social interdependencies. The relationship 
between youth and society becomes particularly sensible in times of social conflict and 
transformation, since the decision about which symbols, structures and institutions of the collective 
will be taken over to the new configuration of social and political life can result in strong generational 
conflicts. In such times, the youngsters are confronted with a situation in which they both carry the 
burden of embodying the future of society and have the chance to participate actively in the process 
                                                            
33 Cf. Bilstein, Johannes (1996): Zur Metaphorik des Generationenverhältnisses. In: Eckart Liebau, Christoph Wulf (Eds.): Generation. 
Versuche über eine pädagogisch-anthropologische Grundbedingung. Weinheim: Dt. Studien-Verl. (Pädagogische Anthropologie, 3), 
pp. 157–189, on the metaphor of generation, who states that generation as a concept comprises three perspectives side by side: 
relationality, continuity and cyclicity – i.e. defining membership, structuring social time and the cycle of death-rebirth. Hence, 
generation is time and structure. 
34 Cf. Koselleck, Reinhart (2003): Vergangene Zukunft. Zur Semantik geschichtlicher Zeiten. Frankfurt am Main: Suhrkamp (Suhrkamp-
Taschenbuch Wissenschaft, 757), pp. 354. “An unsatisfied prophecy always had been repeatable. Even more so the error, that the 
non-compliance of such an expectation unmasked, turned into an evidence that the apocalyptic prophecy will come true the next 
time, with even greater probability. The iterative structure of apocalyptic expectations induced that contrasting experiences were 
immunised on the ground of this world. They attested ex post the opposite of what they at first seemed to have approved of. They 
were expectations that could not be outrun by obstructing experiences, because they reached beyond the world. … From one 
unsatisfied expectation to the next passed generations, thus a revival of the apocalyptic prophecy was embedded into the natural 
cycle of the generations. Therefore the long-term earthly experiences of everyday life never clashed with those expectations that 
were related to the end of the world. The opposition of Christian expectations and earthly experiences were related to each other, 
yet could not refute each other. The eschatology hence war reproducible to that extent and as long as the realm of experience in this 
world did not fundamentally transformed.” (p. 361)  
35 Lenzen, Dieter (1985): Mythologie der Kindheit. Die Verewigung des Kindlichen in der Erwachsenenkultur; versteckte Bilder und 
vergessene Geschichten. Reinbek: Rowohlt (Rowohlts Enzyklopädie, 421), p. 300. He lists certain characteristics of an heroic story, 
that could be transferred to the stages of psychological development and characteristics of adolescence: e.g. apotheosis of the 
parents, being exposed to special threats, a specific power – omnipotence, the essential task to fight a ‘monster’ (= being an adult), 
which is coped with in several stages, one of which is symbolising some sort of ‘rebirth’ (e.g. as new member of society). 
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of shaping the new structures, still they have to make their way against the powers of persistence of 
the old. 
With the development of a standard of youth, specific characteristics have been ascribed to the 
youth period, one of which being the ability to generate social change within the framework of 
progressive improvement. These standardisations set clear limits to the scope of action and 
development of the young generations, for they are at the same time viewed as carriers of a cultural 
heritage, which the members of a generation shall accumulate and transfer to the subsequent 
generations. A generational change, which naturally is underway, hence is understood as necessary 
feature of the continuation of society and consequently is a category of a social order, as it structures 
individual as well as social experiences and determines social membership. Generations, and as a 
rule young generations, are conceptualised as category of social action, particularly as initiators of 
renewal. 
A new beginning is a critical point for any social structure, which primarily is wishing for stability and 
continuation beyond the present generation. Yet, every social structure inherently exists with a 
specific expectation towards its future. “Youth is the future of our society” is an articulation of such 
a, yet completely unspecified, expectation. It is open for any projection between the two poles 
‘danger for society’ and ‘chance of society’. Youth here is no longer a causal, functional concept but 
turns into a semantic conceptualisation within a system of meanings which structure a social system 
and provides it with sense, that legitimises the order and binds its members. One essential element 
of legitimation and membership commitment is the assurance of a predictable future existence for 
society. Still, future is not completely predictable or statistically deducible. In a temporal order of 
society future by nature is the unknown and not assignable. Hence, social structures produce an 
imagery that will repress the uncertainties the course of time indispensably implies, either through 
rituals, myths as in traditional societies or through mechanisms of controlling, such as images of 
modern youth. 
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Part II – Youth and Politics in the Southern and Eastern Mediterranean 
Youth as Political Actors after the “Arab Spring”: The Case of Tunisia 
Carolina Silveira 
Introduction 
The series of demonstrations now commonly known as the “Arab Spring” ignited the Arab world in 
2010/2011, and saw young people taking to the streets to protest against their corrupt government 
system hoping to make a change. The initial spark that aroused this wave of protests took place in 
Tunisia, as a humble fruit vendor set himself ablaze after being humiliated, beaten and robbed by 
police officers. The protests in Tunisia, which have since been dubbed the “Tunisian Revolution”, 
expanded across the Middle East in a domino effect that attracted attention the world over, largely 
thanks to young bloggers who organized demonstrations, filmed events as they happened, and 
distributed information online. There is no denying the widespread attention garnered by the Arab 
spring demonstrations, but we must now consider the results and political changes achieved since 
these events. The focus of this paper lies on youth political involvement in Tunisia, with the aim of 
providing an understanding of the ways in which young people have tried to gain influence, both 
through traditional politics, as well as through alternative methods of political engagement, such as 
civil society groups and social networking sites. The demographics in Tunisian society will be 
considered as a starting point, followed by an investigation of youth political representation.  
Before delving into an analysis of young people as political actors, it is important to define ‘youth’ 
and to look at the demographics that shape society in Arab world, and more specifically, in Tunisia. In 
the context of the Arab spring, however, this task is not as straightforward as it might seem. In 
‘Problematizing Arab Youth’, Emma Murphy points out that little attention has been given by 
scholars to the difficulties of identifying ‘on whom the term [youth] might legitimately be conferred 
or what constitutes the set of interests and identities which enable ‘youths’ to cohere into a distinct 
sub-set’.36 However, focusing on how we frame the youth segment is essential if we are to 
understand ‘who they were, what it was they wanted or their significance as a rising social and 
political force’37 in Tunisia. Although often described as a youth led movement, many who were 
deeply engaged in the protests may have fallen outside of the ‘youth’ age bracket, which according 
to UNESCO (the United Nations’ educational, scientific and cultural organization), lies between the 
ages of 15 and 24. This strict classification becomes more complex with UNESCO’s additional 
understanding of ‘youth’ as a ‘period of transition from the dependence of childhood to adulthood’s 
independence and awareness of our interdependence as members of a community.’38 Taking the 
latter definition as a point of analysis, ‘youth’ becomes a fluid segment rather than a fixed age group. 
This conceptualization serves the purposes of this paper well, as many involved in the Arab Spring 
demonstrations may have fallen outwith the 15 to 24 age bracket, but found themselves in a period 
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 Mediterranean Politics 17, no. 1 (2012): p. 2. 
37 Ibid. 
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of transition between dependency and adulthood. It is important to keep in mind, however, that the 
statistics used throughout this paper come from secondary sources, and therefore reflect age 
categories of ‘youth’ as used in each particular research cited; the general idea of ‘youth’ will 
nonetheless retain its broader meaning. 
Conceptualising Tunisia’s youth 
The ‘youth’ segment, particularly in the context of the Arab world, can be analysed in a variety of 
ways, as Murphy explains. She proposes four different approaches to conceptualising the Arab youth: 
1) as a demographic ‘bulge’; 2) as a human resources issue; 3) as a stage of transition into adulthood; 
and 4) as a constructed identity.39 Looking firstly at the so-called demographic bulge, there is no 
denying that the Arab world is home to an overwhelmingly young population, with 65% of all 
residents in this region being under 25 in 2012.40 However, some demographic differences can be 
identified between the various countries in the Arab region. Tunisia’s demographics skew towards an 
intermediate age structure, with 40% percent of the population being under-25.41 This strongly 
contrasts with countries like Yemen, where the percentage of under-25s is closer to 70%.42 When we 
consider the demographics in Western countries, however, even Tunisia’s intermediate age structure 
appears strikingly young. Taking some European countries as examples, the under-25 population in 
2014 lies at 29% in the UK, 23% in Germany, 24% in Italy, and 24% Greece.  
A youthful demographic can have an undeniable impact on society and politics, particularly with 
regard to human resources.43 Unemployment rates, for example, are often higher in countries with 
such a large proportion of young people. Considering that under-25s are a segment of the population 
less likely to have significant work experience, and taking into account the sparse employment 
opportunities even for the highly qualified, some assert that ‘the spark that ignited the uprising was 
not a cry for democracy but a demand for jobs.’44 Unemployment statistics certainly corroborate this 
theory, with unemployment standing at 30% among 15 to 24 year olds in Tunisia in 2010.45 For the 
highly skilled youth, i.e. those with higher education, the rates were at a staggering 61%.46  
The increasing enrolment demand on all education sectors has also posed a problem for young 
people, leaving many without the skills or qualifications necessary to compete in the job market. The 
struggle to find employment or to receive an appropriate education in order to develop their skills, 
leads to a generation that feels excluded and marginalized from society, unable to contribute to the 
working community and often lacking future prospects. Young people are thus prevented from 
                                                            
39  Murphy, “Problematizing Arab Youth”, 7. 
40  Floris, Sylvie. "Youth, those Anti-Heroes of the Arab Spring." IEMed Mediterranean Yearbook (2012): 2. Accessed March 8, 2014. 
http://www.iemed.org/observatori-en/arees-danalisi/arxius-adjunts/anuari/med.2012/Floris_en.pdf. 
41  Index Mundi. "Tunisia Demographics Profile." Accessed March 9, 2014. 
http://www.indexmundi.com/tunisia/demographics_profile.html. 
42  Inter Press Service News. "Young Yemen Multiplies Without Growth." Accessed March 9, 2014. 
http://www.ipsnews.net/2013/06/young-yemen-multiplies-without-growth/ 
43  Murphy, “Problematizing Arab Youth”, 7. 
44  El-Khawas, Mohamed A. "Tunisia’s Jasmine Revolution: Causes and Impact." Mediterranean Quarterly 23, no. 4 (2012): 8.  
45  IIham Haouas, Edward Sayre, and Mahmoud Yagoubi. "Youth unemployment in Tunisia: Characteristics and policy responses." Topics 
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entering the transitional phase into adulthood, as they cannot marry or even move out of their 
parents’ home without a fixed income.47  
This brings us to the final categorization of the Arab youth as an independent, constructed identity. 
Floris asserts that the youth in the Tunisian society ‘were in a position of “sub-citizens,” which 
explains why the first word to be chanted at demonstrations was “dignity”’.48 The feeling of 
disaffection within this large youth segment was undoubtedly aggravated by the failure of the 
government to appropriately deal with the difficulties they faced. This failure can be largely affiliated 
to state corruption, repression, lack of investment in the underdeveloped central and western 
regions of the country, and an education system that did not provide young people with the skills 
required for the few employment opportunities available.49 Three years after the revolution, 
Tunisia’s unemployment rate has risen to 42% among young people,50 indicating that the socio-
economic problems facing them still remain. Although the circumstances that led to the Arab Spring 
cannot be simplified into one single issue, it is clear that the youth, frustrated with the difficulties 
directly affecting them and desiring a change from this ‘sub-citizen’ existence, were at the heart of 
the movement.  
Youth representation in Tunisian politics 
The following section considers the extent to which the youth in Tunisia achieved the changes that 
they strove for. When regarding the level of satisfaction with politics, one of the first questions to ask 
is whether young people feel represented by the politicians in power, or simply whether they are 
being heard. In this regard, it seems that not much has changed. According to a poll conducted by 
the Al Jazeera Studies Centre in 2013, 81% of young people (17-31) do not feel represented by the 
Constituent Assembly, and only 14% claim that the revolution has been a success.51 Tunisia Live, a 
news website created by a group of young Tunisians in the aftermath of the Tunisian Revolution, 
reported that in the 2011 parliamentary elections, only 17% of Tunisia’s youth (aged 18 to 25) 
registered to vote.52 Alarmingly, out of those who did vote in the 2011 election, 14% said they would 
not vote again.53 Sarah Dickson’s article on voter trend in Tunisia deals with the puzzling question of 
why some young people ‘seem to have “given up” on the effectiveness of voting’,54 despite 
expressing an interest in political change. The interviews she conducted reveal a wide array of 
political opinions, but one unifying trend: although most young people were uninvolved in politics 
before the revolution, they have now become extremely interested in political developments.55  
                                                            
47  Murphy, “Problematizing Arab Youth”, 10. 
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51 World Bulletin. "Arab youth feel alienated from politics." Accessed March 9, 2014. 
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The disengagement from voting among the youth can be attributed to many factors, one of which is 
the persisting distrust of political parties and the political system in general.56 Many were dissatisfied 
with the election results of 2011, and complained that the new government showed similar problems 
to the regime under Ben Ali. The fact that around a quarter of National Constituent Assembly (NCA) 
members switched party affiliations since they were elected only serves to worsen the situation.57 
Furthermore, a consensus on what a democracy entails is still lacking in Tunisia; according to 
Dickson, a period of ‘political learning’ is required in order to transition to a long-lasting democratic 
system, but young Tunisians have not yet developed a ‘collective sense of democratic values.’58 Some 
young people even question how they can feel represented when many parties are still led by 
significantly older politicians.59 Beji Caid Essebsi, leader of the secular party Nidaa Tounes is 88 years 
old, much older than the Tunisian life expectancy of 74, and was elected President in December 
2014.60 
Youth involvement in traditional politics 
Since much of the youth in Tunisia disapprove of the politicians in power, it is interesting to analyse 
the involvement of young people in traditional politics, i.e. as active policy makers. The National 
Constituent Assembly (NCA) is taken as an example here, as it was the first legislative body drafting 
policies and the new constitution after the Tunisian revolution. Out of 217 members of the NCA, 9 
were under 30 (4%), while the vast majority were over 50 (76%).61 These numbers are not entirely 
surprising, since an analysis of age structure of constituent representatives in many Western 
countries might reveal similarly low numbers of young people. What makes these figures a cause for 
concern is the aforementioned demographic youth ‘bulge. Considering that such a large proportion 
of the population is under 30, and this segment of society is arguably suffering the most from the 
current economical and political climate, it is worrisome that they only represent 4% of the NCA. 
However, many young people show no interest in being politicians themselves, or even being 
affiliated with political parties. From those who did join a party after the revolution, many withdrew 
after elections because they were disappointed with the strategies of these parties and the lack of 
cohesion and collaboration of ideas, especially between the younger and the older members. Young 
people interviewed by Tunisia Live claimed that belonging to a political party means committing to 
speak in the name of the party, which takes away the freedom to act or express personal opinions.62 
Few young people hold decision-making positions due to lack of political experience; and yet they are 
consistently denied opportunities to gain this experience. The new institution responsible for 
organizing and supervising the elections, Instance Supérieure Indépendante pour les Eléctions (ISIE), 
has been described as the authority responsible for ‘ensuring democratic, free, pluralistic, fair and 
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transparent elections’.63 However, this important political body has established a minimum age of 35 
and at least 10 years of experience as prerequisites for membership, making young people 
automatically ineligible to apply for a position. 
In the run-up to the legislative and presidential elections of 2014, some changes in favour of younger 
people can be observed in the political system. Around 40% of newly registered voters were between 
the ages of 18 and 30.64 Furthermore, due to amendments in the law regarding legislative elections, 
every electoral list must now contain at least one candidate under the age of 30 among the top 3 
candidates on the list.65 But despite the encouraging number of registered young voters, getting 
young people to turn up on voting day still poses a challenge. Many remain disconnected from the 
political process, blaming their reluctance to vote on the lack of reliable information and a distrust of 
political parties.66 To counter this perception, Civil Society Organisations (CSOs) have been working 
tirelessly to improve youth participation in Tunisian politics. According to Mohamed Madhkour, the 
liaison between the ISIE and Civil Society Organisations, ‘young people in CSOs are a primary reason 
why [ISIE] received the [large] number of [voter] registrations from younger age groups.’67  
Civil Society Organisations in Tunisia 
Frustrated with institutionalized political participation, there is a growing sentiment among the youth 
of Tunisia pointing to the idea that to really incite change, the best course of action is to work with 
civil society rather than to engage in traditional politics, with many now undertaking more informal 
paths towards building their nation’s future. Tunisia has experienced a sudden wave of new youth-
led civil society organizations (CSOs) since the Revolution, including non-governmental organizations 
(NGOs), faith based organizations and more. Although CSOs existed under the Ben Ali regime, the 
restrictions on such groups made it very difficult for them to operate. These laws were reformed by 
the interim government after the revolution, providing CSOs and their donors and funders with 
freedom from ‘oppressive legal impediments’.68 These organizations have become an important part 
of the democratization process and have shaped political culture. The participation of civil society in 
the political process is generally seen as necessary and legitimate among democracy advocates. CSOs 
can generally take on two prevailing roles: Creating dialogue, and/or providing services. In the case of 
Tunisia, many CSOs tend to act as lobbyists, watchdogs against corruption, or educators of citizens’ 
rights.  
The organization ‘I Watch Tunisia’ for instance has been successful in exerting some influence in 
political decision-making. They have monitored the progress of the NCA on the Tunisian constitution, 
creating a website where people can voice their opinion, and vote on each article of the constitution. 
                                                            
63  The International Republican Institute. “Tunisia Elections Dispatch.” Accessed September 26, 2014. 
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Shortly after Tunisia’s NCA was elected, ‘I Watch Tunisia’ also held a ‘mock’ assembly, i.e. a simulated 
version of the NCA, in which 217 youths from throughout Tunisia proposed legislation for their 
country’s future. These suggestions were then brought before real NCA members as 
recommendations during a press conference. Some of the proposed legislations even caught the 
interest of the NCA members, who chose 3 of the recommendations for further development.69 
Moreover, ‘I Watch Tunisia’ hosted the International Anti-Corruption conference (IACC) in 2014, the 
first to be held in the Arab World. Mouheb Garoui, president of ‘I Watch’, talks about the importance 
of the event: 
‘This is an honour for the Tunisian civil society working on transparency and fighting corruption. It’s a 
kind of official recognition of the role of youth in this transitional period.’70 
For many young people, CSOs allow more political freedom as they do not involve partisan alliance, 
which in turn makes it easier to create dialogue between holders of opposing political ideologies. 
This is particularly important since much of the political scene in Tunisia is dominated by the conflict 
between secular and religious parties.71  
In the context of the 2014 elections, CSOs have played a significant role in engaging the youth of 
Tunisia. More than 2,500 volunteers from 140 CSOs worked together with the ISIE to increase voter 
registration, with the majority of volunteers being under the age of 30.72 The CSOs Swaty and I watch 
Tunisia organised events targeted at young people in a bid to ‘take registration papers to 
them…rather than wait for them to come to us’.73 Other CSOs aimed to help already registered 
young voters to make informed decisions on voting day. JID Tunisie (Independent Young Democrats 
of Tunisia) targeted the undecided or less politically active youth, helping them to find a political 
party that fits their interests. Al Bawsala, an organisation composed entirely of Tunisian activists 
under 30, has posted online the profiles of politicians running in the elections in order to help young 
people make more informed decisions.  
However, there are limits on the extent to which CSOs are able to assist in achieving democratic 
change. The role of religion as a threat to this transition is an issue raised by some scholars: ‘for every 
organisation in favour of democratization, there is likely to be another in favour of more conservative 
social values’.74 Money can also be an issue for the sustained work of these organizations. Some rely 
on foreign funding, but this can raise questions over motivation and expectation. Foreign funding of 
CSOs can ‘narrow the space for independent civil society’, as it sometimes undermines home-grown 
initiatives.75 A further limitation lies in the fact that the work of CSOs has not expanded in rural areas 
to the same extent that it has in urban regions of the country. Nonetheless, it seems that the rise in 
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Civil Society Organizations has been a positive outcome from the revolution by allowing young 
people to become more engaged in politics.  
Social networking sites 
Another relevant element of youth politics in Tunisia has been the Internet, or more specifically, 
social networking sites (SNS). It is commonly known that young activists successfully used social 
media to organize the protests in 2010/2011. But does the Internet play a political role in Tunisia 
today? Many would argue that social networking websites are indeed a major forum through which 
the youth can be politically involved. The study conducted by Dickson shows that many young people 
feel they are able to keep politically informed through Facebook: ‘When asked how they are involved 
in politics, many reported that they post political statuses on Facebook to express their opinions.’76 
Furthermore, according to her study, the youth seemed ‘excited and proud to be able to keep up 
with politics and share their opinions with others [online].’77 Another study by Breuer and Groshek 
showed similarly positive findings. They claim that SNS are perceived by young people as a reliable 
source of political information and a safe forum for exchanging opinions.78 The Internet has also 
taken on the role of ‘uncensored news agency’ allowing for free and more importantly – independent 
– news feeds.79 Furthermore, it can be a way for the Tunisian diaspora to be involved in the 
developments in their country.80 Poell and Darmoni point out for example, that the use of Twitter 
during the revolution was of ‘crucial importance for the transnational communication process’81, as it 
allowed those in Tunisia to reach diaspora networks, fostering quick diffusion of news.   
Conclusion 
In conclusion, despite the difficulties still facing the youth of Tunisia, and their disillusionment with 
election results after the Tunisian Revolution, it seems that the fall of Ben Ali brought about a change 
in attitude among young people. Youth engagement in Tunisian politics ranged from little to no 
involvement before the revolution due to Ben Ali’s restrictive governance. The old system held 
control over almost every aspect of social society, including the media, CSOs, political parties and 
education. For many, taking a neutral stance seemed like the only viable option under the old 
regime.82 In the aftermath of the revolution, drastic changes took place with regard to the 
involvement of Tunisia’s youth in political movements. Most young people now express a real 
interest in the political developments of their country. How they find agency, however, can differ 
from person to person. Social media continues to play an important role in this population segment, 
just as it did during the protests. Facebook for example, has become a vital way to freely voice 
opinions on political issues. Furthermore, many young people seem to be drawn towards Civil Society 
Organisations rather than traditional political channels due to lingering problems of cohesion within 
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party lines, distrust of the political system, restrictive age requirements, and a lack of information. As 
some scholars have observed, Tunisia is in a political learning process necessary for democratic 
transition. It remains to be seen how the situation will develop in the coming years, and whether this 
new attitude to politics will be enough to create lasting change. 
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From The Core To The Fringe? The Political Role of Libyan Youth During And After 
The Revolution 
Anna Lührmann 
In 2011, Libyan youth activists – armed and unarmed – were at the core of the revolution and 
vigorously demanded the fall of the Gaddafi regime. Many harbored idealistic expectations for a 
rapid transformation of the country and immediate and genuine inclusion in political and economic 
processes. The first transitional elections took place in July 2012. It seems that the political 
representation of youth in Libya was higher during the revolution than in the formal institutions of 
the “New Libya”. How has the political participation of young Libyans evolved during and after the 
revolution? Youth political participation refers here to the meaningful and effective inclusion of 
relatively young people in the decision-making process. This broad youth definition includes anyone 
between 15 and 35. Youth political participation can be divided into consultative, youth-led or 
collaborative youth participation (Lührmann 2013: 16, based on Hart 1992, Landsdown 2010, Karkara 
2011). In this paper, the main focus is on collaborative youth participation, which refers to young 
people being effectively included in regular political decision-making processes (e.g. as voters, as 
Members of Parliament (MPs), as members of political parties or advocacy groups).  
In many countries, we can observe the following phenomena: Youth tend to be active on the streets, 
but continue to be marginalized in formal decision-making bodies. In transitional processes, 
significant frustration is likely to arise if youth are not included in new formal decision-making 
procedures. This might have a destabilizing effect on the democratization process and accelerate 
conflict dynamics. It is therefore important to understand barriers to the political participation of 
youth. Barriers can be found on various levels - individual, organizational and structural (UNDP 2008: 
6). This approach will serve as the analytical framework for the second part of the paper. This paper 
draws on three field visits to Tripoli that included discussions with Libyan civil society 
representatives, MPs, civil servants as well as representatives of the international community.1 The 
empirical analysis is enhanced with data from the 6th Wave of the World Value Survey. The 
conceptual framework draws from a recent publication on youth political participation on behalf of 
UNDP (Lührmann 2013). As of spring 2014, the political situation in Libya has become highly chaotic 
and all formal governance institutions are highly contested (Lacher 2014). Hence, this article 
addresses the revolutionary period in 2011 and the brief period of relative calm in post-Gaddafi Libya 
until the ouster of Prime Minister Ali Zeidan in March 2014. 
Taking stock: Political participation of youth during and after the revolution in Libya   
1. Revolutionary Period (February 2011 - July 2012) 
Inspired by the fall of Ben Ali in Tunisia, a mostly young movement of Libyans started mobilizing for a 
“Day of Revolt” on February 17, protesting against the human rights violations of the Gadhafi regime 
(Lindgren 2013: 210). The arrest of a young human rights activist, Fathi Terbil, on February 15 further 
fueled protests.2 The February 17 movement quickly spread throughout the country. Protests were 
met with severe repression and military action from the side of the regime. During the following civil 
                                                            
1  5-12 July 2012, 6-13 October 2012 and 25-29 January 2013. 
2 BBC Online, 16.2.11. 
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war, youth took vital roles in the armed militias, media and online activism as well as in humanitarian 
aid work.3  The Libyan Youth Movement and other young activists used social media for mobilization 
and self-organization. There are some indications that these activities played a vital role for the 
revolution. Lindgren shows in an in-depth analysis of tweets on 17 February how twitter helped 
activists to subvert Libya’s restricted media landscape (Lindgren 2013). The majority of Libyans below 
35 indicate in 2013 that they use the Internet daily.4 Hence, chances are high that online mobilization 
reached many youth in 2011. Facebook also provided a platform for the Libyan Youth Movement to 
share news and develop their political agenda (Sommer et al 2013). However, only a small fraction of 
Libyans seem to have used Facebook in 2010: 2,4 % according to The Guardian (2014). Additionally, 
the Libyan Youth Movement may have been highly relevant in the initial days of the uprising, but did 
not emerge as a leading actor in the revolutionary struggle. Hence, online and youth-led activities 
probably played a vital role in the early days of the Libyan revolution, but they also should not be 
overrated. Gaddafi did not fall because of twitter but because people took to the streets and because 
of the civil war and NATO’s military intervention.  
Already during the revolution, youth were sidelined in important decision-making bodies. In the main 
governance authority of the revolution and later of the first months of post-Gaddafi Libya – the 
National Transitional Council (NTC) – Fathi Terbil apparently was the only youth representative 
present (Murphy 2011). Elder men representing their cities and tribes seemed to dominate the NTC. 
Traditional non-state governance institutions, such as tribal leadership, are often based on seniority 
or lineage and hence tend not to encourage the inclusion of youth in political decision-making. After 
the liberation of Tripoli, an interim government under Abdurrahim El-Keib took office in November 
2011. In his cabinet, the above-mentioned young human rights activist, Fathi Terbil, became Minister 
of Youth. After a brief discussion with him in Tripoli in October 2012, it remained unclear if and how 
he actually tried or managed to feed youth views in the interim government's decision-making.   
2. First Transitional Elections and Their Aftermath (July 2012 - Nov 2012)  
The first transitional election in Libya took place on July 7, 2012. 82% of all eligible voters registered 
and 62% of registered persons turned out to vote (EU EAT 2012: 14, 34). Apparently, “Libyans 
needed to vote.”5 Local and international observers (Grifa 2012) consistently describe the 
atmosphere in Libya during the election day and shortly afterwards as “party time”.6 Overall, the 
elections were perceived as a central achievement of the revolution. 
On 8 August 2012, the General National Congress took over power from the National Transitional 
Council. Congress members had been elected in competitive, multi-party elections. There were 
several Members of Parliament below the age of 30. Particularly on women’s and political party lists, 
young candidates had a chance. For example, Hana Jibril, a 26-year-old dentist from Misrata, served 
on the Budget Committee. However, the overall representation of the mostly young revolutionary 
fighters in the GNC was "weak" (Lacher 2013). The former revolutionary fighters still enjoyed a high 
                                                            
3  Der Tagespiegel, 14.10.12. 
4  Data from the 6th wave oft he World Value Survey (2013); Frequency of internet use as information source (Under 35/ Over 35): 
50%/24% Daily; 11/9% Weekly; 6/5% Monthly; 4/5 % Less than monthly; 30/58% Never; Non-responses are excluded (3%).   
5  Personal communication, Western diplomat, Tripoli 9.7.12 
6          BBC News, 7.7.12. 
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degree of public trust and admiration, but were largely excluded from the official institutions of the 
“New Libya”.  
3. Government of Ali Zeidan (November 2012 - March 2014)  
Following the elections, it took the General National Congress until November 2012 to appoint a 
Prime Minister - Ali Zeidan - and to approve his cabinet.7 In Ali Zeidan’s cabinet, no minister was 
below 40 years old. The Minister for Youth and Sports, Abdulsalam Abdullah Guaila, was 45 years old 
when he took office.8 He left the cabinet together with other members of the Justice and 
Construction Party (Libyan Muslim Brotherhood) in January 2014.9 Little is known about his work. I 
was only able to find the following tweet about his ministry: “Was Stuck in traffic near sports + youth 
ministry #Libya. Youngest in or out at least 50 and if obesity is a sport they'd get the gold medal.” 
(@misrati_free on twitter; 30.8.13). Some civil society organisations (CSO) featuring youth leaders or 
youth issues were established during and after the revolution (Clément et al 2013). Nevertheless, 
elder men seem to dominate the political debates in post-revolutionary Libya, for example the Grand 
Mufti Sadeq Al-Ghariani (Lacher 2013). 
Public Opinion  
Regardless of this underrepresentation of youth and tremendous governance problems, such as the 
deteriorating security situation, the vast majority of young Libyans (64%) still seemed to believe that 
their revolution was “successful” in summer 2013. This is the finding of an opinion poll conducted by 
the Al Jazeera Centre for Studies in April/Mai 2013.10 According to this poll, only 24% of Libyan youth 
think that their country needs a “revision of leadership.” Likewise, only 11% of young Libyans are 
reported to believe that the elections were not free and fair as opposed to 38% of Egyptians. 
According to this poll, the motives for revolution also differ in the three North African countries. In 
Libya, most respondents cite civil and political rights, whereas in Tunisia dignity and economic 
conditions were on the minds of youth. In Egypt, corruption was the main concern reported.11  
The recent wave of the World Value Survey, conducted in Libya in 2013, with a total of 2131 
respondents, allows further insights into Libyan public opinion in this crucial phase of Libya’s history 
(WVS). About half of the respondents are below 35 years (45%). 38% of young respondents state 
they have attended peaceful demonstrations as opposed to 26% of respondents above 35 (see Figure 
1). This resonates with the picture of a “youth revolt.” The data also reflects the recent wave of 
political activism in Libya. The 6th Wave of the World Values Survey (WVS) records attitudes for 39 
different countries on the question of participation in political demonstrations. Among all countries, 
Libya is the country with the highest share of respondents claiming they have attended a peaceful 
demonstration in the past. On average across the world, 12% of respondents claim to have attended 
peaceful demonstrations compared to 30% in Libya.  
 
                                                            
7  Libya Herald, 3.11.12. 
8  Libya Herald, 3.11.12. 
9  Al Ahram, 21.1.14. 
10  AJE, 30.7.13. 
11  AJE, 30.7.13. 
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Figure 1: Attitudes towards Attending Peaceful Political Demonstrations in Libya 2013 (WVS) 
 
Source: Own illustration based on data from 6th Wave of World Value Survey (N=2, 131). The survey participants declining to answer this 
question are not included here (3%; “Don’t know” or “No answer”).    
The World Value Survey also provides some indications about the societal position of youth. On the 
one hand, 62% of respondents state that most people in Libya would place people in their 20s at a 
rather low position in society. Correspondingly, 61% would place people in their 40s at a relatively 
high position. This suggests that there might be a cultural barrier to a higher participation of youth in 
politics. On the other hand, 69% of respondents state that most people in Libya would accept it if a 
“suitably qualified 30 year old” was appointed as their boss. Similarly, 65% agree or strongly agree 
that “old people have too much political influence” (Figure 2). The age group of respondents does 
not matter for the response rates described in this paragraph. These findings suggest that Libyan 
society might be willing to accept more youth political leadership in the future, even though they 
describe the current societal position of youth as relatively low. 
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Figure 2: "Old People Have too Much Political Power" (WVS Libya 2013) 
 
Source: Own illustration based on data from 6th Wave of World Value Survey (N=2,131). The survey participants declining to answer to this 
question are not included here (9%; “Don’t know” or “No answer”).    
Youth marginalization in post-Gaddafi Libya: Reasons and Ways Ahead   
Based on the empirical findings, the initial thesis – political representation of youth in Libya was 
higher during the revolution than after - needs to be modified. Youth representation during the 
revolutionary period and after the election was actually quite similar. Both during and after the 
revolution, the important role that youth played in the streets and in the militias was not translated 
into important roles in more formal decision-making bodies. What are the reasons behind this 
misbalance? In many other countries, we can observe similar phenomena. Youth are active in the 
streets and continue to be marginalized in formal decision-making bodies (Ellis 2007, Golombeck 
2002, MacKinnon et al 2007). Barriers to youth political participation may be found on three levels: 
individual, organizational and structural (UNDP 2008:6). 
The level of individual capacity is a starting point for explanation. The mere presence of youth in 
formal institutions (e.g. as MPs) is not enough. Rather, elected representatives need the capacities 
and skills to effectively participate in the decision-making process. Here, young people can often be 
sidelined if they lack knowledge or technical skills to participate meaningfully. However, in Libya in 
2012 this point should not have been relevant, as all MPs were new to their job. Youth 
representatives also have the advantage that they were not involved in high ranks of the Gaddafi 
regime and hence may have a higher credibility. Therefore it is actually surprising that the Libyan 
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interim authorities did not tap into the fresh resource of young personnel more often. During the 
transition process in Eastern Europe, young technocrats quickly rose to become ministers in the 
1990s. Particularly in the light of Libya’s Integrity Law, the Eastern European experience might be an 
interesting inspiration for the Libyan case. The Integrity Law, passed in May 2013, excluded anyone 
with responsible positions under Gaddafi from political offices and hence decimated the pool of 
available political leadership personnel (Lacher 2014: 2). This opportunity to give young people more 
political responsibility was regrettably missed. 
On the organizational level, functioning civil society organizations or political parties that may be 
intermediaries between the youth population and the political elites are lacking. There are some 
active youth civil society organizations (e.g. H2O), but their outreach to youth particularly outside of 
a narrow elite is doubtful. Instead, many young people continue to be organized in armed militias. 
With weapons in their hand they storm ministries and parliaments in order to fight for their demands 
– often successfully.12 It will be critical for the “New Libya” to find a way to channel political 
grievances in peaceful and constructive deliberation processes. This would also foster the meaningful 
engagement of youth. 
The restrained political role of youth might also be attributed to patriarchal social constraints in the 
societal environment, giving limited room to the equal participation of youth and women. The 
transition from childhood to adulthood in the MENA region is often characterized as period of 
“waithood.” Young men spend their most energetic years waiting for a job in order to be eligible for 
marriage. Due to persistent political and social exclusion, youth are left in a passive state (UNDP 
Egypt 2010). The revolution has not managed to break away all of these barriers. The analysis of the 
World Value Survey data suggests that young people still have a lower social status in Libya than 
people in their 40s. However, the survey data also shows that a vast majority of Libyans seems to 
believe that the older generation holds too much political power. This discontent might eventually 
lead to behavioral and social change, and allow for the inclusion of youth in the political process. 
Additionally, it has to be considered that Libyan society is deeply fragmented into numerous groups – 
tribal, religious, regional (Lacher 2013). It is probably safe to assume that for many youth the 
similarities with other, older people from their alliance are higher than with other youth from 
opposing (political) groups. In other words, factors other than age might matter more for political 
identity and societal cleavages.  
Conclusion 
Compared to their vital role during the revolution, the inclusion of youth in formal decision-making 
bodies in post-revolutionary Libya was meager. This can be attributed to various factors, mainly in 
the organizational and structural realm. In order to further shed light on this issue a comparison with 
neighboring Egypt might be fruitful. The solution to end youth exclusion from political processes 
does not lie in the capacities of individual youth alone. Political structures and processes have to 
change in order to include the voices of young people and their procedural preferences. In a nutshell, 
the socio-political environment, organizations and youth all have to change in order to move closer 
together. Unfortunately, many activities aimed at enhancing youth political participation target 
                                                            
12 Libya Herald, 12.2.13. 
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individual capacities only and neglect the social and political environment. This is not enough to 
substantially enhance youth political participation.  
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The Attractiveness of Political Islam for Youth in North Africa 
Charlotte Biegler-König 
Introduction 
Following the fall of the Mubarak regime in February 2011, mass protests took place for over two 
years in Egypt. The protests intensified with the prohibition of the Muslim Brotherhood in September 
2013 and their subsequent labelling as a ‘terrorist organisation’ on 25 December13. A striking feature 
of the rallies was the large number of young demonstrators and protesters. In particular, young 
people and students took to the streets after 25 January 2011: for the overthrow of president 
Mubarak, for new elections, secularism, for fewer Islamic Sharia laws in the Constitution, both for 
and against the new government, and against the military coup. At the centre of the Egyptian riots 
were young people demanding a future. They argued particularly controversially about the religious 
orientation of the Egyptian Constitution. It is important to note that religion did not play a role in the 
initial protests, and that it only became an issue after Mubarak’s fall. The same can be observed in 
Tunisia. The protests here were less violent, and political reforms were able to advance more 
steadily, but in the process of negotiating the new constitution, Islamic activists did also play an 
important role. Since the successful overthrow of former dictator Ben Ali, new freedom has been 
found, and the number of young people joining Islamist groups, in particular Salafists, increased 
drastically after the Tunisian revolution. 
It is interesting, therefore, to examine how the younger generation understands ‘Islam’ as a political 
and/or social-religious role model. Why are Islamic parties and movements so attractive to North 
African youth? The focus of this article is youth in Egypt. But for reasons of diversity, the young 
generation in Tunisia will be considered for a comparison in various points. First, the term ‘political 
Islam’, which Salafism14 can also be assigned to (also referred to as Salafism?), needs to be clarified, 
as well as the meaning of ‘post-Islamism’. Following this, the situation of young people in Egypt and 
Tunisia will be explained in detail. The third part will provide a brief insight into the concept of 
identity formation. Based on the discussion of two political groups, the appeal of political Islam will 
be analysed as an identity-creating element and as a mobilising incentive. 
Political Islam and Post-Islamism 
The protests in Egypt since Mubarak’s fall suggest a divided society. Whereas demonstrations against 
Sharia law in the Constitution took place during Mursi's presidency, following the banning of the 
Muslim Brotherhood, many took to the streets demonstrating in favour of its claim to power. Here, 
two different conceptions clash over the role of religion in the state. While many young people want 
a liberal constitution and see religion as a private affair, others feel it is the state's duty to enforce 
religious law. These two opposing ideas are represented by the concepts of political Islam and Post-
Islamism. 
Political Islam, also known as ‘Islamism’, defines Islam not only as a religion but also as a guide for a 
specific social order and political system. A separation of religion and state is not wanted. On the 
                                                            
13  Zeit Online (2013): Ägypten stuft Muslimbrüder als Terrororganisation ein. URL: http://www.zeit.de/politik/ausland/2013-
12/aegypten-muslimbrueder-terror-organis¬ation (Stand 07.01.2014). 
14 Salafism (Arabic ) means ancestors, the ‘ancients’ or predecessors. 
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contrary: politics should take place within a religious context15. The starting point is the seventh 
century, the time of the Prophet Muhammad, when he not only promoted Islam, but also worked as 
a legislator and military leader. The Quran and the Hadiths (‘traditions’) written down by the tenth 
century jointly form the basis for Sharia law, which regulates both prayers and fasting as well as 
defining marriage, and family, inheritance and penal law. Moreover, Sharia specifies the situation of 
non-Muslims and describes Jihad as a means for expansion. Political Islam dictates all areas of life 
and thus provides a return to ‘original Islam’. 
This idea of a radical political Islam including the application of Sharia law and the practice of Jihad, 
however, dates back to the 20th century16. The first major Islamist movement was the Muslim 
Brotherhood founded in Egypt in 1928. The Muslim Brotherhood gained much ground. As a contrast 
to the poor governance of the authoritarian regime at the time, it advocated a political system 
focused closely on political Islam. The same applies to Islamic groups in Tunisia. The Ennahda party17 
is ideologically close to the Egyptian Muslim Brotherhood. 
Salafism, in turn, preaches an extreme form of political Islam. The Salafist groups themselves do not 
constitute a homogeneous group, but cover a wide spectrum ranging from Salafist parties to 
charitable organisations, but also to radical individuals18. However, other than the more 
pragmatically oriented Muslim Bothers eager to take over the government, they share the same 
fundamental conviction of striving for and returning to the religious ideals according to the example 
of the Prophet Muhammad and the first generation of his followers.19 
An alternative to the conventional definition of ‘political Islam’ is the definition of ‘post- Islamism’20. 
It is based on an understanding of Islam, which is compatible with modernity, i.e. the 7th century is 
no longer perceived as an element of a normative, or idealist model: “Post-Islamism is not anti-
Islamic or secular; a post-Islamist movement dearly upholds religion but also highlights citizens' 
rights. It aspires to a pious society within a democratic state"21. In post-Islamism, Islam is associated 
with individualism, freedom and democracy. It describes a system in which all citizens, regardless of 
religion or gender, can find a home22. This system relegates religion to the private spheres of citizens. 
The state’s laws should allow everyone to practise their faith without imposing a religious way of life. 
                                                            
15  Bayat, Asef (2007): Making Islam Democratic – Social Movements and the Post-Islamist Turn. Stanford: Stanford University Press. 
 Political Islam adopts a highly critical attitude towards the concept of democracy. It conceives a fundamental dilemma in the 
relationship between man and God as denoted by the roots ‘demos’ and ‘kratos’: ‘rule of the people’, not ‘reign of God’. Man writing 
his own law puts him in opposition to God. In: Murtaza, Muhammad Sameer (2011): Die ägyptische Muslimbruderschaft – 
Geschichte und Ideologie. Verlag rotation 
16 Schirrmacher, Christine (2011): Geistesgeschichtliche Ursprünge des Politischen Islam/Islamismus. In: Friedrich-Ebert-Stiftung (Hsg.) 
20.-22. Oktober 2011. Politischer Islam – Islamismus. Extremistische Islam-Varianten in der Diskussion. URL: http://library.fes.de/pdf-
files/akademie/berlin/09185.pdf (Stand 07.01.2014). 
17  Ennahda (Arabic  ) means 'rebirth'. 
18  Marks, Monica (2013): Youth Politics and Tunisian Salafism: Understanding the Jihadi Current. In: Mediterranean Politics 18, Heft 1, 
pp.104-111. 
19  The term ‘umma’ is of central importance. It describes the unity of the Muslim community. This means the unity of state and society, 
of state and religion, of religion and politics, of people and God. In Salafism and Islamism, the ‘umma’ is seen as an alternative model 
to the concept of the nation state as imported from the West. (Zapf/Klevesath 2012: 13-14) 
20  Bayat, Asef (2007): Making Islam Democratic – Social Movements and the Post-Islamist Turn. Stanford: Stanford University Press 
21  Bayat, Asef (2011): The Post-Islamist Revolutions. What the Revolts in the Arab World mean. In: The Council on Foreign Relations 
(Hg.), Foreign Affairs. URL: http://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/67812/asef-bayat/the-post-islamist-revolutions (Stand 
07.01.2014). 
22  Bayat, Asef (2007): Making Islam Democratic – Social Movements and the Post-Islamist Turn. Stanford: Stanford University Press 
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The demands of many of the protesters from 25 January 2011 and subsequent rallies23 can best be 
considered variants of post-Islamism since people wanted freedom of opinion and democracy – not 
the introduction of Sharia law. 
The Situation of Youth 
The term ‘youth’ describes a particular population stratum with its own particular living conditions. 
The individuals meant here are people between 15 and 35 years years of age.24 Similar to many parts 
of the Arab world, in Egypt and Tunisia this group accounts for a large proportion of the total 
population. Approximately 60 % of the entire population are under 30 years old25. About 35 % of the 
Egyptian population are young adults between the ages of 15 and 3526. This stratum has a high level 
of education: Approximately 43% of Egypt’s young people hold a university degree. In sharp contrast 
to this high rate of literacy and education are the career prospects: each year, there is a ratio of only 
200,000 new jobs for 700,000 university graduates. An additional factor aggravating the labour 
market situation is the often poor quality of university teaching meaning that graduates frequently 
enter the labour market as unskilled job seekers27. 
This precarious education and labour market situation was also caused by restrictive and 
authoritarian policies. Young people were denied active participation in political decision-making 
processes, as well as the opportunity to express their concerns about the future. Accordingly, the 
amount of party affiliations and participation in the elections in 2005 and 2010 was very low among 
young Egyptian voters28. The situation was similar in Tunisia. Until the first protests in late 2010, it 
had been unusual for young people to openly voice their opinion in the streets, outside their private 
spheres.  
Egyptian and Tunisian youth had been a politically and socially (particularly concerning job prospects) 
marginalised group for a long time29. They acquired their political socialisation through digital 
networking; as a consequence they learnt and understood a new and different kind of citizenship. 
This distinguishes them from the older generation, which obtained information mainly from 
domestic sources or a few private international contacts30. This was also one of the key reasons why, 
in media coverage, we have chiefly seen young Egyptians and Tunisians expressing displeasure. 
                                                            
23  Nowaira, Amira (2011): Egypt's Day of Rage goes on. Is the world watching? In: The Guardian. URL: 
http://www.theguardian.com/commentisfree/2011/jan/27/egypt-protests-regime-citizens (Stand 30.05.2014). 
24  Of course, there is not only one youth but many different groups summarised here under the term ‘youth’. 
25  Ali, Fatuma Ahmed/Hannah Muthoni Macharia (2013): Women, Youth, and the Egyptian Arab Spring. In: Peace Review - A Journal of 
Social Justice 25, Heft 3, pp. 359-366. 
26  Martini, J./D. Kaye/E. York (2012): The Muslim Brotherhood, Its Youth, and Implications for U.S. Engagement. Santa Monica: RAND 
Corporation. 
27  Ali, Fatuma Ahmed/Hannah Muthoni Macharia (2013): Women, Youth, and the Egyptian Arab Spring. In: Peace Review - A Journal of 
Social Justice 25, Heft 3, pp. 359-366 
28  In a 2008 survey, only 7.1% of the young Egyptians stated that they were members of a political party (Sika 2012: 193). The overall 
participation in the elections of 2005 was 23%, and in 2010 only 15%.  
 Sika, Nadine (2012): Youth Political Engagement in Egypt: From Abstention to Uprising. In: British Journal of Middle Eastern Studies 
39, Heft 2, pp. 181-199 
29  Ali, Fatuma Ahmed/Hannah Muthoni Macharia (2013): Women, Youth, and the Egyptian Arab Spring. In: Peace Review - A Journal of 
Social Justice 25, Heft 3, pp. 359-366 
30  Herrera, Linda (2012): Youth and Citizenship in the Digital Age: A View from Egypt. In: Harvard Educational Review 82, Heft 3, pp. 
333-352. 
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Political Islam as an Identification Model 
Why do religious or political concepts seem so attractive? In the centre of this attraction is the 
question of identity31. The term identity includes identifying oneself with something. Identification 
with something happens on a mental or spiritual level. Here, models are accepted or rejected, 
religious or similar intellectual beliefs are adopted, and values and impressions checked in order to 
create one’s own identity within a collective32. The concept of identity consists of two levels of 
meaning: "Who am I?" and "What am I?".33 
The first question analyses the mental structure of individuals with their individual characteristics 
and capabilities. The individual person form their social identities in the interaction process with their 
social surroundings and so develop an understanding of their own positions within social structures 
and in relation to others. They assign features to themselves and their social environment and thus 
create reference groups to identify with. Thus they develop a social identity which places an 
emphasis on the question “What am I?” 
The question “What am I?” is aimed at the individual aspects of a qualitative partial identity, with 
which human collectives can identify. It is in the collective processing of these partial identities that 
group identities can define themselves in contrast to other groups. The definition of the ‘other’ is 
essential to the creation of one’s own collective identity, as it determines who is a member of the 
group and who is not. Due to the self-definition of the collective and its external borders, supposed 
similarities are emotionalised and become obligations within the group while other groups can be 
identified as threats on the basis of social comparison processes34. Against this background, the 
‘other’ of political Islam in terms of its political, moral and religious views can be defined as other 
religions and Weltanschauungen. 
In the following sections, youthful commitment before and after the upheavals of 2011 will be 
examined and set into the context of the previously discussed concepts of political Islam and Post-
Islamism. Here, the concept of identity is used as an analytical approach on the basis of which the 
motivation of young people for religious involvement will be explained. 
Young People in the Muslim Brotherhood 
An important factor of young people’s involvement in religious organisations is the authoritarian 
leadership style of previous decades. This experience helped the Egyptian Muslim Brothers to 
become the largest opposition movement. Founded in 1928, the Muslim Brotherhood was from a 
very early stage in opposition to the military regime in Egypt, established since the 1950s. Therefore, 
                                                            
31  An alternative approach which is mainly used in migration research involves the division into ‘push factors’ detaching young people 
from their familiar social environments (economic, social and political marginalisation), and ‘pull factors’ attracting young people to 
Salafist groups (charity work, financial aid, social recognition) In: Lee, Everett S. (1966): A Theory of Migration. In: Demography 5, 
Heft 1, pp. 47–57. 
32  Körner, Katharina (2009): Identitätsstiftung durch den Europäischen Verfassungsvertrag (Schriften zum Europäischen Recht; 146). 
Berlin: Duncker & Humbolt, p.34 
33  Kretschmann, Carsten/Liermann, Christiane (2007): Identitäten in Europa – Europäische Identität. Anmerkungen zu einem 
kontroversen Begriff. In: Belafi, Matthias/Krienke, Markus (Hg.). Identitäten in Europa – Europäische Identität. Wiesbaden: Deutsche 
Universitätsverlag, pp. 9-16. 
34  Körner, Katharina (2009): Identitätsstiftung durch den Europäischen Verfassungsvertrag (Schriften zum Europäischen Recht; 146). 
Berlin: Duncker & Humbolt. 
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it soon became the target of state repression35. Accordingly, the elder, still active leaders of the 
Muslim Brotherhood (some elected for life) were socialised by decades of persecution, 
imprisonment, torture and oppression. As a result, these generations saw in the military regime the 
identity-constituent ‘other’. More and more, they came to identify with a traditional, conservative 
Islam and to define political Islam as a guideline for organised action36. At the same time, the long 
persecution led to a legitimisation boost for the Muslim Brothers among young people: 
"Imprisonment thus enhanced the moral authority of the former prisoners"37. The political Islam of 
the Muslim Brotherhood was thus a symbol of the resistance of many years; it was deemed 
legitimate, against an illegitimate and brutal system offering no future prospects to young people. 
The situation is different with the Salafist groups in Tunisia. They equally draw their legitimacy from 
long-term opposition to the former regime, but also from their opposition to the religious Ennahda 
party after the protests. Ennahda, according to one teenager’s reproach, "is negotiating with people 
who tortured our fathers"38. In addition, many religious youngsters believe Ennahda to be 
cooperating with Western forces and therefore not able to integrate Sharia law into the new Tunisian 
constitution. A 24-year old Salafist laments: "I don’t see what makes them so Islamic. They use lies to 
manipulate the people just like any party"39. 
Another item contributing to the attractiveness of the Muslim Brotherhood as a long-standing, lonf-
suffering and relevant opposition is the fact that they make young people feel supported and 
appreciated. Today, the Egyptian Muslim Brotherhood has about 600,000 - 700,000 members. On 
the assumption that the Muslim Brothers represent a cross-section of the total population, the 
proportion of the young people can be estimated at about 35%40. The Muslim Brotherhood is very 
well interconnected and organised. A special importance lies in the universities as places of 
recruitment. The Muslim Brothers approach young people at an age when they are open to new 
ideas, when they strive for independence and to define their personalities. In short, they are in a 
phase of their lives in which they intensely tackle the important issues of identity: who and what they 
are. Belonging to the collective identity of a religious group takes on a central importance in a partial 
identity of the youngsters. In this situation, the Muslim Brotherhood succeeds in presenting itself as 
an open and flexible welfare association providing opportunities for participation and a sense of 
belonging. It also provides various social services: from religious study groups and social activities, 
through affordable study materials and excursions, to financial support. At the universities, the 
Muslim Brotherhood is seen as an organisation that encouraged active participation and mobilised 
opposition against government control even before 2011. This includes the allocation of active tasks 
at rallies and elections. Young people assume such tasks as distributing food, safeguarding large 
                                                            
35  Pioppi, Daniela (2013): Playing with Fire - The Muslim Brotherhood and the Egyptian Leviathan. In: The International Spectator - 
Italian Journal of International Affairs 48, Heft 4, pp. 51-68. 
36  Martini, J./D. Kaye/E. York (2012): The Muslim Brotherhood, Its Youth, and Implications for U.S. Engagement. Santa Monica: RAND 
Corporation. 
37  Huntington, Samuel P. (1991): How Countries Democratize. In: Political Science Quarterly 106, Heft 4, pp. 614. 
38  Wolf, Anne (2013): Salafists challenge Ennahda for allegiance of youth in Tunisia. In: The National, May 12. URL: 
http://www.thenational.ae/thenationalconversation/comment/salafists-challenge-ennahda-for-allegiance-of-youth-in-tunisia (Stand 
01.11.2014). 
39  Marks, Monica (2013): Youth Politics and Tunisian Salafism: Understanding the Jihadi Current. In: Mediterranean Politics 18, Heft 1, 
pp.108. 
40  Martini, J./D. Kaye/E. York (2012): The Muslim Brotherhood, Its Youth, and Implications for U.S. Engagement. Santa Monica: RAND 
Corporation, pp.9. 
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crowds, cleaning up public places, in short: welfare tasks. This way, it does not only appeal to 
conservative-religious students, but it also targets those of different ideological backgrounds41. Many 
students therefore identify with the organisation. 
Similarly small reservations with regard to the Salafist movements can also be detected among 
Tunisian youth. Apart from online networks and mosques, the neighbourhood cafes mainly provide 
young people with the opportunity of an informal first encounter with the ideologies of the Salafists. 
A young Salafist described such a meeting: "We always do our preaching in the local dialect, far from 
the language of politicians. We are simple people and we address simple people in our sermons [...] 
During our sermons, people also had fun"42. The Islamic organisations give young people the feeling 
of being part of a collective identity and belonging to a community of shared values and solidarity, 
which they often miss in their social, economic and political environment. 
However, this strength of the Muslim Brotherhood is also its weakness. During their university years, 
students get to know the organisation in a very open and inviting way. Yet, outside the university, the 
Muslim Brotherhood has the same problems as many other organisations and political parties: 
obsolescence. Until 2010, all its presidents were from the 1920s cohort43. A strict hierarchy based on 
leadership and obedience prevents young people from actively participating in decision-making44. 
The situation is different with the Tunisian Salafists. Young people are an important part of Salafist 
groups and networks. Through their many contacts, who also attract new members, they distribute 
leaflets and Salafi literature, support the charities of the Salafists and protest publicly against 
infringements of religious taboos45. The youngsters also distance themselves visibly from the secular 
Tunisian society and so become the flagship of the Salafist movement. Men grow beards and often 
wear a kamis (long shirt from Afghanistan), young women usually wear a jilbab (full body garment) 
and / or niqab (black face veil)46. Wearing these religious symbols can also be understood as a 
conscious rebellion against the autocratic regime. Since these symbols were frowned upon or 
banned under Ben Ali, they are now important items of the young Salafists’ identity47. 
The generation conflict in the Egyptian Muslim Brotherhood had led to the separation of the Al-
Wasat political party in the 1990s and in 2011 it caused the elimination of the Egyptian Current Party. 
Both parties spoke out against mixing religious missions and political objectives. Al-Wasat brought 
about a controversy within the Muslim Brotherhood, with the result that the Muslim Brotherhood 
has slightly liberalised in recent years (e.g. in admission of female staff). The Egyptian Current Party, 
however, was founded by disillusioned young Muslim Brothers feeling deprived of their revolutionary 
victory. In fact, the Muslim Brotherhood remained together until Mubarak’s fall. The Egyptian 
                                                            
41  Ibid. 
42  Merone, Fabio (2013): Salafism in Tunisia: An Interview with a Member of Ansar al-Sharia. In: Jadaliyya, April 11. URL: 
http://www.jadaliyya.com/pages/index/11166/salafism-in-tunisia_an-interview-with-a-member-of- (Stand 01.11.2014). 
43  Murtaza, Muhammad Sameer (2011): Die ägyptische Muslimbruderschaft – Geschichte und Ideologie. Verlag rotation. 
44  Pioppi, Daniela (2013): Playing with Fire - The Muslim Brotherhood and the Egyptian Leviathan. In: The International Spectator - 
Italian Journal of International Affairs 48, Heft 4, pp. 51-68. 
45  Marks, Monica (2013): Youth Politics and Tunisian Salafism: Understanding the Jihadi Current. In: Mediterranean Politics 18, Heft 1, 
pp.104-111. 
46  Malka, Haim / William Lawrence (2013): Jihadi-Salafism’s Next Generation. In: CSOS Analysis Paper, October 2013. 
47  Marks, Monica (2013): Youth Politics and Tunisian Salafism: Understanding the Jihadi Current. In: Mediterranean Politics 18, Heft 1, 
pp.104-111. 
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Current Party focuses on a rather post-Islamist agenda. This means that they advocate more equality 
between the sexes, freedom of religion, emancipation of the young generation (the average age 
being 31), and democratic processes inside and outside the party48. Thus, Islam is still a factor 
creating identity, but is not considered an integral part of the public and political arenas. 
This results in different impressions of why young people perceive Islam and political Islam as 
attractive49. The Muslim Brotherhood and the Salafists hold several advantages. On the one hand, 
they have collected a wealth of experience and expertise over the years, resulting in impressive 
mobilisation options. Secondly, their definition of the identity-constituent ‘other’ is a simple one: it 
provides an identity beyond Western notions. Thus, they offer identity references concerning the 
political mainstream which young Egyptians and Tunisians can call their ‘own’ without fear of being 
subjected to an imperial or hegemonic foreign power. Political Islam - in all its characteristics - can 
therefore be attractive to a youth striving for independence.  
However, a large proportion of the young people equally aspire to freedom and participation rights 
that political Islam, such as it is practiced by the Muslim Brotherhood, cannot offer. Parties such as 
the Egyptian Current, therefore, are gaining a lot of sympathy (although their influence should not be 
overestimated). However, they must also deal with the constant suspicion of being influenced by the 
West. A weakness is that the identity-constituent ‘other’ is based on Western religious ideas and 
refuses the lack of freedom, in a Western sense, such as the way of living according to religious 
doctrines that is prescribed by the state. Another practical weakness lies in the few available 
resources and the limited mobility potential due to its small membership. Especially the latter may 
prevent people from leaving the Muslim Brotherhood and joining smaller, more liberal groups. All in 
all, it is worth noting that the proportion of young people in the Muslim Brotherhood, as mentioned 
above, only amounts to approximately 35 % (about 200,000 - 300,000 members) out of a total young 
population of about 30 million (35% of the total population). Both the Egyptian Current and Al-Wasat 
parties have small memberships50. The influence of Islamic parties on Egyptian youth should not be 
generalised. 
Conclusion 
‘Islam’ serves as an identity-creating element for self-confident youth. It is possible to differentiate 
between the attraction posed by political Islam (including Salafism) and that of post-Islamism. The 
former provides a lot of expertise by the Muslim Brotherhood and several Salafist groups, as well as 
functioning structures and a large mobilisation potential. In Egypt and Tunisia, the latter offers 
participation and representation options on the basis of a modern understanding of religion and 
politics. Both have in common that they constitute an opposition to the values of the old regime, 
                                                            
48  Martini, J./D. Kaye/E. York (2012): The Muslim Brotherhood, Its Youth, and Implications for U.S. Engagement. Santa Monica: RAND 
Corporation 
49  Martini, J./D. Kaye/E. York (2012): The Muslim Brotherhood, Its Youth, and Implications for U.S. Engagement. Santa Monica: RAND 
Corporation.; Pioppi, Daniela (2013): Playing with Fire - The Muslim Brotherhood and the Egyptian Leviathan. In: The International 
Spectator - Italian Journal of International Affairs 48, Heft 4, pp. 51-68.; Kucinskas, Jaime (2010): A Research Note on Islam and 
Gender Egalitarianism: An Examination of Egyptian and Saudi Arabian Youth Attitudes. In: Journal for the Scientific Study of Religion 
49, Heft 4, pp. 761–770.; Popa, Eugenia Laura (2011): Knowing the Other. Cultural and Religious Identity in Islam – “Knowing the 
Other. Cultural and Religious Identity in Islam”. In: Scientific Annals of the Alexandru Ioan Cuza University of Iaşi 2011, Heft 6, pp. 
120-129. 
50  On 01 October 2014, the Egyptian Current Party merged with the party Strong Egypt. The amount of members is at approximately 
500. Al-Wasat Party has about 5,000 members. 
  
 
 
Youth, Revolt, Recognition. The Young Generation during and after the „Arab Spring“. 
Berlin 2015: Mediterranean Institute Berlin (MIB)/Humboldt University Berlin, edited volume by Isabel Schäfer. 
42 
 
either by the long years of resistance or by the demand for civil rights in Tahrir Square. Islam itself 
serves both movements in different ways as a basis of legitimation and identification beyond western 
ideals, and is therefore attractive to the young. This trend is expected to continue in the future 
because the military coup against the Mursi government in Egypt in 2013 and the adoption of a very 
secular constitution by referendum with an impressive 98.1 % of voters suggest a return to the old 
status quo51. Although the Egyptian Muslim Brotherhood has various organisational problems, it may 
now be strengthened as a symbol of resistance against the new regime after the military coup of 
2013. Through the renewed oppression, their attractiveness to marginalised youth may still increase, 
whilst more moderate parties, such as Egyptian Current, could lose their legitimacy through 
cooperation with the new regime. The attractiveness of a radicalised political Islam could thus grow 
among Egyptian youth. 
In another way, this also applies to a minority of youth in Tunisia. The Salafists offer these young 
people the opportunity to be heard and become part of a large Muslim collective identity. This is 
becoming more important by the fact that political forces – especially the Ennahda party, which had 
been actively involved in the overthrow of Ben Ali – have so far barely been able to revoke the 
economic, social and political marginalisation of the young. The Salafist groups with their clear rules 
and strict ideology give young people security in a chaotic world. 
Political-religious groups win their appeal by the economic, social and political marginalisation of 
youth. In both countries, the political-religious groups are divided into different lines: moderate and 
radical ones, those adapted to the political and social rules and those that are in radical opposition. It 
is noteworthy that all groups benefit from the fact that the previous authoritarian regime 
represented a radical secularism. This enforced the need for legitimisation upon secular parties. 
Young people in both countries believe that political Islam provides the possibility of an alternative 
lifestyle 
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The Role of Artistic Protest Movements in the Egyptian Revolution 
Daniel Farrell 
Introduction 
The purpose of this article is to argue that artistic protest movements have had a significant impact 
on the unfolding of the dramatic political events that have taken place in Egypt over the past four 
years. Like all revolutions, the Egyptian revolution has been far from simple and has been influenced 
by a broad and complex range of factors. It will be argued here that artists of various kinds, many of 
them very young, have played a central and important role in shaping and communicating the 
demands of the protestors and in helping to drive the revolution forward. They have enabled people 
to discuss and debate political issues openly and have provided new mediums for people to express 
their opinions more freely. Artists’ groups and collectives have been influential in bringing people 
together to co-operate and collaborate – thus increasing their impact on the course of the revolution 
– and in encouraging people who have never been active in politics before to find their voices. As 
Ursula Lindsey asserts: ‘What Egyptians call the January 25 Revolution has undoubtedly ushered in a 
new sense of freedom, as well as a determination to use public space to congregate and connect, 
and to demonstrate support for the uprising through cultural activism’ (2012).  
Many different forms of artistic protest movement have taken part in the revolution, from rap music 
to street theatre to poetry, and they have each played a role in influencing it, often in collaboration 
with each other at cultural festivals, such as the Al-Fann Midan (‘Art is a Square’) festival in Cairo. 
This essay will examine the actions of young graffiti and street artists in the events of the revolution 
as a case study – focusing in particular on their role in encouraging young people to play an active 
part in it – in order to demonstrate the broader influence of artistic protest movements on political 
developments in Egypt since 2011. 
Graffiti was, of course, not invented on Tahrir Square in January 2011, but has always existed as a 
way for people to express political opinions and can, to a certain extent, be considered as a 
barometer of public opinion. According to Chaffee: ‘Graffiti writing is one of the easiest and most 
efficient ways for individuals and opposing groups to register political dissidence, express social 
alienation, propagate anti-system ideas, and establish an alternative collective memory’ (1999, p. 
127; cited in Findlay, 2012, p. 178). In particular, graffiti is a medium often used by disaffected young 
people who have little or no access to mainstream political channels. Much has been written about 
the submissive and inactive political position of young people in Egypt before the revolution and 
their virtual absence from the political decision-making process (Floris, 2012). 
Indeed, the 2010 UN Development Programme report on the state of young people in Egypt found 
that those in the 18-29 age group were the least likely to engage in political activity. It also found 
that many young people felt they were being openly discouraged from taking an active role in politics 
at all, being encouraged instead to focus their energies on private concerns (UNDP, 2010, pp. 105-
10). According to Makar, this created a false impression that young Egyptians were apathetic and 
politically unaware, a viewpoint she argues is contradicted by the leading roles taken by young 
people, including many young street and graffiti artists, in the revolution (2011, p. 311). Murphy has 
posited that ‘the street’ became the gathering place of choice for a generation of young people 
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frustrated by their exclusion from their country’s traditional political structures and the system’s 
refusal to reform or modernise to meet the needs of the population in the twenty-first century 
(2012, p. 11).  
Thus, younger artists employed the ancient art of graffiti to express their opinions, speaking to a 
whole new generation of political activists who went on to play a central role in the revolution. The 
following sections will argue that graffiti has influenced the unfolding of political events in Egypt 
since 2011 in three main ways: firstly, as a means of spreading information and new ideas among the 
population; secondly, as a means of facilitating people in coming together to work collaboratively; 
and thirdly, as a medium for people to express themselves freely and to encourage more and more 
people, especially those from the so-called ‘lost generation’ of disillusioned youth, to play an active 
role in politics. 
Spreading Information and Ideas 
Graffiti played an important role in disseminating ideas and information among the public as the 
revolution unfolded. Before 2011, graffiti was a very rare sight in Egypt, with artists and society at 
large under constant threat of suppression by the government and its agents. However, with the 
outbreak of the revolution, graffiti began appearing all over Cairo, with the walls of the city turning 
into a canvas for the people to express their political demands and seek to spread new ideas among 
the population. Speaking in 2012, artist Abou Al Naga claimed that the graffiti across Cairo acted as a 
mirror reflecting what the country had experienced over the previous year (Mahmoud, 2012).   
Works depicting and condemning the atrocities committed by the authorities served both as a form 
of protest and as a catalyst, mobilising people to continue the uprising against the government. The 
creation of portraits of those killed in the protests and at the hands of the police served both to 
commemorate those who had died for the cause of the revolution and to attack the regime for its 
actions (Elkamel, 2012). Thus, according to Kamran Rosen, graffiti, which has always been a highly 
controversial form of art, became much more than that; it became a type of war paint in the fight 
against the regime (2013).  
As well as communicating the ideas of the protestors, graffiti also fulfilled a practical role in 
informing people of protests and rallies. For example, in the days leading up to 25 January 2011, one 
of the most important days of protest in the revolution, graffiti all over the city called for people to 
come out on that day and take part in the protests.  Later on, as frustration with the slow pace of 
change following the resignation of President Mubarak grew, notices about further days of protest 
were carried across the city in the form of graffiti (The Real News, 2012). These sought to remind 
people that the revolution was not over, encouraging citizens to continue the struggle for reform and 
change. The works of graffiti made reference to what had been accomplished thus far, 
demonstrating to young people in particular that their actions had brought results, but also stressing 
the need to continue in order to consolidate what had been achieved and bring about lasting change. 
As well as spreading new ideas, graffiti and street art also provided a medium for people to come 
together and co-operate, as will be discussed in the next section.    
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Organisation and Collaboration 
Artistic protest movements have played an important role in organising groups of people to work 
together, something that is vital to the success of any such protest action. Many artists’ collectives 
have been set up, enabling artists of various kinds to come together and to collaborate on larger 
works in order to spread support for the revolution. One of the largest of these, the Revolution 
Artists’ Union was founded by a diverse group of writers, poets, photographers, singers, filmmakers, 
painters and many more on Tahrir Square in January 2011 at the height of the revolution. They 
wanted to work together and support one another in using their art as a medium to promote the 
political ideas of the revolution (Ibid.).  
Young graffiti artists have been central to these movements and many have organised the creation of 
large collaborative works of graffiti, some of which have become symbols of the revolution itself. For 
example, groups of street artists worked with traditional Arabic calligraphists to paint slogans 
throughout the city. One such work with the phrase ‘I Love my Country’ made into the shape of a 
heart signified for many the aims of the protestors and was printed on t-shirts worn by some who 
took part in the revolution.  
In one co-ordinated event in May 2011 that garnered huge publicity, a group of graffiti artists 
stormed the headquarters of the Interior Ministry and covered it with portraits of protestor Khalid 
Said on the first anniversary of his death at the hands of police (Ibid.). These events demonstrate not 
only the importance of involving as many people in the revolution as possible, but also the 
significance that large organised events can have on shaping public opinion. In these cases, the 
graffiti artists were able to channel the feelings and emotions held by many people and use them to 
further the aims of the revolution. In March 2014, following international protests, two policemen, 
Awad Saleh and Mahmoud Ghazala, were found guilty of torturing Khalid Said to death, with both 
being sentenced to ten years in prison (Ahram Online 2014).     
Another major collaborative event organised by young graffiti artists and which sought to encourage 
involvement in the revolution was the so-called ‘Mad Graffiti Weekend’ that took also place in May 
2011. Initiated by Aida al-Kashef and ‘Ganzeer’, a multi-disciplinary artist who came to international 
attention during the revolution, the weekend was a direct response to the attempts being made by 
the authorities to cover up or remove the portraits of those who had died in the revolution. Seeing 
this as a form of censorship, the artists resolved to organise a special weekend during which they 
would create a large series of works across the city. Aida al-Kashef claimed that he and many others 
who were bothered by the censorship taking place felt they had to take action and re-cover the walls 
of the city with graffiti (Egypt Independent, 2011).    
Groups of volunteers co-ordinated the activities of the artists, spreading the word over Twitter and 
creating a Google Map detailing the location of each work throughout the city (Ganzeer, 2011). This 
action led to the creation of one of the best-known works of graffiti from the Egyptian revolution, the 
image of a tank facing down a bread seller on his bike, which was painted by a large group of artists. 
Here, Ganzeer claimed, the artists were acting to defy openly the censorship being imposed on them 
in an effort to ensure that the streets of Egypt belong to the people and not the government (Ibid.). 
Artist Omar Mustafa who had painted a portrait of Amr al-Beheiri, a political activist who had been 
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arrested in February 2011 and sentenced to five years in prison by a military tribunal, repainted the 
portrait over Mad Graffiti Weekend. He said: ‘I have repainted Amr’s portrait, using a larger stencil 
this time’, claiming he would continue to use the portrait as an ‘awareness-raising icon against the 
injustices of military courts’ (Egypt Independent, 2011).        
As in many other aspects of the revolution, it was young artists who were to the forefront of this 
process and their participation encouraged other young people to get involved. One the most high-
profile of these is Ganzeer, who helped to organise the Mad Graffiti Weekend and who participated 
in the creation of the mural of the bread seller facing down the tank referred to above. In fact, he 
became so well known and associated with the revolution that he was denounced on Egyptian 
television by broadcaster Osama Kamal in May 2014 and was forced to leave Egypt (Pollack, 2014). 
Large organised events like the Mad Graffiti Weekend helped to facilitate people in playing a role in 
the revolution by providing them with an opportunity to take part in a political activity. In this way, 
the young graffiti and street artists helped other young Egyptians to find their voices and provided a 
means for them to express their opinions and hopes for the future, as will be discussed below.     
Free Expression and Involvement 
The third main way in which graffiti – and artistic protest movements in general – has influenced the 
Egyptian revolution has been its role in providing forums for people to discuss and debate political 
issues openly and to express their opinions freely. This is arguably the most important function it has 
had in a society in which creativity and the free articulation of ideas were so heavily restricted for so 
long. The freeing of artistic expression in the revolution has been symbolic of the overall process of 
the liberation of Egyptian society from the grip of an authoritarian regime. The artistic protest 
movements have thus provided mediums for people to channel their thoughts, feelings and opinions 
about the political situation in their country and to communicate them openly for the first time.  
The graffiti and other artists do not claim to have all the answers to the problems facing Egypt, but 
they have created forums for citizens of the country to come together and debate the issues in the 
hope of finding solutions. For example, ‘Ganzeer’ (a pseudonym meaning ‘Bicycle Chain’), claims he 
goes by that name because he thinks of artists as a mechanism pushing change forward. He claims: 
‘We are not the driving force. We are not the people pedalling, but we connect ideas and by doing 
this we allow the thing to move’ (Pollack, 2014). Indeed, critic and author Carlo McCormick has 
argued that Ganzeer and others like him are working more as activists than as artists (Ibid). With 
parts of the city essentially turned into open-air galleries, people have been confronted with new and 
different ideas as they go about their daily lives and they have the opportunity to discuss them with 
others gathered in public spaces. Indeed, the Revolution Artists’ Union has roped off sections of wall 
across the city in order to allow graffiti artists to work and have people observe them (Themba Lewis 
Photography, 2014). Festivals such as the Al-Fann Midan mentioned above happen in the open as 
much as possible, inviting people to take part and interact with the subject matter in order to 
promote education on the issues and foster exchanges of views. They also work to ensure that the 
revolution is seen to be on-going process, the outcome of which can still be shaped and influenced 
by people, and not one that it over or whose conclusion has already been reached (Lindsey, 2012). 
The artistic protest movements have also allowed people who had never previously taken part in the 
political process to have their voices heard. The existence of alternative means of political activity 
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such as the graffiti and street art movements outside the traditional political channels has 
encouraged young people in particular to seek to play more of a role in the development of their 
country. In contrast to the closed nature of the pre-revolutionary political system, these artistic 
movements invite the public to take part as much as possible. Graffiti artists working on Tahrir 
Square have stressed that the inspiration behind their works has come not just from themselves, but 
also from speaking to people on the square and listening to their ideas. Some artists also referred to 
having conversations with people who could not read or write, people whose opinions are otherwise 
far less likely to be heard, and creating works based on these discussions (The Real News, 2012).  
Conclusion 
The revolution that has taken place in Egypt over the past three years has been influenced and 
affected by a large number of factors. One of these is undoubtedly the range of artistic protest 
movements that have sprung up throughout the country. These have included street theatre groups, 
writers, rappers and singers as well as the street and graffiti artists who have been the focus of this 
essay. These artists have benefitted greatly from the effect the revolution has had on weakening the 
censorship imposed on cultural expression in Egypt and on making Egyptian society more open to 
different thoughts and ideas on the future. In this sense, the artistic movements are both a cause and 
effect of the revolution, using the new sense of freedom and openness that resulted from it to drive 
forward the ideas of the protestors, shaping opinions and providing forums for debate, thus 
influencing the revolution itself. 
Using graffiti and street art as a case study, this article has argued that the artistic protest 
movements have impacted on the events of the revolution in three main ways. Firstly, the artists 
have communicated the ideas of the protestors, spreading awareness of their demands among the 
population, as well as highlighting the atrocities committed by the regime. Much of the graffiti visible 
in Cairo has also had a practical function, informing people about protests and commemorating 
those who have died in the revolution. Secondly, the movements have worked to bring groups of 
people together to work towards a collective goal, a vital element in the success of such revolutions. 
This has helped to facilitate collaboration and co-operation by different groups of artists and has 
encouraged many people to take part in the protests.  
Thirdly, the protest movements have provided forums and venues for people to express their 
opinions freely and openly, fostering discussion and debate among the population, particularly 
among many, such as young people, who have never been involved in politics before. The artists 
have also enabled the people of Egypt to channel their creativity at a time when the restrictions 
placed upon it by the authoritarian regime were being lifted. With the new regime of President al-
Sisi, who came to power in 2013, and the military re-imposing many forms of censorship that had 
been lifted following the 2011 revolution, many young artists have continued to campaign and take 
part in public debates in order to ensure that the gains made then are not lost. Having played such a 
significant role during the revolution, artistic protest movements are continuing to fight for reform 
and a better future for Egypt.  
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The „Gezi Generation“: Youth, Polarization and the „New Turkey“ 
Gözde Böcü 
A Turkish Summer 
The Democratic Republic of Turkey, founded by Mustafa Kemal Atatürk in 1923, became a multi-
party system in the 1950s. Since then, Turkish democracy has been struggling to consolidate itself, 
facing major military coups in 1960, 1971 and 1980 to re-establish the elitist republican order, and 
has been coping with ethnic and religious polarization since the 1980s (Demirel 2005). After a decade 
of unstable coalition governments in the 1990s, the Islamic conservative party AKP (Adalet ve 
Kalkinma Partisi) came to power and has been leading the country for more than ten years (Aran 
2013). The controversy about the AKP’s party program and probable Islamic tendencies started in the 
aftermath of the elections in 2002. The liberal and secular parts of society especially assumed a sort 
of hidden Islamist agenda (Kurt & Alyanak 2011). After ten years of AKP rule it has become evident 
that it is not the Islamic agenda or the anti-republican stance, but rather the autocratic tendencies 
which represent the real problem (Tisdall 2013). In the last ten years the oppressive policies of the 
government seem to have incensed Turkish society more than expected, and eventually led to the 
democratic protest movement which started in Gezi Park in June 2013. 
Gezi Park is a rare green area in the heart of Istanbul. When the government decided to use the Gezi 
Park area to build another shopping mall for the city, the inhabitants of Istanbul protested against 
this top-down decision. When police used excessive violence against the peaceful environmental 
protestors in and around the park in order to clear it, a widespread resistance against the police and 
the governmental measures arose (Kilic 2013). Such a wide protest as the summer 2013 protest 
against the AKP government had never been seen before in the history of the Turkish Republic. 
Previous protests had mainly been organized by the secular elite and were not widely successful, 
because until 2007 the majority of the people stood behind the policies of the AKP, believing that it 
would continue the democratization process and bring an end to the series of military coups in 
Turkey (Atay 2013). 
More than a year after the protest the popular question “Quo vadis Turkey?” remains valid. What 
does the dominance of AKP in Turkish politics mean to the Gezi Generation and how can the 
increasing polarization of Turkish society be stopped? What role will young people play in the future 
and will they be able to influence mainstream politics in Turkey? This paper aims to provide an 
understanding of recent developments in Turkey by looking at the causes of the protest and 
increasing polarization within society, focusing mainly on the role of youth. 
The Gezi Spirit 
The protest’s famous slogan, which spread all around the world in June 2013, developed out of the 
area where it took place: Gezi Park in Istanbul’s Beyoglu District, next to Taksim Place. All protestors 
identified with the slogan “Everywhere is Taksim, Everywhere is resistance” when police forces 
cleared the area around Gezi Park in Istanbul (Kilic 2013). The events occurred after some 
environmentalists protested against plans to build a grand shopping mall, destroying one of 
Istanbul’s rare green spaces. Until that day activists had been holding peaceful protests in a space in 
Gezi Park (Atay 2013). The park was filled with the activists’ tents. Everyday more and more creative 
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protestors offered readings, gatherings and concerts and even cleaned up the rubbish produced by 
the visitors (Catterall 2013). On May 31, the police responded harshly to the peaceful 
demonstrations, firing tear gas at the protestors and beating them. These violent acts by the Turkish 
police were widely condemned by other organizations and institutions, and by the Council of Europe 
(Europe 2013). Thanks to the widespread coverage on Facebook and Twitter, with pictures circulating 
all over the internet, the protest turned into a mass movement (Dorsey 2013). Within several days 
people had started to pay more attention to the protests and participated directly on the streets of 
Istanbul. The streets of Beyoglu, an area popular with tourists, became the main arena for the 
clashes between the police and the people. Within a short time, more than 3.5 million people all over 
Turkey had taken to the streets to protest against the Turkish government’s harsh measures against 
the peaceful demonstrators, whose aims were to fight for more democratic freedom and civil rights 
and to stop the repressive policies of the government (Özel 2014). The high number of injuries and 
the deaths of some protestors strengthened the uprising and made even more people come together 
(Ete 2013). In the final count, anti-government mass protests took place in 79 of Turkey’s 81 regions, 
demonstrating the extent of the movement (Seufert 2013).  
The Gezi movement was not only remarkable in its intensity but also because of the composition of 
its participants. For the first time in Turkish history, nearly all oppositional groups united around the 
same issue: Leftist, Kemalist, nationalist, pacifist, gay, anti-capitalist religious, Kurdish and Alevite 
groups demonstrated side by side on the streets (Aydın 2013). Their main purpose was to show their 
dissatisfaction with the government. Surveys conducted prior to the protest showed that almost 50% 
of Turkish citizens felt their lifestyle and freedoms to be under attack, believing the AKP to be 
pursuing a conservative agenda (Paul/Seyrek 2013). Another survey showed that only 10% of the 
protestors in the Gezi Movement were protesting for environmental reasons. The majority were 
there because of the increasing authoritarian and interventionist style of the government (Can 2013). 
Moreover, the protesters published their demands saying that they did not accept the imposition of 
religious or moral values or norms on society, and that they wished for a more participatory decision-
making system in the environment of a pluralist system that also respects the demands of minorities 
(Werz 2013). The underlying motivation for protesting was not about the park but rather about the 
wish to be heard by an increasingly deaf government.  
Why now? 
It is not the first time in Turkish history that the group in power has ignored and suppressed the 
other. Looking at the causes of the Gezi Park protests from only a short-term perspective would hide 
the real causes of the unsolved tensions in Turkish society. Therefore it is important to take a closer 
look at the long-term causes of the biggest protest movement in Turkish history.  
One of these long-term causes was the increasing polarization in Turkish politics and society: Turkish 
Society had faced polarization ever since the early years of the republic. Long before the conservative 
AKP-government came to power, Turkey struggled with increasing tension between different societal 
groups. When Atatürk and the state founders abolished the Caliphate and Sultanate in 1924, 
religious fraternities were banned and the secularist nation builders took over control of the state. 
Meanwhile, conservative parts of society, especially in rural areas remained unconvinced by the 
Kemalists calling on them to adopt a secular and western lifestyle. Over the decades, the unheard 
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voice of the Islamist and conservative parts of society turned into a huge political power source and 
into an opposing power base against the Kemalist set of ideas. The comeback of the Islamic social set 
of ideas started in the post-1980 military coup era, when conservative Turkish nationalism gained 
influence and the AKP consequently came to power in 2002 (Öncü 2014). 
Some therefore argue that one major reason why the Gezi protest occurred was the long known 
struggle for power over the state and society between the secular and religious parts of society. In 
fact the composition of the protesters as well as their complaints against the government and 
Erdogan strengthen this argument. Some of the policies implemented by the AKP over the past 
number of years have been interpreted as being anti-secular and slightly conservative, therefore 
extending the gap between the conservatives and other parts of society. After a period of 
democratization under the leadership of Erdogan, the stance of the AKP, its politics, and the rhetoric 
of some key personalities in the party have changed dramatically (Prodromoua 2012).  Starting from 
its second term in government, Erdogan and his party clashed with the old ideological basis of the 
Turkish state, beginning with the republican elite and other secular powers in the country such as the 
military. Over time the AKP managed to marginalize it and disable the opposition by means which 
were not always considered democratic. Some judicial cases such as Ergenekon and Balyoz arose, in 
which the state accused intellectual, bureaucratic, military and media people of planning a coup 
against the AKP government to eliminate it (Gürsoy 2012). Although in the beginning some parts of 
society such as leftist and Kurdish groups agreed to these trials because they only targeted the old 
Kemalist elite, all non-conservative parts of society would later feel their freedoms and lifestyle 
limited by the AKP. 
The AKP government and its members, especially in the person of Recep Tayyip Erdogan, started to 
target the private lives of nearly all non-religious groups. When looking at the public statements of 
Erdogan between 2005 and 2013, we can clearly identify this kind of intervention. In most of his 
public statements, Erdogan targets the old elite by referring to abolishing symbols and important 
aspects of the traces of Atatürk in public life. Just before the protest started, for instance, he 
intended to change the name of the state bank T.C. Ziraat Bankasi by eliminating the prefix T.C. 
which stands for Turkish Republic and selling it to a foreign company (HürriyetDailyNews 2013). The 
secular elites saw this attempt as a symbolic fight against the Turkish Republic and its secular 
character. Another factor which angered not only the Kemalist part of society was that he called the 
founders of the Turkish state, Mustafa Kemal Atatürk and his friend Ismet Inönü “two drunks” (Yetkin 
2013). As many people at least respect the memory of Atatürk as a state founder these words were 
highly insulting and angered not only the secular part of society, but the majority of Turkish people 
(Idiz 2013). 
Erdogan has targeted not only the Kemalist part of society, but nearly all groups who do not share his 
values and world beliefs. On several occasions Erdogan managed to insult the religious stance of 
Alavites, criticized the drinking behavior of students and tried to dictate a new lifestyle for women in 
his speeches. His wish to press Turkish society into the frame of Islamic conservatism became evident 
when he announced his wish to raise a “religious generation (dindar genclik)” in 2012. Not only was 
his wish to educate future generations in Turkey, he also wanted half of society, namely women, to 
live in accordance with his and the AKP’s conservative mind set. In several speeches Erdogan and 
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other political figures of the AKP touched on the issue of women by telling them to have at least 
three children and that abortion would be considered murder very soon (Erdogan 2013). There exist 
many other examples from the last decade which easily illustrate how the AKP and Erdogan have 
increased the societal gap between its party and its supporters and other parts of society. Some even 
see a constant rise in the polarization of society in terms of secularism, religion and ethnicity from 
one electoral success of the party to another (Keyman 2014). Therefore we can speak of a gradual 
socio-political marginalization of the non-conservative parts of society in the past decade under the 
rule of the AKP as one of the long-term causes of the protest. 
Capitalism, Conservative Bourgeoisie and Marginalization of Youth  
While protest waves kicked off around the world in 2011, Turkish citizens were following the 
incidents in the Middle East, Greece and other parts of the world closely. However, by that time 
nobody predicted any similar movement in Turkey. For many years everything seemed under control: 
the military was brought under civil oversight, constitutional amendments were made according to 
the EU accession process and economic growth seemed unstoppable.  Erdogan and his party were 
building successfully on Turkey’s two-decade-long economic liberalization and were steadily raising 
the national income (Özel 2014). But with the AKP consolidating its position by centralizing and 
monopolizingpower, a process started which led later to the Gezi movement and to a situation in 
which they became the victims of their own success. The economic boom mainly led to the rise of a 
new conservative bourgeoisie rather than to the establishment of a large middle class inclusive of 
and open to all parts of society. Some claimed that those who benefited most from the economic 
development under the AKP-rule were supporters of the government who gained power through the 
indirect patronage system (Aknur 2014). With the rule of law and many other state institutions under 
the monopole of the AKP-government it seemed very unlikely for non-conservative parts of society 
to gain access to those somewhat state-controlled entities. Accordingly, some argue that this led to 
the socio-economic marginalization of the highly educated, more liberal, mainly young groups, and 
influenced their will to protest (Aknur 2014). Having analyzed some long-term factors, it can be 
argued that the government determined its own destiny by systematically marginalizing all non-
conservative groups of society, economically, politically and socially. To understand the role, 
demands and composition of this marginalized group we have to take a look at the major player in 
the Gezi protest movement: the marginalized youth.  
The “Gezi Generation”  
Immediately after the protest the big question was: who are these people in Gezi Park? According to 
the government they were “extremists” or “terrorists”. The government even encouraged conspiracy 
theories and claimed that the protestors were led by the so-called interest lobby or foreign forces 
who only wanted to harm Turkey and its thriving economy (Werz 2013). Scholars on the other hand 
assumed that the majority of the people who protested belonged to the middle class segments of 
Turkey, who had enjoyed a good education and who were internationally connected (Seufert 2013). 
Keeping in mind that those who died during the protest were all aged between 19 and 27 allows us 
to assume that it was the younger segment of society who protested. Even the group who started 
the protest Taksim Solidarity (Taksim Dayanismasi) on May 27 was mainly a group of university 
students who were brave enough to confront the policies of the Greater Istanbul Metropolitan 
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Municipality (Keyman 2014). These aspects allow us to raise the question of the role and 
participation of youth during the Gezi protest (Kulu 2013). Polls conducted during the protest 
showed that the average age of the people participating in the demonstrations was 28. Almost 50% 
of the protestors were under the age of 30 (KONDA 2014). Moreover, one in every four protestors 
was a student, thus strengthening the perception of a young movement in Gezi (Can 2013). One year 
after the protest we know more about the movement and its participants and are able to label the 
major group involved in the protest as young, urban, educated and non-ideological (Özel 2014). 
Therefore some started to speak of a “Gezi Generation”, characterized by a group of people who 
were younger than 30 and who were maybe born in the 1990s, mainly grew up during the rule of the 
AKP and who now resist this rule and the government’s wish to raise a religious generation (Atay 
2013). Until the Gezi protests this societal group was invisible on the political stage and was 
considered to be uninterested in politics (Belge 2013). Young Turkish people became visible in the 
political arena when the Gezi protest broke out and when mainly youngsters lost their lives during 
clashes with the police, such as 21-year-old Ali Ismail Korkmaz. It was young people like him who 
turned into key figures for the young protestors while thousands of others were injured 
(Becatoros/Fraser 2013).  
It was young people who made the difference during the Gezi protest especially when it came to 
taking part in the protests. One particularly important protest resource which only the youngsters 
could contribute to the protest was the use of social media. Looking at the new protest movements 
all around the world we can clearly identify the impact of social media on the protests in Egypt, 
Tunisia and Greece. Current research on the influence of social media during protests appear to 
validate this assumption. Della Porta and Mosca put forward the view that social media is one of 
today’s most important resources for the organization, implementation and success of a protest 
(Porta/Mosca 2005). Another major assumption in the literature is that social media have a high 
influence on the mobilization of participants for the protest. The use of social media tools such as 
Facebook, Twitter and other similar media not only to inform, but also to invite people to the 
protests increases the number of participants (Eltantawy/Wiest 2011). Other scholars emphasize an 
identity-forming role of social media. According to their view it is easier to create a communal spirit 
when interaction takes place on the streets as well as online (Garrett 2006).  
Keeping a look at the use of those new communication technologies during the Gezi protest supports 
these theoretical assumptions. Firstly, over 35 million people in Turkey use the internet on a daily 
basis. Moreover Turkish people are the third largest national group on Facebook and most of them 
are younger users (Karabag/Coskun 2013). This shows how important the role of the internet in 
Turkey is and the potential of the resource that was lying in the hands of the protestors. Therefore, it 
is not a surprise that protesters used these social media resources during the protests to 
communicate, mobilize and inform each other about current developments. Some Twitter data 
analysis showed that the use of the internet and social media as such was an important tool for the 
Gezi revolt and that Twitter turned out to be the best tool for uprisings. It turned out that the vast 
majority of Turkish Twitter users used hashtags supportive of the protest, whereas only a small 
minority of Twitter users from Turkey supported the government on social media. Another important 
finding from the analysis was the regional distribution of hashtags: It was not the province of Istanbul 
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but the eastern province of Dersim where most “resist” hashtags were used (Champion 2013). This 
shows the considerable impact of social media in spreading the movement outside of the city of 
Istanbul (Dorsey 2013).  
Apart from mobilizing and informing the protestors, another important impact of the use of social 
media during the protest was the identity-shaping of protesters through online media. With the 
utilization of social media came the spread of sarcastic comments and art about the government and 
especially about Erdogan himself. Laughing together meant solidarity for the youngsters. In a short 
time, young people developed new forms of protest (Dagli 2013). Some of these sarcastic pieces 
turned into nationwide resistance symbols, such as “the girl in the red dress” or “the standing man”. 
The distribution of these artistic symbols was especially effective on Twitter. The girl in the red dress 
was photographed during the very first days of the protest when a police officer gassed her without 
reason. Different artist tried to address this incident by reproducing it in different artistic mediums. 
Not only were the protestors caricatured but also pictures of the PM during his rallies in Ankara or 
Istanbul were sarcastically used by the social media community. For instance, the chequered jacket 
of the PM which he wore at a rally in Ankara, was not fashionable enough for the Gezi youth, and 
was seen as a symbol of the backwardness of the PM. Many other sarcastic works were influenced 
this (TEMPO 2013).  
These are only some examples of the creative, sarcastic art pieces produced by young people and 
spread via social media to oppose the government. Keeping in mind that Turkish media suffer from 
state censorship and that many journalists are in jail due to their critical and investigative journalism, 
it is natural that youth used this tool. Moreover it can be argued that the social media environment 
was for a long time the only secure place left where youth could fight back without fearing any direct 
punishment by the state during the protests. We can therefore argue that the use of social media by 
young segments of society was unique and an important contribution to the protest. It clearly 
increased the mobilization of participants and helped to built up a common spirit for the protest. 
Given the centrality of this aspect during the Gezi protest, the role of social media and youth should 
not be underestimated for future perspectives on the development of Turkish democracy.  
The Aftermath of the Gezi Protests   
More than one year after the Gezi protests, not much is left from the initial Gezi Spirit and its Gezi 
Generation. According to some scholars, Gezi lacked the necessary momentum to become a fully 
bureaucratized movement because of the involvement of radical groups and the fact that the united 
groups went back to their old habits immediately after the protest. Although incidents such as the 
corruption scandal in December 2013 or the death of the youngest Gezi protestor Berkin Elvan 269 
days after the protest meant a short re-awakening of the Gezi spirit, the movement never fully 
revived again (Inceoglu 2014).  
The electoral process starting in March 2014 marked the end of the Gezi movement and the making 
of extra-institutional politics in Turkey. With mainstream political parties re-entering the political 
stage, extra-institutional claims were no longer valid. The illusion or the hope that challenging the 
authoritarianism of the AKP by campaigning and voting was still possible hindered the preservation 
and the maintenance of Gezi (Inceoglu 2014). When the political campaigns started, some were 
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hoping for the emergence of new politicians or leaders from the Gezi Generation. In fact, a “Gezi 
Party” was founded in October 2013 aimed at influencing the political process. It was supported by a 
mixture of young and old, left-wing and conservative mainly university students and led by the neo-
classical metal musician Resit Cem Köksal (Aknur 2014). After the outcome of the March 2014 local 
elections all hopes that the Gezi Party might play a role for the future of Turkey disappeared: Recep 
Tayyip Erdogan and his party won the elections and remained in power (Carkoglu 2014). After the 
local elections people opposing the government hoped that at least the presidential elections might 
show a better outcome. Most of them did not believe that the polarizing figure of Recep Tayyip 
Erdogan would persuade the majority of Turkey. Despite everything, Erdogan was elected President 
of the Turkish Republic on 10 August 2014 by a large majority of the votes (Seufert 2014). According 
to observers the recent electoral success and the dominance of the AKP for the last seven elections 
marked the end of pluralist democracy and finally also of Gezi (Keyman 2014).  
Nonetheless, underestimating the future role of the Gezi movement and youth by reviewing its 
impact only by looking at electoral outcomes would be wrong. The success of Gezi and the impact of 
the Gezi Generation should not be reduced only to these electoral outcomes, but should be 
reconsidered from different perspectives. Although the Gezi protests could not be translated into the 
institutional sphere, its major achievement was that helped the marginalized parts of society, 
especially the socio-economically marginalized youth, to overcome their fears and to resist the 
government. The Gezi protests also achieved the revitalizing of civil society: during and after the Gezi 
protest, various old and new organizations, many led by young activists, came together to influence 
mainstream politics. For instance the establishment of an organization called “Vote and Beyond (Oy 
ve Ötesi)” which aimed to prevent fraud during the local elections by assigning a volunteer for each 
ballot box attracted public attention (Inceoglu 2014). These are only some aspects which illustrate 
the change brought about in Turkish society and politics by the protest movement in the summer of 
2013.  
Is Winter Coming? 
Although different scenarios for the future of Turkey are debated it seems very likely that the 
polarization between the different sets of society will steadily increase. Erdogan has taken no step 
back since the Gezi protest and it is very unlikely that he will do so in the future. Analyses have 
shown that with every step consolidating his power, his politics has become more and more 
polarizing. In Erdogan’s personal utopia, which he terms “New Turkey”, there is apparently no place 
for those who do not accept his definition of democracy (Seufert 2014). Criticism, checks and 
balances and participatory democracy seemed to have no place in the New Turkey. In fact for the 
first time in history, Turkey is not only facing the risk of being polarized but also of becoming a more 
and more divided society (Keyman 2014). Keeping the general political situation of Turkey in mind, 
Turkish youth and those who see themselves as part of the Gezi Generation will have to prepare for 
difficult times. Social media have been and will be one of the only free tool available to young 
people. However, remembering several attempts by the government to shut down YouTube and turn 
off Twitter, we can see that freedom of speech does not appeal to the President and his perception 
of a New Turkey either. Additional repressive measures or the closure of access to social media may 
  
 
 
Youth, Revolt, Recognition. The Young Generation during and after the „Arab Spring“. 
Berlin 2015: Mediterranean Institute Berlin (MIB)/Humboldt University Berlin, edited volume by Isabel Schäfer. 
59 
 
further complicate this situation. Nevertheless, as long as young people keep organizing and as long 
as social media is available, there is still some hope and it is called the “Gezi Generation”. 
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Part III – Youth, Migration and the Socio-Economic Dimension 
Reconfiguration of Tunisian Migration Politics after the 'Arab Spring' - The Role of 
Young Civil Society Movements 
Inken Bartels 
Abstract 
Based on participant observation and personal conversations conducted during the World Social 
Forum (WSF) 2013 in Tunisia, the article analyzes the role of new, young and independent civil 
society movements emerging within the field of Tunisian migration and asylum politics. It shows how 
the revolts in 2011 have not only opened up a temporary opportunity for young Tunisians to leave 
their country but also to stay and politicize the issue of migration within Tunisian society in the 
longer run. As a result, it argues, that Tunisian migration politics have not only been re-shaped 'from 
above' through the interplay of the powerful international interests and new actors within Tunisian 
state politics, but are also increasingly influenced 'from below' by new actors of an emerging 
independent Tunisian civil society. While exploring the goals, agendas and forms of organization of 
three young movements present at the WSF 2013, particular attention will be paid to whom their 
claims are made and how they advance as well as challenge existing (mostly European dominated) 
struggles for the freedom of movement and what potentials and problems of transnational 
cooperation remain in this field. 
Keywords 
migration politics, civil society, youth, ‘Arab Spring’, Tunisia, World Social Forum 
Introduction 
Despite considerable media coverage of Tunisian 'boat-people' arriving at the shores of Lampedusa 
or dying in the Mediterranean Sea and their increasing prominence in international political 
discourses, (em)migration remains a highly sensitive topic within Tunisian society; one that is rarely 
discussed openly in public. This is despite the fact that almost every family knows someone among its 
members, friends or neighbors who has left or even died or disappeared while attempting to leave 
Tunisia. Therefore, for many Tunisians the issue of migration is one associated with loss, grief and 
incertitude, but also fear, since 'irregular' - meaning unauthorized - emigration had been criminalized 
and punished under the Ben Ali regime. 
The World Social Forum (WSF) which was hold in Tunisia for the first time in March 2013 was a good 
occasion to observe how this atmosphere has changed since the fall of the old regime in January 
2011.521 During the revolts leading to its fall, thousands of young Tunisians overcame their fears to 
chase out former President Ben Ali and his (border) security and police apparatus and also took the 
chance to leave the Tunisian coast towards Italy in the moment of political disorder (Fargues 2011; 
                                                            
52 Many of the insights presented in the article are based on observation and personal communication with young Tunisian activists 
during my participation at the World Social Forum 2013 in Tunisia (Bartels 2013). 
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Boubakri 2013). While the EU and its member states reacted quickly to (re)install their border control 
regime by signing (not so) new agreements with the Tunisian interim authorities, and to reinforce the 
FRONTEX mandate and mission to end the short-lived era of increased freedom of movement in the 
Mediterranean (Ben Achour/Ben Jemia 2011), Tunisians 'back home' also lost their fear to politicize 
and mobilize around the issue of migration and border control. 
Two years later, new civil society movements, independently addressing domestic as well as 
international questions of border and migration politics, have emerged on Tunisia's political 
landscape. Three of them were especially active at the WSF 2013. Firstly, the Association des Familles 
Victimes de l'Immigration Clandestine (AFVIC) protested against the so-called 'left-to-die'-politics of 
the EU and its member states, demanding information and investigations into the disappearances in 
the Mediterranean Sea. Secondly, refugees and solidarity groups from the Choucha camp on the 
Libyan border brought their protest to the capital to confront the Tunisian government over the lack 
of a Tunisian asylum system and to address the UNHCR which is filling this gap. The UNHCR is 
therefore responsible for the camp, its closure in June 2013 and the outstanding solutions offered to 
the remaining refugees. Finally, Article 13, on of the new truly independent Non-Governmental 
Organizations (NGOs) which have been founded since 2011, critically addressed the consequences of 
the European border and visa regime as well as the unequal rights of migrants in Tunisia. Despite 
their close cooperation with European anti-racist political networks in this field, they complement 
their common 'No Border' and 'Freedom of Movement' slogans with their proper claim for 'the right 
to leave and the right to stay', based on Article 13 of the Declaration of Human Rights. 
Based on participant observation and personal conversations conducted during the WSF 2013, the 
article shows how the revolts of 2011 have not only opened up a temporary opportunity for young 
Tunisians to leave their country but also to stay and politicize the issue of migration within Tunisian 
society in the long-term. As a result, Tunisian migration politics have not only been re-shaped 'from 
above'2 through the interplay of powerful international interests and new actors within Tunisian 
state politics, but are also increasingly been challenged 'from below' by new actors of an emerging 
independent Tunisian civil society.3 While exploring the goals, agendas and forms of organization of 
three young movements present at the WSF 2013, particular attention will be paid to whom their 
claims are made and how they advance as well as challenge existing (mostly European-dominated) 
struggles for freedom of movement and what potentials and problems of transnational cooperation 
remain in this field. 
Historical development of migration and related politics in Tunisia 
Large-scale emigration from Tunisia – as from most Southern Mediterranean countries – started half 
a century ago. However, the period predating the revolts in 2011 saw the most intense emigration up 
to this point in Tunisian history, most of which was directed towards Europe (Di Bartolomeo et al. 
2010, 1; Fargues/Fanderich 2012, 1). 
                                                            
2  For the broader conceptual and empirical context of political transformations in the Mediterranean through the interplay of state 
and non-state actors, see also contributions to Schäfer and Henry 2009. 
3  As this is a still ongoing process in the time of writing (September 2014), reflections and conclusions are necessarily only preliminary 
in character. 
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The role of Tunisian youth 
Apart from the general political situation, most authors refer to the highly pressurized nature of the 
Tunisian labor market as the key cause of the high levels of emigration (Fargues 2004, 1351; 
Aubarell/Aragall 2005, 8). Un- and underemployment, especially of a growing highly educated, urban 
youth with high aspirations, provides a great potential for frustration among graduates as the 
Tunisian labor market does not provide corresponding employment opportunities for the largest 
generation, which was born in the 1980s and reached working age at the beginning of the 21st 
century (Lahlou 2006, 113)5. In addition to rising levels of education, more and more young women 
enter the local labor market and compete for the few jobs available. As the family and social 
constraints of earlier times are lifted, personal freedom of movement increases. 
This economic as well as political frustration 'at home' is exacerbated by a strong attraction to the 
living standards of the population on the Northern shore of the Mediterranean Sea, as well as the 
development of new information technologies. For lots of Tunisian young people, Europe represents 
'the best you can get in terms of living conditions, freedom, guarantees of one's rights, leisure 
activities, etc.' (Lahlou 2006, 110; Zekri 2008b, 5). Against this background, it is not surprising to learn 
that in 2005 more than 75% of young Tunisians6 considered emigration (Fargues 2011). 
And indeed, despite the considerable impact of the financial and economic crisis on Southern 
European countries, their export-oriented agriculture, construction and tourism sectors have overall 
shown a high demand especially for seasonal, flexible and low-skilled labor over the last two 
decades. To some extent these sectors have never been reluctant to employ ‘irregular migrants'. 
Furthermore, the decrease in the active population and aging across Europe leads its states to turn 
not only towards its Eastern but increasingly also towards its Southern neighbors in search of young, 
well-educated workers. At the same time however, the implementation of the visa system and the 
introduction of restrictive border control measures by European states has rendered emigration 
towards the Northern shore of the Mediterranean an increasingly difficult and dangerous task for 
Tunisian youth over the last 40 years. 
Tunisia – from a country of emigration to a country of transit 
These restrictive border and migration policies were first introduced by European states, especially in 
north-western Europe, only after the economic crisis of the mid-1970s. Until then, Tunisians, like 
most migrant workers from North Africa enjoyed easy legal access in Europe. As a consequence of 
the more restrictive policies, the mobility of migrant workers was replaced by permanent settlement 
of migrant families, since family reunification remained one of the few legal ways to enter and stay in 
Europe. Secondly, migrants searched for other routes and means to enter Europe such as clandestine 
entries, overstays after legal entries or asylum applications. 
In this context, movements and practices of migration in the Mediterranean have significantly 
changed since the end of the 1980s. Besides economic, social and political factors within the 
countries of the African continent, regulatory changes in European migration politics, such as the 
introduction of the visa system and the implementation of the Schengen agreement, have affected 
                                                            
5 Youth unemployment rose from 22% in 1999 to 45% in 2009 (Honwana 2011). 
6 Comparing to 22% in 1996 and 45% in 2000. 
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the changing quantity and quality of trans-Mediterranean migration (cf. Lahlou 2006, 109). In this 
context, Tunisia has experienced immigration from more distant countries in Africa and Asia, mostly 
of people on their way to Europe via the Mediterranean, making this traditional country of 
emigration also one of transit (Boubakri 2004).7 
The changing politics of migration 
In reaction, European states began to coordinate their policies towards the Southern Mediterranean. 
Since the mid-1990s, a number of joint Mediterranean policy initiatives have been established. In 
1995, the Barcelona Process or so-called Euro-Mediterranean Partnership (EMP) addressed security, 
the promotion of economic exchange and the control of people's movement as interrelated issues. 
While enhancing the movement of certain goods and capital, it restricted the movement of people 
since security concerns ranked high among European priorities. Set out to combat 'irregular' 
migration and thus to enhance security in the Mediterranean, the EMP charged traditional 
emigration countries such as Tunisia and Morocco to control their external borders and introduce the 
differentiation between 'regular' and 'irregular' migration through visa policies (Bilgin/Bilgic 2011, 1). 
This securitization and externalization of European migration policies was elaborated within the 
'Wider Europe Initiative' (2003) and the European Security Strategy (2003) introducing new measures 
for the EU's relations with its neighbors aimed at the creation of a 'safe neighborhood'. Revising the 
EMP, the European Neighborhood Policy (ENP) made migration (control) a core issue of the 
Mediterranean 'partnership' in 2004. Introduced in the post-9/11 context, it remained committed to 
an overall security-oriented approach to migration. Focusing on bilateral rather than multilateral 
cooperation, however, it assigned – at least theoretically – the Southern countries a more active role 
in addressing their own priorities, such as co-development, enhanced mobility and 'regular' 
migration (Aubarell/Aragall 2005, 11; Zekri 2008a; 2011b). In sum, the ENP set out to create 'deeper 
levels of political and economic integration across and beyond the region, while simultaneously 
hardening the external borders and extending transnational institutions and practices for border 
regulation and management' (Casas-Cortes et al. 2013). 
Regarding the implementation of European migration and border politics in the Southern 
Mediterranean, Tunisia was a rather 'passive witness' for a long time (Fargues 2004, 1358ff). 
Following the logic of EU politics, the regime of Ben Ali criminalized 'irregular' emigration8 and 
controlled its sea borders accordingly. However, it did not introduce the visa requirements for 
citizens from other African countries demanded by the EU. Instead, motivated by economic concerns 
and the will to maintain ties with its emigrant communities abroad, Tunisia developed some genuine 
policies in the field of 'regular' emigration. Political institutions, such as the Office for Tunisians 
abroad (l‘Office des Tunisiens à l‘Étranger, OTE), founded in 1988, and the High Council of Tunisians 
abroad (l‘Haut Conseil des Tunisiens à l‘Étranger), founded in 1990, were exclusively concerned with 
'regular' emigration and the relations with its citizen abroad. While the early official Tunisian policy in 
this area was to encourage emigrants to return, it later focused on managing the economic, cultural 
and subsequently also political relations with the growing Tunisian diaspora (cf. Fargues 2004, 1362). 
                                                            
7 Between 1986 and 2000 Tunisia saw an average net inflow of 77 300 people, mostly coming from its neighboring region (Boubakri 
2004, 7). 
8 See for example a series of Tunisian laws adopted and published in 2004 (Law n° 1975-40 of 14 May 1975, regarding passports and 
travel documents, modified in 1998, 2004 and 2008). 
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While Tunisia at least to some extent developed policies regarding ('regular') emigration, no 
particular policies or institutional frameworks were designed to address the question of immigration 
and asylum – beyond its sheer criminalization  – under the old regime (Di Bartolomeo et al. 2010, 7).9 
In terms of its foreign policy, 'irregular' emigration and its control in particular, became a subject of 
growing importance as a bargaining tool and tactical resource in Tunisia's multi- and bilateral political 
negotiations (Cassarino/Lavenex 2012). Especially since the EU applies a more liberal rhetoric of 
migration management, dialogue and 'shared responsibility' under the 'Global Approach to 
Migration' (GAM) in 2005, emphasizing cooperation with third countries and advocating more 
flexible temporal and 'regular' movements between the two shores of the Mediterranean, countries 
like Tunisia became more interested in cooperation in migration and border politics with the EU 
(Aubarell/Aragall 2005, 6; Pascouau 2012, Casas-Cortes et al. 2013). However, even under the GAM, 
the economic and politically weaker position of the Southern Mediterranean states vis-à-vis the EU 
practically bound them to address migration as a security problem and to adopt its militarized and 
highly technologized measures. Besides its financial dependence on European 'development aid', 
'cooperation with the EU has allowed access to new technological instruments and resulted in the 
weakening of EU criticism of acts of repression in the short term, [while] it has further alienated civil 
society from the regimes, thus feeding into their insecurity in the long run' (Bilgin/Bilgic 2011, 7).10 
Reconfiguration of migration politics after the 'Arab Spring' 
As shown above, for the second half of the 20th century young Tunisians mostly responded to their 
political and economic frustrations with 'exit', meaning emigration. In the early 2000s, 'voice', 
meaning protest11, became more and more an option, providing the ground for the so-called 
'Tunisian revolution' in January 2011.12 
The Tunisian revolts in 2011 
Frustration among the Tunisian youth is not only seen as a major source of emigration but also a key 
factor for the revolts in 2011 (Fargues 2011; Fargues/Fanderich 2012).13 The longstanding and 
widespread discontent among (not only) Tunisian youth, especially in fields where the patriarchal 
system concentrates political and economic power in the hands of the older generations, finally 
brought together a broad coalition of social and political forces against the Ben Ali regime. Starting 
when the 26 year old street vendor Mohammed Bouazizi burned himself in Sidi Bouzid, a small town 
in central Tunisia on December 17 2010 to protest against the economic conditions and 
mistreatment by the police, the growing protest finally overthrew the 23 year long dictatorship of 
Ben Ali on 14 January 2011. This revolutionary situation affected migration movements in the 
Southern Mediterranean and, as a consequence, challenged politics on both shores. 
                                                            
9  To some extent the UNCHR tried to fill this gap, but its role was weakened by its unauthorized position in Tunisia. 
10 For the point of view of the few existing civil society organizations in Tunisia before the revolution, such as the LTDH and the UGTT, 
see Boubakri 2004 and Zekri 2008b. 
11 Using Hirschman's famous theory of response to deteriorating conditions with 'loyalty', 'exit' or 'voice' (1970) as applied i.a. by 
Souiah as a conceptual framework for the study of 'irregular' migration from Algeria (Souiah 2012). 
12 I am exceptionally using the prominent label ‘Tunisian revolution’ here to refer to the political events that took place in the beginning 
of 2011 in Tunisia at large. Otherwise however I prefer the notions of political revolts, uprisings or rebellions in this context in order 
to highlight the ongoing and uncompleted character of this revolutionary process. 
13 For a detailed discussion of the role of the youth and the Tunisian revolts, see Honwana 2011, and the contribution of Carolina 
Silveira in this collective volume. 
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The 'Italian crisis' 
In the first three months of 2011, 25,000 irregular migrants landed on the Southern Italian Island of 
Lampedusa. Facilitated by the reduced and disorganized policing of borders during the revolts in 
Tunisia, the short increase in Tunisian emigration, however, was mainly due to the strong desire to 
emigrate which predated the revolts (Fargues 2011; Boubakri 2013). Eventually it was mainly the war 
in Libya, from where migrants were fleeing violence and instability that significantly increased the 
transnational movement towards Europe (Fargues/Fanderich 2012, 4). 
EU member states, especially Italy which had enjoyed good diplomatic relations with the Ben Ali 
regime14, reacted with anxiety about the 'exodus' or 'invasion' of Tunisians towards its shores.15 
Declaring a state of emergency, a number of decrees and implementation measures were introduced 
during the first half of 2011 to deal with the migrants arriving in Italy (Maccanico 2012, 4). As a 
result, those who arrived between 1 January and 5 April 2011 were granted six-month temporary 
residence permits for humanitarian reasons. Tunisian immigrants largely used these temporary visas 
to move on towards France, which triggered a quarrel between the two countries and even put the 
Schengen agreement, which had abolished border controls between most EU states in the 1990s, 
under question (Martin 2012, 4). Overall howeve, emigration from North Africa to Europe has – with 
the exception of the increased movement from Tunisia in the first half of 2011 – quickly followed 
earlier trends as border controls in Tunisia were reinstalled or reinforced respectively 
(Fargues/Fanderich 2012)16. 
The 'Libyan crisis' 
The maxim of denying entry into the EU remained the top priority of European policies (Martin 
2012). In this respect, European states also quickly responded to the 'emergency situation' at the 
Tunisian-Libyan border, sending humanitarian and operational support, in order to avoid 'massive 
migration' towards Europe predicted by European media and politicians. 
Comparing to the 700,000 migrants displaced after the war in Libya within North Africa, about 
345,000 of them heading to Tunisia, only a small fraction of about 5% actually tried to reach Europe 
at that time (Fargues 2011). In Tunisia, migrants fleeing or returning from Libya were first taken care 
of by the Tunisian army, the local population and NGOs providing them with basic needs.17 This 
spontaneous reaction showed the general potential for civil society engagement which had been 
suppressed by the old regime in Tunisia (Zekri 2011). While the vast majority of the migrants were 
repatriated with the help of International Organizations (IOs) or had left Tunisia on their own by mid-
2011, about 1000 refugees remained in Tunisia's first refugee camps since the Algerian war in 1962. 
The Choucha camp run by the UNHCR quickly became the biggest and most permanent site among 
                                                            
14 Already 1998 Italy and Tunisia signed the first readmission agreement, started joined border patrol trainings and missions in the 
Mediterranean and negotiated 'regular' migration quotas for Tunisians in Italy. 
15 For a detailed account of Italian, French and the EU’s reaction see in particular Ben Achour and Ben Jemia 2011 as well as Schäfer 
2011a. 
16 The rising numbers of crossings of the Mediterranean since mid-2013 despite these enhanced security and their political and 
humanitarian consequences – such as the introduction of EUROSUR, the Mediterranean Task Force, the Italian 'Mare Nostrum' and 
most recently its European successor FRONTEX Plus/Triton – are new and important trends to analyze but must remain beyond the 
scope of this paper. 
17 See blog entry by Boubakri, H. and Potot, S., 'Migrations tunisiennes: quand les visas se tarissent, la mer prend le relais', Mars 11, 
2011 on http://blogs.mediapart.fr/blog/swpotot/100311/exode-et-migrations-en-tunisie-quand-la-societe-civile-se-reveille. 
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them (Boubakri 2013, 11). As a result, Tunisia became a host country for large-scale immigration 
which led the country to embark upon a – still ongoing – process to reform its insufficient asylum 
system (Planes-Bloissac 2012). 
The reconfiguration of Tunisian migration politics 'from above' 
Shortly after the Tunisian revolts, the EU tried to reestablish re-admission agreements and border 
control cooperation with the post-revolution transitional authorities. However, despite the 
remaining unequal power relations between the two shores of the Mediterranean, the new Tunisian 
authorities were hesitant to accept treating migration as a mere security issue at first, as they 
became more reluctant to implement any European-driven decision against the will of an 
increasingly self-confident and organized civil society (Maccanico 2012, 2; Ben Khalifa 2013, 182). As 
a consequence, dimensions of 'technical operational cooperation' and 'inclusive development' 
(Cassarino/Lavenex 2012) as well as 'extra financial assistance' of about €140 million were added as 
incentives to the new bilateral arrangements (Fargues/Fanderich 2012, 7). A Cooperation 
Agreement, signed under these conditions with Italy on 5 April 2011, stated that the EU supports 
reforms in Tunisia but expects 'strong and clear action by Tunisia to accept the readmission of its 
nationals who are irregularly in Europe' and in 'fighting irregular migration'. In a similar sense, the 
'Partnership for Democracy and Shared Prosperity' (2011) and the so-called 'Dialogues for Migration, 
Mobility and Security' at the center of the renewed 'Global Approach to Migration and Mobility' 
(GAMM) in 2011 explicitly introduced the principle of conditionality under a new 'more for more' 
slogan to EU-Tunisian relations (Zekri 2011, 6; Pascouau 2012, 58).  
When negotiations of so-called 'Mobility Partnerships' started under this new framework in 2011, 
many Tunisian actors at first showed equally little enthusiasm for the European version. Instead they 
put forward their own priorities quite different from those envisaged by the EU, making an 
agreement far from certain for about three years (Fargues/Fanderich 2012, 8). According to a report 
by the Tunisian migration researcher Boubakri, all political parties in the new parliament agreed that 
Tunisia should no longer play the gatekeeper for European borders and emphasized the need for 
humane treatment of refugees in Tunisia (2013). Furthermore, civil society actors campaigned to be 
involved in the various stages of the negotiation process (Zekri 2011, 2). As a representative of 
Tunisia’s biggest trade union UGTT critically summarizes, “[t]he position of the Tunisian government 
is never clear. I do not remember exactly, but if it is about encouraging migrants to return in 
exchange for a little money, then this has little to do with the dignity of the Tunisian citizen and 
national sovereignty in international forums” (quoted in Boubakri 2013, 18). Despite the widely 
articulated domestic and international skepticism18, the Tunisian government signed a 'Privileged 
Partnership' with the EU in November 2012, whose Action Plan for 2013-2017 called for greater 
participation by civil society actors in designing renewed EU-Tunisian relations but also explicitly 
stated the objective of concluding a 'Partnership for Mobility'.19 One and a half years later, Tunisian 
                                                            
18 For the critical position of Tunisian civil society actors the see 'EU-Tunisia Mobility Partnership: Externalization policy in disguise', 
December 3, 2013 on http://httpn-www.fidh.org/en/north-africa-middle-east/tunisia/14335-eu-tunisia-mobility-partnership-
externalisation-policy-in-disguise, 'Adresse à M. Mehdi Jomaa, nouveau chef du gouvernement intérimaire', January 5, 2014 on 
http://ffm-online.org/2014/01/05/aufruf-tunesischer-migrantinnenverbaende/#more-17337 and 'Non aux accords de gestion 
concertée de l'immigration imposée par l'Union Européenne aux pays limitrophes de l'UE', March 10, 2014 on http://ffm-
online.org/2014/03/10/tunesien-marokko-eu-nein-zu-den-mobilitaetspartnerschaften/#more-19567. 
19 ‘Relations Tunisie – Union Européenne: Un partenariat privilégie. Plan d'action 2013 – 2017' on 
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authorities finally agreed with the representatives of the EU and its member states to open 
negotiations under the framework of this 'Partnership for Mobility'. This non-binding agreement 
basically offers Tunisia the facility of short term legal migration for some specific groups (such as 
students, researchers and highly qualified Tunisians) in exchange for its readmission of 'irregular' 
Tunisians and other migrants who entered the EU clandestinely through Tunisia.20 
Criticism again came from both sides of the Mediterranean: According to the declaration of a 
transnational civil society network 'it offers only half-hearted commitments to promote legal 
avenues to access the European territory, mainly facilitation of short-term visas for the most 
privileged and/or qualified persons'21. But also former EU Home Affairs Commissioner Malström 
criticized the EU member states for their double standards regarding the application of democratic 
and human rights principles in their foreign policies on the one hand, and their migration politics on 
the other: 'In 2011, the EU missed a historic opportunity to demonstrate its commitment to the 
foundations it is built on. It is as if we'd said to them: “It is wonderful that you make a revolution and 
want democracy but, by all means [possible], stay where you are because we have an economic crisis 
to deal with here.”' (quoted in de Haas/Sigona 2012, 4). In sum, despite its humanitarian and 
democracy-oriented rhetoric, the EU did not offer any new responses to the challenges of cross-
Mediterranean migration after the 'Arab Spring' but rather continued its efforts to strengthen 
restrictive border controls and pressure on readmission agreements (Fargues/Fanderich 2012, 5; Ben 
Achour/Ben Jemia 2011; Zekri 2011; Carrera et al. 2012; Report of the UN Commissioner of Human 
Rights 2012). Whether and how the Tunisian government will follow the incentives given by the EU 
and its member states and implement the security-oriented cooperation agreements or liberate itself 
towards a more human rights oriented agenda remains to be seen. 
After three years, it seems that migration politics have not ranked among the highest priorities 
during Tunisia’s transition period. Observations so far remain ambivalent. First of all, the ongoing 
reform of existing institutions (such as OTE) and the creation of new ones (e.g. a Secretary of State 
for Migration and Tunisians Abroad (le Secrétariat d‘État des Migrations et des Tunisiens à l‘Étranger- 
SEMTE), an Agency of Migration and Development (l‘Agence pour la Migration et le Développement) 
and a National Migration Observatory (l‘Observateur National pour la Migration)) has had high 
priority for the new Tunisian authorities, to better link Tunisians abroad to their 'home country' and 
thus enhance economic and political development through migration.22 In this context, the interim 
government also 'insists on revising migration agreements with European states in order to link 
actions to prevent irregular migration with measures to boost development' (Fargues/Fanderich 
2012, 9). Seeking for the first time also their political participation, Tunisians Residing Abroad was 
granted a representative in the Tunisian Parliament. Another new government body, the SEMTE, is 
now focusing exclusively on migration issues (Boubakri 2013, 14ff). 
                                                                                                                                                                                          
http://eeas.europa.eu/delegations/tunisia/documents/press_corner/plan_action_tunisie_ue_2013_2017_fr.pdf. 
20 ‘Déclaration conjointe pour le Partenariat de Mobilitè entre la Tunisie, l'Union Européenne et ses États membres participants.', 3 
March 2014. In: http://ec.europa.eu/dgs/home-affairs/e-library/documents/policies/international-
affairs/general/docs/declaration_conjointe_tunisia_eu_mobility_fr.pdf as well as 'EU and Tunisia establish Mobility partnership', 
Press Release March 3, 2014 on http://europa.eu/rapid/press-release_IP-14-208_fr.htm. 
21 ‘Tunisia-EU Mobility Partnership: a Forced March towards the Externalization of Borders', March 17, 2014 on 
http://www.migreurop.org/article2492.html?lang=fr. 
22 As (registered) financial remittances send ‘home’ from Tunisians abroad account for about 5% of the Tunisian GDP. 
  
 
 
Youth, Revolt, Recognition. The Young Generation during and after the „Arab Spring“. 
Berlin 2015: Mediterranean Institute Berlin (MIB)/Humboldt University Berlin, edited volume by Isabel Schäfer. 
70 
 
Regarding immigration, Tunisia under transition has kept an 'open-door policy' at least towards 
immigrants fleeing the war in Libya and has – supported by the EU and the UNHCR – started to 
reform its incomplete legal framework concerning the rights of immigrants, asylum seekers and 
refugees in Tunisia (Planes-Boissac 2012). While the new constitution formally acknowledges under 
Article 26 the right to political asylum and prohibits extraditing political refugees, Tunisia has not yet 
adopted legislation replacing the 2004 law generally criminalizing 'irregular' migration. For the time 
being, no residence permits have been delivered to refugees in Tunisia, but the asylum procedure by 
the UNHCR in cooperation with the Red Crescent remains tolerated (Statewatch 2014). As 'the 
Tunisian government [is] obviously unwilling to become the de facto reception country for massive 
push backs at sea'23, migrants that are returned to Tunisia or 'rescued' at sea by the Tunisian National 
Guard occasionally find themselves in prison or detention centers or even further deported or 
returned 'voluntarily' to other African countries (cf. BfdW et al. 2013, 11). In this respect, while 
Tunisian authorities rarely openly oppose the EU, they silently refused to participate in one of the 
latest European initiatives, the Seahorse network through which information about incidents and 
patrols in the Mediterranean could be exchanged. 
Therefore it remains an open question, whether the growing demands for democratic and human 
rights within Tunisia, also pushes its government towards more inclusive and respectful immigration 
policies at home and a more critical stance towards the security-oriented European policies. 
Regardless, the incoming Tunisian government has already been asked to 'define its own priorities 
and underlying principles on migration policy and make them public' (Cassarino/Lavenex 2012). In 
this context, an emerging independent civil society can play a decisive role in the promotion of 
migration politics that are more focused on migrants' rights than European security interests 
(Crépeau 2012). 
In sum, while both emigration and protest have been observed to increase with the rise of a new 
connected and informed generation of frustrated young Tunisians, these have mainly been perceived 
as two either-or options (namely 'voice' and 'exit') in academic literature (Fargues 2011; 
Fargues/Fanderich 2012). In addition, I argue for a third effect that can be observed in the current 
Tunisian society where by the two options are combined leading to an increasing politicization of 
migration issues 'from below'. In the remaining paper, I will present three examples of how young 
and independent civil society movements are raising their voices against the dominant national as 
well as international border and migration policies. 
Challenging Tunisian migration politics 'from below' 
Before the revolts in 2011, the topic of migration had been largely absent from the media and public 
debates in Tunisia (Zekri 2008a, 12; Planes-Boissac 2010, 14). There were neither civil society 
organizations specialized in migration and asylum politics nor any migrants’ (self-)organizations in 
Tunisia.24 And even at times of consolidation and re-organization of the Tunisian state, migration 
policy often took a 'backseat' in official state politics (Fargues/Fanderich 2012, 12). 
                                                            
23  http://ffm-online.org/2014/04/24/lampedusa-28-000-boat-people-nutzten-mare-nostrum-eu-militaer-nordafrikanische-haefen/. 
24 For the role of the numerous associations of Tunisians Residing Abroad defending their rights within Tunisian politics before and 
after the 'revolution' which are beyond the scope of this paper, see Zekri 2009, 2011. 
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The emerging role of an independent civil society in Tunisian migration politics 
Young people, however, were not only leading the protest against the Ben Ali regime, they were also 
the ones keeping migration on the Tunisian political agenda. As they remain skeptical about and 
widely absent from the creation of the numerous new political parties, they rather organize in civil 
society associations and social movements that more directly articulate 'their' problems (Howana 
2011, 17). Often young people who initiated the revolution were not politically organized before, as 
criticism of political or social conditions was systematically repressed under the old regime. 
Furthermore, freedom of association was virtually non-existent (Boubakri 2013, 29). 'With few 
exceptions such as the Tunisian League for Human Rights, all organizations and associations that 
worked on political issues were denied legal registration [in Tunisia. As such, they had a] very limited 
margin for maneuver, since they were not allowed to hold public meetings or engage in any sort of 
public criticism of the regime' (Honwana 2011, 7). The funding possibilities for autonomous civil 
society engagement were equally precarious, as European support for example was mostly directed 
towards state institutions under the Ben Ali regime (BfdW et al. 2013, 9). For the field of migration 
politics, this meant that independent expression and political action by individuals or unauthorized 
associations was practically almost impossible (Boubakri 2013, 20)25. 
Nevertheless, two types of non-state actors addressing the issue of migration were present during 
this time in Tunisia. On the one hand, humanitarian organizations, such as the social service branch 
of the Catholic Church, Caritas, and the operational partner of the UNHCR, the Tunisian Red Crescent, 
were providing humanitarian and material assistance to vulnerable migrants. On the other hand, a 
few established organizations not specialized in migration incorporated such issues into their overall 
agenda on human rights (the Tunisian League for Human Rights/la Ligue Tunisienne des Droits de 
l‘Homme, LTDH), on workers’ rights (l'UGTT).  Among them, the UGTT had the most elaborate 
political program on migration in Tunisia and the way it should be treated (Zekri 2008a, 11)26. 
Furthermore, women's organizations, such as the Tunisian Association of Democratic Women 
(l'Association Tunisienne des Femmes démocratiques, ATFD) and the Association of Tunisian Women 
for Development Research (l‘Association des Femmes Tunisiennes pour la Recherche sur le 
Développement, AFTURD) occasionally addressed the case of migrant and refugee women within the 
scope of their actions. 
Only after the revolts has Tunisian civil society achieved a significant degree of freedom to conduct 
independent activities to support the rights of migrants, refugees and asylum seekers (Planes-Boissac 
2012, 56). No longer bound by the hegemonic political discourse and ideologies, they quickly created 
new ways of engaging the state and society in these issues (Honwana 2011, 20). As the result, two 
years later, the creation, institutionalization and transnationalization of new independent 
movements and associations in the field of migration politics can be observed. I observed and 
interviewed three of them at the WSF 2013. 
                                                            
25 More than 6000 associations, often so-called TROs (Truly Governmental Organizations) existed who were subject to political 
authorities and the Ministry of the Interior in particular. In the area of migration politics, their main mission was the (political) control 
of the Tunisian diaspora (Boubakri 2013, 20). For a good historical overview of the associative sector in Tunisia, see also Zekri 2009. 
26 The UGTT's Department of International Relations and Emigration for example started to organize conferences on migration issues in 
2007 (Zekri 2009, 9). 
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„L’Association des Familles Victimes de l’Immigration Clandestine“(AFVIC) – The Association of 
Families Victim of Clandestine Immigration 
According to the Council of Europe, 2000 migrants are estimated to have died in the Mediterranean 
Sea in 2011, at a time when it had become one of the most militarized and heavily patrolled areas of 
the globe (Ben Achour/Ben Jemia 2011; de Haas and Sigora 2012). The blog Fortress Europe has 
counted 1,674 deaths in the Sicilian channel in 2011, approximately 83% of all deaths in the 
Mediterranean Sea.27 As a result, a movement of Tunisian, European and other North African 
associations began to protest against the gap between the EU’s rhetoric and actual practices of 
human rights within their migration management leading to what became known as the first 
'migration revolt' in Tunisia (Dünnwald/Kopp 2013, 24). 
In this context families of about 350 missing migrants, who began to organize themselves in the 
Association of Families Victim of Clandestine Immigration (AFVIC) in 2011 in order to search for their 
relatives, became publicly known. Starting with spontaneous sit-ins, hunger strikes and attempts to 
burn themselves, in order to receive public attention, they quickly started to cooperate with Tunisian 
but also European associations (Ben Khalifa 2013; Liberation September 13, 2013). Since then, 
Migreurop28 in France and the women's collective Il Venticinque Undici in Italy have been supporting 
their search for information about the missing migrants in Europe and continue their protest against 
detention, deportation and expulsion by the French and Italian authorities on the Northern shore of 
the Mediterranean. On the Tunisian side, the Tunisian Forum on Economic and Social Rights (le 
Forum Tunisien pour les Droits Économiques et Sociaux, FTDES) 29 helped the families to raise public 
attention, for example through jointly organizing demonstrations in the capital30. Together with the 
International Human Rights League, the LTDH and the ATFD, the FTDES called the Tunisian prime 
minister to sign the United Nations Convention on the Protection of all Migrant Workers and 
Members of their Families.31 Furthermore, a broader transnational movement was initiated in spring 
2011 by the French associations, la Cimade32 and Migreurop together with the Moroccan association 
GADEM33 to denounce the consequences of European migration policy towards Tunisia and reinforce 
the relationship with the newly established independent civil society actors (la Cimade/GADEM 
2011). Due to this combined transnational pressure, the newly appointed SEMTE became active for 
the first time. Representing the Tunisian government on the issue, the new Secretary of State for 
migration issues met with the families concerned, re-opened files of unsolved cases and - in 
cooperation with Italian authorities - started a mission to collect information about the migrants who 
'disappeared' between January and April 2011 and those irregularly held in detention centers in the 
EU (Ben Khalifa 2013, 184; Boubakri 2013, 14). 
                                                            
27 See http://fortresseurope.blogspot.com.search/label/CIE?updated-max=2011-07-18T17%3A05%3A00%2B02%3A00&max-results=20. 
28 http://www.migreurop.org/. 
29 http://www.ftdes.net/. 
30 For example, in front of the Italian embassy when the Italian president Berlusconi visited Tunisia on April 4, 2011; see 'Manifestation 
anti Berlusconi devant l’Ambassade d’Italie en Tunisie', April 4, 2011 on http://www.kapitalis.com/politique/3377-manifestation-
anti-berlusconi-devant-lambassade-ditalie-en-tunisie.html. 
31 ‘Tunisie: Appel à la ratification de la Convention international sur les travailleurs migrants', Lettre ouverte au Premier ministre, July 
25, 2011 on http://www.fidh.org/fr/maghreb-moyen-orient/tunisie/Tunisie-Appel-a-la-ratification-de. 
32    http://www.lacimade.org/. 
33    http://www.gadem-asso.org/. 
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Furthermore, after demonstrations and sit-ins in front of the Ministry of the Interior jointly organized 
by the AFVIC and FTDES, an agreement between the Tunisian government and the EU was reached to 
establish a board of inquiry on the shipwreck of 6 September (Planes-Boissac 2012, 54). In addition, 
the Tunisian and Italian governments announced plans to revise their bilateral agreements to include 
a 'global dimension taking into account the causes which push young Tunisians to risk their lives at 
sea' (Tunisian Press Agency, September 13, 2012). According to Boubakri, the political pressure of a 
transnational political movement put on authorities on both sides of the Mediterranean Sea explains 
the campaign's success 'to make the two governments redouble efforts to find survivors, to identify 
prisoners and to allow families to mourn whose relative are confirmed missing' (2013, 14f.). 
Meanwhile, Tunisian associations keep up the pressure and even harden their tone vis-à-vis their 
government demanding greater distance from the EU migration policies and more serious 
investigations into the missing migrants. In addition, traditionally influential Tunisian organizations 
such as the LTDH and the UGTT have joined the demand for an independent commission of inquiry 
including authorities, NGOs and representatives of the families concerned, which despite all 
expressions of good will is still rejected by the Tunisian government (Ben Khalifa 2013, 183). 
Protesting at the WSF 2013, a more experienced and well connected AFVIC was turning towards the 
international community and addressed directly the EU Commission as the highest instance for their 
demands for investigations about the disappearances in the Mediterranean Sea. 
'Voices from Choucha' – The protest of refugees from the 'Choucha Camp' 
After the outbreak of the war in Libya in February 2011, hundreds of thousands of people - Libyans 
and foreign refugees - crossed the border into Tunisia. Four camps were installed at the Tunisian side 
of the border to accommodate the refugees. The Choucha camp, opened in February 2011 about 
9km from the border, was the largest of them and remained in operation the longest. It was directed 
by the UNHCR and managed by the Danish Refugee Council and the International Organization for 
Migration (IOM). Intended for a few thousand refugees, there were about 20,000 people living there 
by 2012. The camp became overcrowded and lacked food, water and medical supplies. Tensions also 
existed between different communities in the camp (CeTuMa 2013). 
However, the refugees living in Choucha, were not allowed to move around freely in Tunisia, but had 
to remain in the region around the camp. While many of them – more than 4000 according to the 
UNHCR official numbers34 – were recognized and resettled in other countries by the UNHCR or left 
the country on their own, about 500 still have no legal status in Tunisia. They have not been not 
recognized by the UNHCR as refugees and Tunisia has no law on asylum to regularize their situation 
(Crépeau 2012). Others, who were recognized but not accepted to the resettlement program, were 
offered 'local integration' within Southern Tunisia even though the institutional framework and 
available funding options were insufficient to do so.35 Therefore, those who do not want or cannot 
return to Libya or their countries of origin still find themselves in a precarious situation of 
                                                            
34 As quoted from Al-Jamai, M., 'A Refuge No More. Camp Choucha officially closed on June 30 but some refugees are refusing to go', 
July 1, 2013 on http://www.correspondents.org/node/2946. 
35 Those who participated in the 'local integration program' (that was co-financed by European countries) were offered 90 DT (about 
45€) to rent a house somewhere near in Ben Gardène/Guerdene (Tringham 2013). Due to this impossible task and the experienced 
(racial) discrimination while trying to do so, more than 50% refused to participate in the program (see also 'Choucha Refugee Camp 
to Close, Leaving Hundreds of Residents in Limbo', June 28, 2013 on http://www.tunisia-live.net/2013/06/28/choucha-refugee-
camp-to-close-leaving-hundreds-of-residents-in.limbo/). 
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lawlessness and discrimination in Tunisia. 'Officially it is as if they do not exist'36. While dozens of 
humanitarian organizations worked in and around the camp when it opened in 2011, today only the 
Tunisian Army is present and it is about to turn the space into a military zone37. Since October 2011, 
the UNHCR has continuously decreased its provision of food and medical supplies. In April 2013 they 
cut the electricity for the first time and reduced the amount of drinking water in order to persuade 
those who had not been accepted on the resettlement program to participate in the IOM's 'voluntary 
return program' (Tringham 2013). Despite this unsettled situation, the EU called its humanitarian 
management a 'successful strategy' (Lüdemann 2013) and the UNHCR closed the camp in June 2013 
without offering acceptable solutions to those still remaining in the desert without food, water, 
money or medical supplies38. Nevertheless, about 150 refugees have chosen to stay and others have 
even returned to the camp, which the refugees are now running by themselves. Many who had left 
experienced discrimination or were unable to find 'legal' jobs or affordable accommodation in the 
cities of Southern Tunisia. Moreover, those 'rescued' at sea by the Tunisian National Guard have 
found a place to stay in this tolerated 'ghost town' after leaving the city of Medenine where the 
UNHCR and the Red Crescent today focus their operations. For those returning to or remaining in 
Choucha today, the choice seems to be try to find work in Libya or take a boat towards Italy39. 
As a consequence of their desperate situation, the refugees who were excluded from the 
resettlement program or not even recognized as refugees by the UNHCR started a nationwide 
protest in May 2011, which increasingly raised international attention and transnational solidarity. 
Their major demands are to be accorded asylum and to be granted international protection in a 'safe 
country' (meaning one with an effective system of protection, which is absent in Tunisia) and thus a 
general resettlement for everyone in the Choucha camp.40 
Starting with peaceful demonstrations on the main streets around the camp in May 2012, a group of 
50 refugees went to the Tunisian capital located 400km north of the Choucha camp one year later to 
conduct a hunger strike in front of the UNHCR head office in Tunis. At first, their protest focused 
mainly on the UNHCR as the responsible actor for their desperate situation (Jungle World April, 14 
2013). Between February and April 2013, they organized sit-ins in front of the office of the EU and 
European embassies located in Tunis calling them to 'finish their job' and to 'stand up to their 
responsibilities, not turning deaf ears to the situation' but allowing the refugees admission into their 
countries.41 Finally, they also went to the Tunisian government to demand an end to the 'local 
integration program'.42 Since none of these actors has accepted responsibility or taken any action as 
a result – apart from calling the Tunisian police and sending the protesting refugees to jail43 – the 
                                                            
36 Pradilla, A., 'Libya: Refugees of Libyan War Protest at World Social Forum', March 31, 2013 on 
http://allafrica.com/stories/201304010087.html. 
37 See http://blechvisa.blogspot.de/. 
38 See Choucha protest solidarity blog which reports how the Tunisian military has helped emptying the remaining water tanks and 
tearing down the toilets on http://chouchaprotest.noblogs.org/. 
39 Report Choucha Delegation vom 18.Januar bis zum 26.Januar 2014' on http://www.borderline-
europe.de/sites/default/files/features/Report_Deutsch_Endversion-3.pdf. 
40 See http://voiceofchoucha.wordpress.com/. 
41 Protest declaration' February 2, 2013 by 'voiceofchoucha' on http://voiceofchoucha.wordpress.com/. 
42 Protest für Flüchtlingsrechte vor der EU-Delegation in Tunis, Tunesien', Press Release of the Choucha Solidarity Network, April 23, 
2013 on chouchaprotest.noblogs.org. 
43 ‘La prison ou l'expulsion pour les réfugiés de Choucha?' Communique de presse, February 9, 2014 on http://ffm-
online.org/2014/02/09/tunis-20-protestierende-choucha-fluechtlinge-vor-eu-delegation-verhaftet/#more-18439 and ‘Tunis: 
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refugees used the WSF 2013 as a broader platform for their demands calling Tunisian and foreign 
activists for support (Jungle World April, 14 2013). 
Consequently, other newly established Tunisian associations, together with transnational networks 
and organizations, have put the rights of refugees of the Choucha camp high on their agenda. The 
FTDES, CeTuMa44 and the LTDH have organized conferences and published press releases to raise 
attention on the obligations of the Tunisian government, the UNHCR and the NATO member states 
involved in the war in Libya. The FTDES carries out and coordinates activities to support refugees in 
the Choucha camp. Ironically the UNHCR uses their growing activism as an excuse: 'Tunisia has one of 
the most active civil society movements after their revolution. There are a lot of options; the UNHCR 
isn't the only actor in Tunisia.45 
In addition, activists from Choucha and the Tunisian solidarity associations got in contact with 
organizations and networks from Europe who collect funds and raise awareness about the situation 
in Choucha.5346 Together they have organized press conferences, debates, film screenings and 
demonstrations not only in Tunisia but also in many European capitals, promoting an image of the 
refugees in Tunisia not as victims or objects of help but as actors of resistance articulating their 
demands for political and social rights. 
'Article 13' – Fighting for the right to stay and the right to leave 
Besides these rather spontaneous protest movements addressing international migration and border 
politics as well as the unsettled situation within Tunisia as a country of transit and immigration, a 
number of new independent associations have further institutionalized the political struggle for 
migrant rights 'from below'. 
The youth association Article 13 founded in summer 2012 in Tunis is one of them.5447 Inspired by the 
preparations for the WSF 2013, a group of young women, who had already been active in university 
groups and other human rights associations before, started to self-organize around questions of 
freedom of movement and refugee rights within Tunisia. Their aim is to enhance critical discussions 
within Tunisian society about these issues and about alternatives to the dangerous journeys across 
the Mediterranean Sea. 
Well-connected within Tunisian civil society as well as abroad, they address migration from a 
perspective (not only) new to the Tunisian political discourse. The name Article 13 was chosen in 
reference to Article 13 of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights (stating that everybody has the 
right to leave his or her own country and to come back), and to Article 14 (referring to the right to 
                                                                                                                                                                                          
Choucha Protest vor EU-Delegation' March 19, 2014 on http://ffm-online.org/2014/03/19/tunis-choucha-protest-vor-eu-delegation/. 
44 Tunis Centre for Migration and Asylum (Centre de Tunis pour la Migrantion et l'Asile, CeTuMa), a new NGO attached to the academic 
sphere aims to enhance public and scientific discussion about a new immigration policy in Tunisia. 
45 Al-Achni, D. (Regional Public Information Officer) for the UNHCR in Tunisia quoted in 'Choucha Refugee Camp to Close, Leaving 
Hundreds of Residents in Limbo' at TunisiaLive, June 28, 2013 on http://www.tunisia-live.net/2013/06/28/choucha-refugee-camp-to-
close-leaving-hundreds-of-residents-in-limbo/. 
46 For example Afrique-Europe-Interact, Boats for People, Welcome to Europe, borderline Europe and Forschungstelle für Flucht und 
Migration (FFM). For current events, such as the day of transnational protest in Tunisia in September 2013 or the protest in front of 
the conference of the ministries of interior in Germany in December 2013, follow http://chouchaprotest.noblogs.org/ and 
www.afrique-europe-interact.net. 
47 See http://blechvisa.blogspot.de/. 
 
  
 
 
Youth, Revolt, Recognition. The Young Generation during and after the „Arab Spring“. 
Berlin 2015: Mediterranean Institute Berlin (MIB)/Humboldt University Berlin, edited volume by Isabel Schäfer. 
76 
 
stay there under good social conditions). The association Article 13 connects migration issues to the 
fight for social rights, fair development and good working conditions. In a broader perspective, the 
initiative criticizes the world's unequal living conditions, which result from the global economic 
system and the restrictions of the global migration regime. In a practical sense, it seeks to fight 
against the European border regime from the Southern side of the Mediterranean and therefore 
demands reciprocity of visa requirements between all countries. As a first step, it has initiated 
protest against the visa fees required by European states. It has started information campaigns to 
educate the Tunisian population about the visa regime widely perceived as 'normal', though it is the 
result of a political decision from the 1990s. Meanwhile, Article 13 is also fighting for the rights of 
people who pass through Tunisia on their way to Europe. In this context, they also try to put pressure 
on the Tunisian government to respect and to recognise the international conventions for the 
protection of human rights and freedom of movement. 
Focused on these thematic axes and born out of a context of transnational engagement during the 
preparation of the WSF 2013, the political activism of Article 13 is largely motivated by the wish to 
demonstrate that all people – whether migrants, potential migrants or non-migrants – from the 
Southern side of the Mediterranean are 'not only victims' but that they will also fight for their rights – 
to move but also to stay. In this context, their genuine concern seems to be the question of how to 
connect wide spread, mostly European dominated 'No border'-struggles with the Tunisian context 
where migration also means danger, loss and grief for many families concerned. 
Conclusion 
In conclusion, while emigration is socially and culturally present in almost every Tunisian family, the 
issue is only now being politicized within Tunisian society. After the revolts of 2011, young Tunisians 
have not only opted for 'voice' – meaning protest – or 'exit' – meaning emigration – but have also 
started to politicize and mobilize around migration issues. Therefore, today we can speak not only of 
a reconfiguration of Tunisian migration politics 'from above' – meaning the reorganization of official 
state policies on both sides of the Mediterranean in reaction to the 'Arab Spring' – but also 'from 
below' – meaning the increasing influence of independent civil society actors in this field. Only three 
years after the revolts in Tunisia new movements in more or less institutionalized forms have 
emerged on the Tunisian political landscape that address migration issues from an independent, self-
confident and critical perspective, claiming rights instead of asking for help. Whether focusing on the 
rights of those who have already emigrated and are now missing (AFVIC), those who immigrated to 
Tunisia and left without an adequate framework of asylum (the Choucha protest) or those thinking 
about emigration in the future (Article 13), their protest not only addresses the Tunisian authorities 
but also directly the Italian government, the EU and the UNHCR, who are seen as responsible for the 
current situation in Tunisia. Furthermore, not only the direction of their protest is transnational but 
also their cooperation. The young movements are not only well connected within Tunisia and 
regularly join each other’s protests, they are also closely linked with existing movements from 
different countries and continents in the transnational struggle for the freedom of movement. In this 
respect, the WSF 2013 in Tunisia, as a global meeting and exchange about struggles around migration 
issues, provided an important first opportunity to share and discuss particular Tunisian perspectives 
within a transnational forum. At the same time, however, it indicated the ambivalence between the 
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emerging transnational solidarity on the one side and the reproduction of global power relations 
even within these struggles through its forms and goals of political organization on the other – a 
process that demands further observation, (self-)reflection and analysis 
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Migration and Youth - A Moroccan Perspective 
Bachir Hamdouch 
Introduction: The Evolution and Importance of International Migration for Morocco  
Migration is specific to youth as few elderly people emigrate. The Moroccan population living abroad 
is estimated at 4.5 million people, of which 85% are living in Europe. It represents about 13% of 
Morocco's population (34 million).1 More importantly, more than two thirds of Moroccan 
households are directly affected by international migration, with at least one of their members living 
abroad or having returned from living abroad. Throughout the country, all walks of life, men and 
women, all levels of education are affected.  
Until the early 1970s, most of the emigrants came from two poor rural areas, Souss - Massa -Draa 
(South West) and East Rif (North East). Emigrants from the former went predominantly to France and 
Wallonia in Belgium, while and those from the latter to Flanders, the Netherlands and Germany, 
mostly within the framework of bilateral labor agreements. It was almost exclusively young men, 
illiterate or with a rudimentary education. 
This migration has evolved considerably since the mid-1970s, when Europe severely restricted the 
entry of workers from the South. Three notable changes occurred: the number of Moroccans living 
abroad (MLA) has tripled; migration has become ‘feminized’ and became balanced in terms of 
gender; and migration patterns have radically changed, from a temporary and circular migration, to 
permanent migration.2 
Remittances reached their peak in 2007 and at 9% of GDP represented the most important source of 
foreign currency in the country. They have since declined – due to the global economic crisis and 
tighter immigration controls in Europe – in both absolute and relative terms, representing only 7% of 
GDP in the period 2008-2014. They are now the second most important source of foreign currency, 
after tourism but before foreign direct investment. 
All this raises the question of the future role of international migration in Morocco, particularly for 
young people who are the main source of emigrants. What are the recent trends in international 
migration in Morocco, the changing profile of emigrants, the propensity to emigrate and return? 
What perspectives (conclusions?) can be drawn? These are the questions to which we (I?) will try to 
provide answers in this paper.  
Recent Trends in International Migration in Morocco  
Three important recent trends are emerging: The first trend is less emigration over the past six years, 
particularly in Europe, due to the global economic crisis affecting most countries of the European 
Union. According to official statistics registered with the consulates of Morocco, the annual growth 
rate of MLA3 has been less than 2% since 2008, whereas it was almost 5% in the 1990s and 2000s and 
                                                            
1 Haut Commissariat au Plan (2012).  
2 Hamdouch B. & Al. (2000), Hamdouch B. (ed.) (2008). 
3  These statistics underestimate the number of MLA, because they record only those who want to register with consulates and who 
need their services, whether regular or irregular. 
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over 10% in both the 1970s and 1980s.4 So, there has been a progressive reduction in the rate of 
emigration. 
The second trend is more returns of MLA from Europe due to the economic crisis, and from the 
United States because of the changed social climate post-9/11, but also because of the greater 
resilience of the Moroccan economy and the improvement of the socio-political context in Morocco. 
No longer is it only retirees who return to the country, but also recent graduates and other highly 
skilled young people who have been working in well-paid jobs (finance, management and marketing, 
new technologies); retired MLA have been returning to Morocco less since the second half of 1970.5 
Young people returning are often sent by multinational companies for whom they have worked 
abroad in order establish or strengthen subsidiaries in Morocco, or they are attracted by high 
government positions, or opportunities for promising career in major Moroccan public or private 
companies, or finally by creating their own businesses.6 
The third trend concerns immigration to Morocco by Europeans, Sub-Saharan Africans, Arabs and 
those from other continents. Sub-Saharan Africans are now less likely to be in transit to Europe, 
which is almost inaccessible, and more likely to be migrating to Morocco. It is the same with 
European and Arab citizens – especially since the "Arab Spring" – and nationals of countries in Asia, 
particularly those from China. 
A new Moroccan immigration policy is being developed and implemented to take the new reality of 
immigration in Morocco into account.7 
The Evolution of Moroccan Emigrants’ Profiles 
Migrants are generally young; the proportion of women has sharply increased; they are more 
educated and skilled, and finally their destinations are more diversified, although Europe remains 
predominant. 
Young Emigrants 
Investigations in Morocco since the 1970s show the continuity of the predominance of young people 
among the emigrants. The average age at the time of emigration abroad has changed little, ranging 
between 24 and 25 years since the 1960s. Only in the second half of the 1970s did it fall to 22 years 
due to the importance of family reunification which followed the cessation of labor migration from 
the South and change migration model, the transition from a largely circular migration to permanent 
migration.8 Another survey conducted in 2005 indicates that the average age of Moroccans living in 
Europe was 23 years old at the time of their departure from Morocco. Young people aged 20 to 29 
years account for 61% of emigrants; those from 15 to 19 years 15%, and those aged 30 to 39 years 
13%.9 
                                                            
4  ETF/AMERM (Nov. 2012). 
5 Hamdouch B. (2006 a). 
6 Hamdouch B. (2006 b), Haut Commissariat au Plan (2006), Association Maroc Entrepreneurs (2007). 
7  Hamdouch B. (October 2013). 
8  Hamdouch B. et al (2000). 
9  Hamdouch B. (ed.) (2008). 
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Increase of Female Emigration 
After the emigration of women within the framework of family reunification, their independent 
migration is becoming increasingly important. Currently, the Moroccan population living abroad is 
more balanced in terms of gender: 58% men and 42% women, while in the 1960s and 1970s, the 
Moroccan population abroad was composed almost exclusively of men. The male / female ratio is 
more balanced in the old immigration countries (France, Belgium, Netherlands, Germany) than in the 
new ones (Italy and Spain). 
Increase of Educated and Skilled Profiles 
The educational level of emigrants has risen sharply over the past four decades, taking advantage of 
advances in education in Morocco. The proportion of those without education decreased from 40% 
in 1960 to 11.5% in 2000 and those who have secondary and higher levels, increased respectively 
from 26.7% and 2.5%, to 51% and 16%. 
Table 1: Evolution of Education Level of Emigrants by Migration Schedule (%) 
Period of 
emigration 
Without 
education 
Primary 
education 
Secondary 
education 
Tertiary 
education 
Total 
Before 1960 82,8 10,7 6,5 0,0 100 
1960-1969 40,0 30,7 26,7 2,5 100 
1970-1974 39,4 34,8 25,8 0,0 100 
1975-1979 39,5 46,2 13,6 0,7 100 
1980-1989 19,0 26,9 41,8 13,3 100 
1990-1994 7,9 26,7 50,3 15,2 100 
1995-1999 9,6 23,0 50,3 17,1 100 
2000-… 11,5 21,3 51,1 16,1 100 
Total 21,4 28,4 39,8 10,4 100 
 
Source: Hamdouch B. (ed.) (2008). 
 
The observation of the level of qualification at the time of emigration, as indicated by the 1998 and 
2005 surveys, reflects a net increase (see Table 2). The emigration of unskilled people significantly 
decreased from 41.8% to 24.1. In contrast, the migration of skilled workers has increased from 2.8% 
to 16.4%. The middle managers (technicians, foremen) fell from 2.7% to 1.6% and that of engineers 
remained almost stable, from 1.3% to 1.4%. 
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Table 2: Evolution of the degree of skills (1998, 2005) 
Qualification level at the time of 
emigration 
1998 Survey 2005 Survey 
Without qualification 41,8 24,1 
Low skilled worker 35,5 10,7 
Skilled worker 2,8 16,4 
Technician 2,1 1,3 
Foreman 0,6 0,3 
Engineer 1,3 1,4 
Other 15,9 45,7 
 
Source: Hamdouch B. et al (2000), Hamdouch B. (ed.)(2008). 
 
More Diversified Destinations 
There has been a double diversification over the past few decades: Firstly in Europe, from traditional 
reception countries (France, Belgium, Netherlands, Germany) to new ones (Spain, Italy, UK, 
Scandinavia...). Secondly, to countries in other continents: North America (Canada and United 
States), Gulf Arab countries... Other ancient destinations, such as Sub-Saharan Africa, are 
maintained, and still others, Maghreb countries, varied according to the political uncertainties 
including the "Arab Spring." 
Propensity to Emigrate 
Levels of youth emigration from Morocco are not very different from those of other countries. A 
survey was conducted in 2011 by Fondapol in 25 countries. The sample is one thousand young 
people aged 16-29 years in each of the selected countries. It appears that the propensity to migrate 
is 29% in Morocco, barely higher than in Russia (28%) or Mexico (27%), but lower than in South Africa 
and Estonia (31%), and even lower than in Greece (35%) and Romania (41%).10 The ETF survey, 
conducted in Morocco in 2012, gives more details.11 Interviewees are between 18 and 50 years old. It 
distinguishes between the people based on their emigration potential (41.8 %): those with a low 
propensity to emigrate – those who express a wish or desire to emigrate (28.5%) – and those with a 
high propensity – those who have begun to prepare – who make up only half the amount of those 
with a low propensity (13.3%). 
 
 -  The same survey shows the profile of potential migrants: 
 -  They are young: 50% are 18-29 and 30% are 30-39 years old. 
 -  There are more men than women (60%/ 40%). 
                                                            
10 Le Matin du Sahara (4 March 2011). 
11 Project ETF/AMERM (November 2012). 
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 -  They are single: men / women (62 %/49 %). 
 -  They are more educated, but this is a contributing factor, not a determining one. 
Usually, they are not unemployed. Unemployment is a factor encouraging emigration, though it is 
not criteria. Although there is a positive correlation between unemployment and the propensity to 
emigrate, only 21% of those who want to emigrate are unemployed compared to 45% of those who 
work. Thus the purpose of the migration is more to improve income levels and standard of living 
rather than simply to find a job. This finding is confirmed by previous investigations on the 
employment situation of emigrants just before departure. However, the same surveys show that the 
proportion of unemployed increased among the emigrants in recent decades, due to the degradation 
of the employment situation, particularly for young people, with the arrival of wave of new entrants 
into the labor market.12 
Conclusion and Outlook 
International migration is important to Morocco. It primarily concerns young people. However, it has 
undergone significant changes in recent decades as a result of many factors, including contrasting 
economic fortunes in Morocco, in other countries of the Mediterranean and in Sub-Saharan Africa as 
well as in Europe. The socio-political and demographic circumstances in all of these countries, as well 
as their respective migration policies have also played a considerable role. 
The profile of Moroccan emigrants has evolved. If they are still mostly young, they are more 
educated and skilled, the proportion of women has increased, with almost as many women 
emigrating as men, and finally, their destinations are more diversified, although the predominance of 
Europe remains. Recent trends from the current global economic crisis indicate less emigration from 
Morocco, more returns and more immigration, in particular of Sub-Saharan Africans and Europeans 
to Morocco. The propensity of Moroccan youth to emigrate is the same as that of many other 
countries; it is even lower than that of similar countries. Prospects after the economic crisis are 
uncertain and depend on the demographic and socio-economic developments in the regions South, 
East and North of Morocco as well as in Morocco itself, and last but not least on cyclical surges and 
public policies of both sides of the Mediterranean Sea. 
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Youth Unemployment in the Southern Mediterranean: Demographic Pressure, 
Human Development and Policies 
Wai Mun Hong 
 
Introduction 
(Un)employment can be considered a common measure of socio-economic well-being; it is a term 
that describes economically active persons who find themselves jobless. For many unemployed 
citizens, hopelessness sets in as the period of job search drags on, undoubtedly causing serious 
psychological impact and provoking dissatisfaction with those in power - a dissaisfaction that often 
manifests itself through protests. Unsurprisingly, unemployment became a heated topic during the 
social uprisings that erupted in the Southern Mediterranean region.1  
Unemployment rates in the Southern Mediterranean during the period preceding the 2010-2011 
social uprisings were in fact improving, but in many countries, rates still remained in the double 
digits. Job creation had been growing faster than the labour force, but the impact was hardly felt. 
Youth bore most of the brunt, becoming more vulnerable to unemployment with respect to other 
working age segments of the population. Job searching was indeed increasingly daunting as an 
average of more than half of the youth in the Southern Mediterranean felt that it was not a good 
time to find a job.2 
Many observers in the region highlight the importance of demographics since the Southern 
Mediterranean youthful population continued to put pressure on the job market capacity with more 
new entrants for every retired person from the labour force. This was changing in the last decade as 
the year-on-year growth of the labour force, including the youth workforce, began to decrease in 
some of the Southern Mediterranean economies. But demographic pressure was not the only aspect 
influencing the Southern Mediterranean's chronic unemployment problem; it was the interaction 
between demographic factors and out-dated equity-oriented socio-economic policies that in fact 
produced a long-term impact on the (youth) (un)employment situation. Southern Mediterranean 
economies focused on public investments in education as part of their post-colonial policies, with the 
objectice of modernising the state by consolidating power and strengthening capacity building and 
legitimacy. It was not until the 1970s that the impact of this on (un)employment started to become 
visible. Public sector contraction only served to exacerbated the situation. Even today, the people of 
the Southern Mediterranean continue to feel the side-effects of these policies as highly educated 
persons find themselves facing increasing difficulties when entering the job market. 
With this context in mind, this paper explores the intricacies of the (un)employment landscape in the 
Southern Mediterranean region. Statistical analysis will be used to observe the impact of 
demographics and human development dynamics on unemployment, illustrating how post-colonial 
policies still play a role in this issue. The analysis includes an intra-regional comparison element due 
of the diversity of the region. The objective is to identify nuanced differences between the 
economies in the Southern Mediterranean region with regard to (un)employment in order to explain 
                                                            
1 The Southern Mediterranean economies refer to Algeria, Egypt, Israel, Jordan, Lebanon, Libya, Morocco, Palestine, Syria and Tunisia. 
2 Silatech and Gallup, Inc., The Silatech Index, Series: Mindset Score, Year: 2010. Southern Mediterranean economies included in the 
study are Algeria, Egypt, Jordan, Lebanon, Libya, Morocco, Palestine, Syria and Tunisia. 
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why some countries experienced social uprisings and socio-political change while others did not. 
Furthermore, this paper also analysis the role that youth played in the social unrests across the 
region, suggesting that young demographics and youth unemployment have been the main factors 
contributing to the social chaos. After all, the youth segment constitutes an important part of the 
social fabric, and is often considered “the future of the country”.  
In the first section, the paper presents an overview of the unemployment situation in the Southern 
Mediterranean with a statistical analysis of the labour and job markets. The second section focuses 
on youth unemployment, and the third on their participation in the labour and job markets. The 
fourth section assesses the impact and the intricacy of demographic trends on (youth) 
unemployment in the Southern Mediterranean based on data from various international 
organisations. The fifth section assesses the human development aspect of the (youth) labour force, 
and explains how this affected (un)employment. Recognising the shortcomings of statistical analysis 
as a method for capturing the intricacies of the unemployment landscape, the sixth section discusses 
some explanations that go beyond recent argumentative narratives. 
Unemployment in the Southern Mediterranean 
By 2010, unemployment rates in the Southern Mediterranean had reached one of its lowest points in 
the decade, with a combined rate of 10 percent3. At the state level, rates varied between 24 percent 
in Palestine and 7 percent in Israel. Regional unemployment also decreased by 5 percent between 
2001 and 20104, although at state level, progress was disparate. Algeria's unemployment situation 
saw the greatest improvement, with its total unemployment rate falling by 17 percentage points, 
while Egypt experienced the slowest improvement, with total unemployment rates falling by only 
0.40 percentage point. (See graph 1.1) 
Graph 1.1. Total unemployment rate, 2001 and 2010, percentage 
                                                            
3       Author's own calculations, The World Bank's Development Indicators, Series: Labor force, total; Unemployment, total (% of total 
labor force), Year: 2010. Data for Lebanon and Libya not available. 
4 Ibid. 
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Source: The World Bank, World Development Indicators & Global Development Finance, Series: Unemployment, total (% of total labor 
force), Year: 2001 and 2010. Note: Data for Lebanon and Libya not available. 
 
However, despite their improving employment situation, Southern Mediterranean economies did not 
succeed in overcoming their chronic unemployment rates. In Algeria, despite a decrease of near 20 
percentage points, the unemployment rate remained at double-digits. In Tunisia, unemployment 
rates not only stayed above 10 percent - the region's second highest -, but also had one of the 
slowest improvements. Similar developments could be found in Jordan, Syria and Egypt. 
Table 1.1. Labour force and job market trends 
 
 Between 2001 and 2010 
 
Total nº. of 
new jobs 
created 
Growth in nº. 
of new jobs 
created, % 
Nº. of new 
labour force 
entrants 
Labour force 
growth, % 
Algeria 3,681,274 53.78 2,280,441 24.22 
Egypt 5,527,938 30.34 5,986,273 29.77 
Israel 686,206 30.06 661,949 26.30 
Jordan 363,704 34.71 368,733 29.63 
Lebanon* 121,626 10.76 148,494 12.10 
Morocco 1,567,295 18.09 1,353,745 13.67 
Syria 977,659 22.30 894,057 18.03 
Tunisia 567,826 20.57 574,193 17.66 
Palestine 224,432 48.49 284,451 46.15 
Southern Mediterranean** 13,596,335 30.44 12,403,840 23.84 
 
Source: Author's own calculations and The World Bank's Development Indicators, Series: Labor force, total; Unemployment, total (% of 
total labor force), Year: 2001 and 2010.5 Notes: * Between 2004 and 2007. ** Excludes Lebanon and Libya. 
 
What is intriguing about this development is that the region's average of near 5 percent economic 
growth6 per annum (p.a.) in the past decade had little trickle-down affect on job creation. In 2010, 
the Southern Mediterranean labour force was approximately 64 million strong.7 It grew by 24 
percent from 2001, an equivalent of 12.4 million new labour force entrants (see Table 1.1.). The 
region had generally succeeded in stabilising its unemployment rate by stimulating a job creation 
growth of 30 percent, just enough to absorb the number of new labour force entrants. Although the 
number of jobs created was proportionally growing at a rate faster than that of the labour force, it 
did not improve the unemployment situation significantly. 
                                                            
5  (a) Due to incomplete and disparate data for calculation purposes, the difference in the number of employed persons between 2001 
and 2010 as a proxy of the number of new jobs created. The logic being that all employed persons must have a job, and therefore 
difference in the number of employed persons between two-time period is the number of “new” jobs created, positive or negative. 
 (b) Number of new labor force entrants is the difference in the total labor force between 2001 and 2010. 
6 Economic growth here refers to Gross Domestic Product (GDP) growth. Growth rate is based on author's own calculations, The World 
Bank's World Development Indicators, Series: GDP growth (annual %), Year: 2001 to 2010. Data for Palestine not  available. 
7 Author's own calculations and The World Bank's World Development Indicators, Series: Labor force, total; Unemployment, total (% 
of total labor force), Year: 2001 and 2010. Due to incomparability in the latter comparative analysis, this figure excludes  Lebanon 
and Libya. With Lebanon and Libya, the size of the labour force was 68 million. 
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At the state level, Algeria outperformed other economies in the Southern Mediterranean region. Its 
growth in terms of new jobs created exceeded the growth of the labour force by 30 percent, 
explaining the steep drop in unemployment rates. Other Southern Mediterranean economies 
maintained a gap between 1 and 5 percent, but also experienced faster job creation over labour 
force growth. These developments produced mixed effects on unemployment situations across the 
Southern Mediterranean. Algeria benefited the most by far, with approximately 1.4 million of jobs 
created in excess of the number required to cover the number of new labour force entrants as well 
as a substantial portion of the existing pool of unemployed.  
Morocco, Syria and Israel also experienced similar developments, albeit to a lesser extent. In the rest 
of the region, despite similar trends in the growth differential between job creation and the labour 
force, different unemployment dynamics were produced. In Egypt, the number of new jobs created 
was 458,334 short of the number of new labour force entrants. This number was 60,019 in Palestine, 
6,366 in Tunisia, and 5,029 in Jordan.  
On the regional level, the number of new jobs created outstripped the number of new labour force 
entrants by approximately 1.2 million. However, the spill-over of new jobs created in excess only 
marginally decreased overall unemployment rate by 5 percent; unemployment rates thus remained 
at a double-digit 10 percent. Indeed, Southern Mediterranean economies were successful in 
stabilising the unemployment rate in the past decade, but the situation remained unchanged for so 
long that the economies were not only at risk of decreasing productivity and efficiency, but also 
prolonging social discontentment on the ground. Although unemployment rates were somewhat 
stabilised, the real number of unemployed people was still growing. It can be concluded that the 
stablization of unemployment rates is no longer a sustainable strategy in the Southern 
Mediterranean. As the 2010-2011 social uprisings and the continued social discontent in the region 
demonstrate, greater socio-economic progress is needed in order to prevent further social chaos. It is 
not enough to create new jobs as a way to absorb the bulge of new labour force entrants. The 
number of new jobs created must grow at a rate far higher than the stabilising rate in order to bring 
it significantly down, and closer to the potential natural unemployment rate of the economy in order 
to ensure at least the minimum level of productivity and efficiency. 
Youth Unemployment in the Southern Mediterranean 
The unemployment landscape in Southern Mediterranean was bleak for the population at large, but 
the situation was (and still is) even more dauting for the young generation8. On the eve of the social 
uprisings, youth unemployment rates were above 20 percent, which was double the total 
unemployment rate; these rates were, and still are, among the world's highest. Some of the highest 
youth unemployment rates in the region were found in Egypt and Tunisia, where the social uprisings 
ignited. In fact, youth unemployment rates in the region had fallen to around 8 percent since 2001, 
with some economies improving faster than the others. 
Showing the greatest improvement among the Southern Mediterranean economies, Algeria’s youth 
unemployment rate decreased from nearly 50 percent in 2001, the region's highest rate at the time, 
                                                            
8 According to The World Bank, the youth population comprises any person aged between 15 and 24. Youth labour force refers to the 
population aged between 15 and 24 who are economically active. 
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to 21.5 percent a decade later. Meanwhile, the youth unemployment rate in Egypt, which in 2001 
stood at 27.7%, fell only by 2.9 percentage points in the same decade, remaining the third highest in 
2010. The situation in Tunisia was also one of the most serious in the region by the eve of its social 
uprising in 2010. (See graph 2.1) 
Graph 2.1. Youth unemployment 
 
Source: The World Bank, World Development Indicators & Global Development Finance, Series: Unemployment, youth total (% of total 
labor force ages 15-24), Year: 2001 and 2010 unless specified otherwise. Note: Data for Libya and Tunisia of 2010 not available. 
 
The high youth unemployment rates in the Southern Mediterranean region meant that almost 50 
percent of the total number of unemployed persons were youth (2.3 million in 2010). This was most 
visible in Syria and Egypt, where social unrests are still on-going, since more than 50 percent of the 
total unemployed population in these countries were young people. Tunisia was not far behind with 
46 percent. Jordan also had similarly high proportions of unemployed youth, but managed to 
narrowly escape a similar predicament. Better performing economies had a smaller proportion of 
young people within their total unemployment rates (see Table 2.2). 
A common feature of the Southern Mediterranean economies is the decreasing share of youth in 
total unemployment. Syria experinced a decline of 14.16 percentage points, the biggest decline in 
the region. Algeria was a close second, with a decrease of 10 percentage points. In Jordan, however, 
young people remained some of the most vulnerable to unemployment in the region, as the share in 
total unemployment remained extremely high - about 50 percent - and decreased by only 1 percent. 
Palestine was the exception, experiencing an increase in the share of youth in total unemployment. 
The falling share of youth in total unemployment in the Southern Mediterranean economies also 
corresponded to a 24.64% contraction of the pool of unemployed youths. Algeria experienced the 
largest contraction: the number of unemployed youth decreased by 64.02 percent. Still, this was not 
necessarily true for other Southern Mediterranean economies. Despite a fall in the proportion of 
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youth in the total unemployment, Egypt's pool of unemployed youths grew by 11 percent, Lebanon's 
by 8 percent and Jordan's by 2 percent. 
In other words, from a regional perspective, unemployment in Southern Mediterranean had indeed 
made substantial progress in all elements that make up the youth (un)employment composition. 
However, this outcome was underpinned by diverse and unbalanced performances in each economy 
in the MENA region. Although an improving (youth) (un)employment rate is an over-arching indicator 
of better employment prospects, it does not the reveal hidden flaws in the intricate composition of 
elements that result in (un)employment. This is evident in the case of Egypt, where the youth 
unemployment rate and the proportion of youth in total unemployment decreased, but the pool of 
unemployed youth continued to expand. This finding is by no means indicative, but it offers a 
potential explanation to the social chaos and the growing discontent among the unemployed, 
regardless of age. 
However, the same assumption does not explain the case of Syria, for instance. Syria may not have 
been the best performer in the region, but it had a better general scorecard and less contradictions 
than Egypt. In Tunisia, comparable data of the two-time periods do not exist, but the central 
indication factor for the social unrest in 2010-2011 was the high (youth) unemployment rate. 
Table 2.2. Youth unemployment trends and dynamics 
 % of youth within total unemployment rate Between 2001 and 2010 
 2001 2010 Expansion in nº. of unemployed youths 
Growth in nº. 
of unemployed 
youths, % 
Algeria 47.76 37.76 -786,004 -64.02 
Egypt 61.40 55.01 131,387 11.32 
Israel 28.11 24.08 -15,287 -23.24 
Jordan 50.41 ('07) 49.37 1,721 ('07-10) 1.76 ('07-10) 
Lebanon 47.92 ('04) 40.58 ('07) 3,783 (04-07) 8.14 ('04-07) 
Morocco 38.24 37.18 -92,562 -19.55 
Syria 69.94 ('02) 55.79 -137,203 ('02-10) -33.34 ('02-10) 
Tunisia 46.28 ('05) - - - 
Palestine 38.89 40.56 26,910 45.09 
Southern Mediterranean* 49.08 45.34 -735,556 -24.62 
 
Source: Author's own calculations, The World Bank's World Development Indicators, Series: Labor force, total; Unemployment, total (% of 
total labor force), Labor force participation rate, total (% of total population ages 15-24), Unemployment, youth total (% of total labor force 
ages 15-24), Year: 2001 and 2010 unless specified, and U.S. Census Bureau International Data, Series: Population by youth age group, Year: 
2001 and 2010. Note: * includes Algeria, Egypt, Israel, Morocco and Palestine. (a) Year of the data in brackets when data of year 2001 
and/or 2010 are not available. (b) Data for Libya not available. 
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Youth labour force and job market trends 
As the youth become increasingly educated and well-informed, they start to represent an important 
part of the Southern Mediterranean socio-economic fabric and contribute to time-invariant socio-
economic development. Yet, this young generation has been the one most affected by 
unemployment. Although the youth segment accounted for only one-fifth of total labour force in the 
Southern Mediterranean countries9 (approximately 13 million in size),, they constituted a 
disproportionate 50 percent of the total number of unemployed persons. The core of the 
unemployment problem troubling many of the Southern Mediterranean economies today could be 
the result of these paradoxical intricacies at work. 
Although many observers argue that demographic pressure has caused the unequal representation 
of youth in total unemployment in the Southern Mediterranean economies, the statistical analysis 
illustrated in Table 3.1. shows that the effect could be marginal. Between 2001 and 2010, youth 
labour force in the Southern Mediterranean region has only grown by 1 percent, or 140,805 persons. 
At the state level, instead of expansion, half of the Southern Mediterranean economies experienced 
a contraction in youth labour force, including Syria and Tunisia where social uprisings erupted. The 
most serious cases were found in Algeria where youth labour force suffered a - 20 percent growth. 
Morocco's youth labour force experienced a -14 percent growth, Tunisia's -11 percent, Syria's -7 
percent, and Lebanon's -2 percent (see Table 3.1.). 
Table 3.1. Labour force trends and dynamics 
 
 Growth between 2001 and 2010 
 Labour force  Youth labour force 
Labour force 
aged 25-64 
Algeria 24.22 -20.01 40.81 
Egypt 29.77 24.34 31.20 
Israel 26.30 3.10 30.15 
Jordan 29.63 20.27 32.54 
Lebanon 43.53 -2.00 56.39 
Libya 25.83 8.85 30.93 
Morocco 13.67 -13.61 22.90 
Syria 18.03 -6.57 28.99 
Tunisia 17.66 -11.03 25.71 
Palestine 46.15 30.13 52.33 
Southern Mediterranean 24.29 1.08 31.48 
 
Source: Author's own calculations, The World Bank World Development Indicators & Global Development Finance, Series: Population, 
total, Labor force, total , Labor force participation rate for ages 15-24, total (%), Year: 2001 and 2010,  U.S. Census  Bureau International 
Data, Series: Population by youth age group, Year: 2001 and 2010. 
 
                                                            
9 See table 3.2. 
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Most of the Southern Mediterranean economies that experienced negative growth in their youth 
labour force also saw negative growth in the number of unemployed youths (except Lebanon).10 
Egypt's high growth in youth labour force, which was also one of the highest in the region, could 
represent a causal factor in the increase of unemployed youth in the country (likewise for Jordan, 
although to a lesser extent).  
Contractions in youth labour force in the Southern Mediterranean economies could potentially be 
the result of the decreasing youth labour force participation rate. Syria saw the greatest decrease in 
youth labour force participation rates with a decline of 11.70 percentage. Egypt and Libya were the 
only economies to experience an increase in youth labour force participation rates, which increased 
by 5.30 and 1.60 percentage points respectively. In Egypt, however, this rising youth labour force 
participation rate only further accentuated the high proportion of unemployed youth and the (youth) 
unemployment rate. 
Although it remains unclear to what extent youth labour force growth in the Southern 
Mediterranean area affected (youth) unemployment on a regional level, the increase in youth labour 
force certainly provides explanations to some of the cases on a country-level, for example, in Egypt 
or Jordan, where growth in the youth labour force was extremely high. If marginal growth in youth 
labour force cannot provide explanation to the high (youth) unemployment rate in other cases in the 
Southern Mediterranean, (dis)equilibriums in the labour force may hold some justifications.  
Table 3.2. Youth labour force and employment trends 
 
 % of youth in the labour force % of youth in total employed persons 
 2001 2010 2001 2010 
Algeria 27.28 17.56 19.59 15.32 
Egypt 20.83 19.96 16.63 16.50 
Israel 14.21 11.60 12.78 10.72 
Jordan 23.33 ('07) 21.96 19.25 ('07) 18.05 
Lebanon 19.02 ('04) 16.52 ('07) 16.54 ('04) 14.15 ('07) 
Libya 23.10 19.98 - - 
Morocco 25.29 19.22 23.44 17.42 
Syria 31.12 ('02) 24.41 25.97 ('02) 21.53 
Tunisia 19.38 ('05) 16.57 15.40 ('05)  
Palestine 27.83 24.78 24.16 19.87 
Southern Mediterranean* 23.01 18.86 15.23 13.33 
 
Source: Author's own calculations, The World Bank's World Development Indicators, Series: Labor force, total; Unemployment, total (% of 
total labor force), Labor force participation rate, total (% of total population ages 15-24), Unemployment, youth total (% of total labor force 
ages 15-24), Year: 2001 and 2010, and U.S. Census Bureau International Data, Series: Population by youth age group, Year: 2001 and 2010. 
Note: *includes Algeria, Egypt, Israel, Morocco and Palestine. (a) The year of the data is specified in brackets when data of year 2001 
and/or 2010 are not available. Labour market in the Southern Mediterranean economies had indeed bean all but balance. Although youth 
                                                            
10 See also Table 2.2. 
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accounted for approximately 20 percent of the total labour force, they also bore the most of the brunt of unemployment, representing 50 
percent of the total unemployed persons. In a labour market in equilibrium, the percentage of youth in the labour market and in the total 
employment would have been similar or close. However, the gap between the proportion of youth in total unemployment and that of total 
labour force in the Southern Mediterranean countries only reveals the unbalances in the labour markets (see Table 3.2.). 
 
In 2010, the gap between the percentage of youth in the labour market and the total employment in 
the Southern Mediterranean countries was 5.53 percent, which was in fact an improvement from 
7.77 percent in 2001. Algeria and Syria experienced the greatest improvements with the gap reduced 
by 5.45 and 2.27 percent respectively, while in the rest of the MENA region, the gap reduced by less 
than 1 percentage. Despite the decreasing gaps, labour markets in Palestine, Lebanon and Egypt 
were still some of the most unbalanced in the MENA region. 
One factor that contributed to the unbalanced youth labour markets in the Southern Mediterranean 
countries was the continued marginalisation faced by young people, even when the job markets 
were expanding. Out of 12 million newly created jobs11, only 8.24 percent were occupied by youth 
(this corresponds to 963,040 jobs). The statistical analysis illustrated in Table 3.3. shows that those 
Southern Mediterranean economies with the greatest improvements in employment rates have 
some of the lowest proportion of new jobs for youth. In Algeria, for instance, despite the greatest 
improvement in the general (un)employment situation, only 7.39 percent of the total new jobs went 
to young people. In Morocco, one of the best performing economies in the MENA region, youth 
labour force was totally excluded from the new job creation efforts, and some young people even 
lost their jobs for the benefit of older labour force; these factors potentially explain the meagre fall 
of youth unemployment in Morocco (see Table 3.3.). 
Table 3.3. Youth in the job market 
 
 Between 2001 and 2010 
% of new jobs 
created occupied by 
youth  
Total nº. of new 
jobs created 
Nº of new jobs 
created occupied 
by youth 
Algeria 3,681,274 271,963 7.39 
Egypt 5,527,938 888,280 16.07 
Israel 686,206 26,371 3.84 
Jordan* 124,010 6,864 5.54 
Lebanon** 121,626 -9,910 -8.15 
Morocco 1,567,295 -248,339 -15.85 
Syria*** 921,541 1,207 0.13 
Palestine 224,432 24,765 11.03 
Southern Mediterranean**** 11,687,146 963,040 8.24 
 
Source: Author's own calculations, The World Bank's the World Bank's World Development Indicators, Series: Labor force, total; 
Unemployment, total (% of total labor force), Labor force participation rate, total (% of total population ages 15-24), Unemployment, youth 
                                                            
11 Ibid. These 12 million newly created jobs exclude Jordan, Lebanon, Libya, Syria and Tunisia. This figure is used instead of 13 million as 
shown in table 1.1., because the respective data on youth unemployment rate are not available, in order to establish a meaningful 
two-time period comparison between 2001 and 2010. 
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total (% of total labor force ages 15-24), Year: 2001 and 2010, and U.S. Census Bureau International Data, Series: Population by youth age 
group, Year: 2001 and 2010. Notes: * between 2007-2010. ** between 2004-2007. *** between 2002-2010. **** includes Algeria, Egypt, 
Israel, Morocco and Palestine only. (a) Data for Libya and Tunisia is not available. (b) The percentage of total new jobs created occupied by 
youths derived from the percentage of the difference between the number of employed youths in 2001 and 2010 over the total new jobs 
created (proxied by the difference in the number of employed persons between the same two-time periods). 
 
means that proportionally, more youth in the labour force benefited from newly created jobs than 
any other economies of the MENA region. This has likely happened at the expense of the existing 
pool of unemployed persons since its youth unemployment rate fell faster than the unemployment 
rate for those aged between 25 and 64. This suggests that a significant proportion of Egyptians 
suffering from socio-economic discontent are aged 25-64, rather than belonging to the youth 
segment per se (between 15 and 24 years old according to the World Bank's definition). In Syria, 
where civil war continues, less than 1 percent of the newly created jobs were occupied by youth 
illustrating the extent to which Syrian youth continue to be marginalised in the job market. 
Is the impact of demographic pressure over-estimated? 
Demographics in the Southern Mediterranean region are indeed young, with the proportion of 
people aged between 0 and 14 representing approximately 30 percent of the population.12 It is likely 
that demographic pressure will continue to stretch the job market’s capacity to absorb the expanding 
labour force. However, this is only one possible explanatory factor; the share of the population aged 
between 0 and 14 is decreasing, which in turn, slows down youth population growth. In the decade 
between 2001 and 2010, youth population in Southern Mediterranean grew by 7.22 percent - vis-á-
vis the total population of 18.81 percent -, while the population aged between 25 and 64 grew by 
25.95 percent13 (see Table 4.1.). 
On the country level, all coutntries except Palestine have a youth population growing slower than the 
working population (aged between 25 and 64), although differences vary between 3 and 27 
percentage. Youth population grew in most of the Southern Mediterranean economies except in 
Tunisia, where a negative growth in youth population became visible, corresponding with the 
contraction of youth labour force in Tunisia. If youth population was growing slowly, this means that 
the demographic pressure would also be correspondingly reduced. Yet, a positive population growth 
rate will always signify an expansion. Rather than focusing on the demographic rates, it is therefore 
relevant to explore the nuances and numeral differences and compare their effects on those 
populations who experienced social uprisings and those who did not. 
Salehi-Isfahani (2012) used the ratio of population aged between 20 and 24 in relation to those aged 
between 60 and 64 to estimate the number of new entrants for every retiring working person, or in 
other words, the entry-to-exit ratio. This means: the higher the ratio, the higher is the pressure on 
the job market’s capacity to absorb the expanding labour force. Using this method, the higgest entry-
to-exit ratio are found in Palestine (6.54), Syria (6.13), and Libya (5.85). Indeed, Syria and Libya have 
experienced social uprisings; however, this method does not explain the cases of Egypt and Tunisia, 
where the entry-to-exit ratio are among the lowest in the MENA region: 3.44 and 3.05 respectively. 
Furthermore, depsite their higher ratios, Algeria (4.22) and Morocco (4.02) hardly experienced any 
social unrests of the magnitude seen in Egypt and Tunisia. 
                                                            
12 Author's own calculations, U.S. Census Bureau International Data, Series: Population by youth age group, Year: from 2001 to 2010. 
13 See table 3.1. 
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Table 4.1. Demographic trends and dynamics 
 
 Growth between 2001 and 2010 
 Total population 
Youth 
population 
aged 15-24 
Population 
aged 25-64 
Algeria 15.68 2.76 27.26 
Egypt 20.88 4.96 26.61 
Israel 17.64 9.63 18.29 
Jordan 33.67 27.81 30.55 
Lebanon 8.16 1.33 16.28 
Libya 18.97 4.20 31.82 
Morocco 11.06 1.51 20.66 
Syria 31.47 30.12 34.80 
Tunisia 9.53 -3.75 20.47 
Palestine 28.53 39.94 25.98 
Southern Mediterranean 18.81 7.22 25.95 
 
Source: Author's own calculations, U.S. Census Bureau International Data, Series: Population by five year age group, Year: 2001 and 2010. 
 
As long as the (youth) population continues to grow, the Southern Mediterranean economies will 
continue to face demographic pressure on their labour and job markets. However, the impact of 
demographic pressure on (youth) unemployment in the Southern Mediterranean region has been 
over-estimated, since youth population and labour force growth have generally falling. 
Human development in the Southern Mediterranean countries 
Education is often perceived as playing a vital role in human development, and to this effect, people 
in the Southern Mediterranean countries are somewhat fortunate in comparison to global standards, 
as they receive free public education up to tertiary level. This means that Southern Mediterranean 
economies spend more on education in terms of percentages of government expenditure and of the 
GDP than other regions in the developing world with similar income levels (e.g. Southeast Asia). The 
average investment in education in the Southern Mediterranean region (percentage of the 
government expenditure) is in some cases higher than in parts of the European Union (EU), revealing 
the importance attributed to education in this are, and their equity-focussed socio-economic policies 
(see Table 5.1.)  
Morocco made the highest investment on education than any other Southern Mediterranean 
economy by spending 26.21 percent of government expenditure. In second and third place are 
Tunisia and Algeria, who spent 20.68 and 20.27 percent in education respectively. Lebanon's 
investments on education (percentage of government expenditure) was the lowest, but this by no 
means suggests that education is less important here. Rather, this reflects changes that emerged as a 
result of the civil war in the 1970s, which considerably weakened the power and capacity of the state 
to control the education system (Buckner, 2011: 21). The size of the investment in education, 
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however, does not always produce the desired results; moreover the results of this investment are 
often difficult to measure and quantify. The most common tool for quantifying the impact of the 
expanding investment in education is the increasing school enrolment rate; this happened in the 
Southern Mediterranean economies (Salehi-Isfanhani, 2012: 850). Indeed, the average gross 
enrolment rate for tertiary education was 36.71 percent in the Southern Mediterranean countries, 
which was higher than any developing regions of similar income level, but it lagged behind with 
regard to secondary education.  (see Table 5.2.) However, what we cannot easily quantify is the 
impact of the enlarged and facilitated access to education on economic productivity, especially when 
a significant portion of highly educated persons are unemployed. 
Table 5.1. Public investments in education (average between 2001 and 2010) 
 
 % of government expenditure % of GDP 
Algeria 20.27 4.34 
Egypt 14.04 4.31 
Israel 13.50 6.24 
Lebanon 9.88 2.36 
Morocco 26.21 5.57 
Syria 16.66 5.15 
Tunisia 20.68 6.39 
Southern Mediterranean* 17.32 4.91 
Middle East & North Africa* 17.03 5.12 
Southeast Asia* 16.82 3.27 
East Asia* 15.93 3.95 
Latin America & the Caribbean* 15.58 4.57 
EU 28* 11.74 5.21 
 
Source: Author's own calculations, World Bank's World Development Indicators, Series: Public spending on education, total (% of 
government expenditure), Public spending on education, total (% of GDP), Year: from 2001 to 2010. Note: * Regional average. (a) Data for 
Jordan, Libya and Palestine not available. (b) Middle East & North Africa refers to the 21 economies according World Bank's classification, 
which include all 10 Southern Mediterranean economies. (c) Southeast Asia refers to the 10 Association of Southeast Asia Nations 
economies. (d) East Asia refers to China (no data available), Hong Kong, Japan and Republic of Korea. refers to the 41 economies according 
World Bank's classification. 
 
An alternative indication of non-monetary returns on investments in education is the quality of the 
education system. High education investment rates in the Southern Mediterranean countries did not 
automatically result in better educational systems. Here, the Southern Mediterranean countries lag 
behind Southeast Asian education systems, although their performance does remain slightly better 
than education systems in Latin America. In terms of performing quality, Tunisia has the best 
educational system in the Southern Mediterranean region, followed by Jordan and Israel, while those 
in Libya, Egypt and Algeria lag behind. 
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Today, the productivity and efficiency of an economic system is measured by the ubiquitous use of 
advanced technology, closely linked to mathematics and science, and technological development. In 
these terms, Southern Mediterranean economies lag behind, especially in comparison to Asian 
counter-parts (in terms of the quality of mathematics and science education), but perform better 
than their Latin American counter-parts. Within the Southern Mediterranean region, Tunisia and 
Jordan provide the highest quality of mathematics and science education (better than some Asian 
and European countries), while Egypt and Algeria have a lower quality of education in these fields. 
Trends in the International Mathematics and Science Study (TIMSS) 2011 further revealed deficits in 
the quality of mathematic and science education in the Southern Mediterranean countries.14 On 
average, eighth grade students in the Southern Mediterranean countries scored approximately 10 
percent lower than the global average in mathematics, and 9 percent lower in science (with the 
exception of Israel). Southern Mediterranean economies also had some of the lowest quality scores 
for management schools, performing worse than most of the developing regions of similar income 
level. Yet, this is where some of the Southern Mediterranean economies have achieved higher 
quality compared to other developing regions, and to some European countries. Tunisia stays ahead 
of the rest of the Southern Mediterranean economies in terms of the quality of management 
schools, followed by Morocco, Jordan and Israel. 
Table 5.2. Performance on investments in education, 2009-2010 
 
 
Secondary 
education 
enrollment, 
gross % 
Tertiary 
education 
enrollment, 
gross % 
Quality of 
the 
educational 
system* 
Quality of 
math and 
science 
education* 
Quality of 
management 
schools* 
Algeria 83.22 24.02 2.63 3.25 3.28 
Egypt 87.77 34.75 2.58 2.70 3.33 
Israel 91.51 60.41 3.08 3.19 4.10 
Jordan 89.35 39.91 4.45 4.74 4.31 
Libya 93.53 55.75 2.43 3.68 2.23 
Morocco 55.85 11.31 2.86 3.69 4.32 
Tunisia 88.04 30.81 4.89 5.53 5.00 
Southern Mediterranean^ 84.18 36.71 3.28 3.83 3.80 
Middle East & North Africa^ 90.09 30.91 3.80 4.17 4.11 
Southeast Asia^ 76.96 26.81 4.15 4.41 4.28 
East Asia^ 92.39 58.53 4.38 5.18 4.41 
Latin America & the Caribbean^ 84.14 34.64 3.17 3.20 4.16 
EU 28^ 102.38 60.61 4.36 4.80 4.73 
 
Source: Author's own calculations, World Economic Forum's Global Competitive Index, Series: Secondary education enrollment, gross %, 
Tertiary education enrollment, gross %, Quality of the educational system, Quality of math and science education, Quality of management 
schools, Year: 2009-2010. Note: * Score 1-7 (best). ^ Regional average. (a) Data for Lebanon, Syria and Palestine not available. (b) Middle 
East & North Africa refers to the 21 economies according The World Bank's classification, which include all 10 Southern Mediterranean 
                                                            
14  See Table A.1. in the Appendix. 
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economies. (c) Southeast Asia refers to the 10 Association of Southeast Asia Nations (ASE8AN) economies. (d) East Asia refers to China (no 
data available), Hong Kong, Japan and Republic of Korea. (e) Latin America & the Caribbean refers to the 41 economies according to The 
World Bank's classification. 
These results explain why skills mismatch remains one of the main concerns in the labour and job 
markets. In increasingly inter-dependent economic systems, most Southern Mediterranean 
economies have displayed little compatibility between the supply structure of their economies and 
the world demand, which makes them vulnerable to external competition and more likely to lose 
from economic globalisation than to benefit from it. The quality of the educational systems also 
causes lower productivity, making the region less competitive. The lower quality of educational 
systems can threaten the skills adequacy of the labour force. In the Executive Opinion Survey 
conducted by the World Economic Forum, in the compilation of the Global Competitiveness Index 
2009-2010, an average of 9 percent of the respondents expressed that an inadequate educated 
workforce was one of the five most problematic areas when doing business in the Southern 
Mediterranean region (and more problematic than in economies in Southeast Asia and Latin 
America). This problem is evident in Syria, where 13.40 percent of the respondents indicated that 
skill inadequacy as one of the five most problematic areas, followed by Jordan (12 percent), and 
Egypt (10 percent). The rest of the Southern Mediterranean economies have lower positions than the 
average of other developing regions, with the exception of Israel and Libya, where skill inadequacy is 
less problematic. 
Table 5.3. Percentage of tertiary graduates by programmes (average 1990-2012) 
 Science 
Engineering, 
manufacturing, 
construction 
Humanities, 
arts 
Social 
sciences, 
business, law 
Health, 
welfare Education Agriculture Services 
Algeria 12.15 13.00 21.00 43.25 4.25 1.50 2.00 1.75 
Israel 5.590 31.50 9.50 31.50 4.50 15.00 - - 
Jordan 14.50 9.00 14.50 28.25 9.25 16.25 2.50 - 
Lebanon 10.25 12.25 14.33 45.08 11.42 4.25 0.33 1.83 
Morocco 16.33 9.50 16.75 38.25 5.75 8.00 1.00 2.25 
Tunisia 26.00 16.00 19.00 24.00 9.00 1.00 2.00 4.00 
Palestine 11.09 7.18 13.55 32.36 8.55 25.73 0.36 0.55 
Southern Mediterranean^ 13.07 14.06 15.52 34.67 7.53 10.25 1.37 2.08 
Middle East, North Africa^ 12.08 14.19 15.91 33.23 7.61 11.73 1.65 2.36 
Southeast Asia^ 11.97 12.56 12.53 30.26 6.09 20.55 4.26 2.30 
East Asia^ 8.68 22.54 14.51 26.27 8.86 8.86 1.18 5.12 
Latin America, the 
Caribbean^ 6.96 11.31 3.67 37.25 12.75 21.30 2.65 3.48 
EU 28^ 8.94 12.92 10.27 35.75 13.15 13.30 2.00 5.14 
 
Source: Author's own calculations, UNESCO Institute for Statistics, Data Centre, Series: Distribution of tertiary graduates by programmes, 
Year: from 1990 to 2012. Notes: ^ Regional average. (a) Data for Egypt, Libya and Syria not available. (b) The sum of the percentages may 
not add up to 100 percent. (c) Middle East & North Africa refers to the 21 economies according The World Bank's classification, which 
include all 10 Southern Mediterranean economies. (d) Southeast Asia refers to the 10 Association of Southeast Asia Nations (ASEAN) 
economies. (e) East Asia refers to China (no data available), Hong Kong, Japan and Republic of Korea. (f) Latin America & the Caribbean 
refers to the 41 economies according The World Bank's classificatio 
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Even in those countries with a high quality of mathematics and science education, students are more 
likely  to opt for humanities, arts and social sciences (HAS) in tertiary education in comparasion to 
students in developed economies, with an even smaller number of students pursuing science, 
engineering, and technical studies (SET).  The choice of subjects studied at tertiary education affects 
the ubiquitous use and development rates of advanced technologies. Although the region's average 
proportion of tertiary graduates in SET was comparable to that of developed East Asian and 
European economies, or even higher in some cases, the proportion of HAS graduates was not only 
higher than any other world region, but also approximately 23 percent higher than the proportion of 
SET graduates. The percentage difference between tertiary graduates of HAS and SET in the Southern 
Mediterranean countries is comparable to the one of the EU’s and Latin American averages, but it 
was significantly dissimilar to (South) East Asian averages, where the quality in mathematics and 
science education is among the highest worldwide. The proportion of SET and HAS graduates was 
most balanced in Tunisia, where the proportion of graduates from each of the cohorts accounted for 
slightly more than 40 percent of the total number of graduates; here, the proportion of SET 
graduates is among the highest in the Southern Mediterranean region. Although the proportion of 
SET graduates is comparable to the MENA region's average, Algeria has far more HAS graduates (64 
percent), and thus the most unbalanced graduate distribution in the MENA region, followed by 
Lebanon, Morocco and Palestine. 
Despite generous expenditure on education, most Southern Mediterranean economies show short-
comings in socio-economic policies, as well as an inability or lack of political will of to generate socio-
economic policies that promote structural reforms and respond to global demand and competition. 
Conclusion 
Unemployment and youth became became heavily discussed topics in the discourses surrounding 
the 2010-2011 social uprisings across the Southern Mediterranean region, particularly since youth 
unemployment shot to above 20 percent in the region after the uprisings. The common phenomena 
we observe across the Southern Mediterranean economies are their overall improvements in terms 
of overall unemployment, while (youth) unemployment numbers remain problematic. 
Youth represent 20 percent of the labour force in Southern Mediterranean, but 50 percent of the 
total unemployment, which signals the extent of the marglisation facing young people in the labour 
market. The magnitude of this marginalisation varies between the economies in the MENA region, 
distinguishing those Southern Mediterranean economies that were affected by social unrests and 
those who were not. There are several ways to measure this magnitude, and to interpret its link to 
the social unrests in the affected economies. In Tunisia, 46 percent of unemployed persons were 
youth. In Egypt, and Jordan to a lesser extent, despite a falling share of youth in the total 
unemployment rates, the number of unemployed young people actually increased. In Syria, only less 
than 1 percent of the total newly created jobs over the past decade are occupied by youth. One root 
cause of youth marginalisation is the demographic pressure in the Southern Mediterranean countries 
thanks to their youthful population. But with plummeting (youth) population growth rates, and a 
contraction of the youth labour force, one can also maintain that the effects could have been smaller 
than expected, if not marginal. This is by no means to discount the role of demographic dynamics in 
shaping the labour force. However, demographic factors can only explain a certain part of the 
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unemployment problem. These subjects and factors interact and respond to policies with effects that 
are hard to measure or to quantify. 
Youth unemployment in Southern Mediterranean countries was actually more influenced by the 
effects of post-colonial policies that mirrored state- and capacity-building efforts and legitimacy 
consolidation, having long-term impacts on people’s attitudes. During the post-colonial period, many 
Southern Mediterranean states implemented free education up to higher education levels, with 
university graduates having guaranteed jobs in the public sector (Anderson, 1987 and Teixeira, 2009 
cited in Buckner, 2011, p. 21). This aspect of the post-colonial period has remained until today, as 
education in most of the Southern Mediterranean states is still is free up to the tertiary level; more 
and more people in the Southern Mediterranean region are literate and educated (Mahdi et al., 
2013: 2), and many see education as an opportunity for social mobility (Cohen, 2004 cited in 
Buckner, 2011: 21). In today's context, where young people are becoming increasingly educated, 
those aged between 15 and 24 are more likely to stay in education longer. This development partly 
explains the decreasing youth labour force participation rate in the MENA region. If these findings 
were verified, such developments could challenge the youth definitions used by international 
organisations in the context of labour markets.  
By the 1970s, the Southern Mediterranean governments found themselves racking up public budget 
deficits which eventually forced them to shift toward neoliberal reforms. Neoliberal reforms in the 
1970s and 1980s led to high economic growth, but the effects on unemployment rates were 
marginal. The reforms benefited the resource rich economies, as oil exports expanded globally during 
the oil booms. The capital intensive oil industry is linked to low employment elasticity, and the 
economic growth had limited influence on employment expansion. 
Southern Mediterranean economies lack a synergy between structural reforms and the 
transformation in the private sector. Governments were offering less public positions, but the private 
sector did not expand fast enough to absorb the affected persons. This reveals the state's lack of 
capacity to follow up with institutional reforms that truly promote liberalisation. Bureaucracy-
oriented education systems became out-dated, and produced graduates with skills that did not 
match the requirements in the private sector. The governments' attempts to mitigate the impact of 
the market liberalisation on the affected persons with more equitable social benefits produced a 
zero-sum effect on the budget, but shaped people's attitudes, perceptions, and behaviour. In 
response to employment erosion, some people in the labour force choose to remain in school and to 
obtain a higher education qualification in order to increase their employability. Others choose to stay 
out of the labour market, because they can afford to do so (middle-income households). As the job 
search period protracts, the enthusiasm of young and first-time job seekers will dampen further by 
the day. The so-called “hittistes” - young people literally leaning against the wall on the streets, 
watching the days go by without doing anythin, because they are jobless and hopeless - represent 
this phenomenon in the Southern Mediterranean countries.15 A negative growth in youth labour 
force due to lower youth participation in the labour market is not a real contraction; it is a 
procrastination of a social problem that is just waiting to erupt. 
                                                            
15 “Hittistes” is a Franco-Arab slang. 
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This attitude is also linked to the socio-economic equity focused policies of many Southern 
Mediterranean states through rent transfers and distributions in the form of social benefits to 
contain the spread of discontent caused by the dismal job market. Many Southern Mediterranean 
states do not have comprehensive social security programmes, but their public social security 
expenditure (in percentages of the GDP) is higher than most middle-income economies, implying 
that social benefits in the region are likely to be more generous.16 Generous social benefits become a 
source of moral hazard among unemployed persons when they start to depend on pay-outs to 
survive, and at the same time they deter from productive economic participation, cultivating a 
culture of “waiting” until they land on a government job. This development is also a by-product of 
the Southern Mediterranean states' earlier policies during the post-colonial period when the public 
sector expanded and not only provided higher wages, but also more social security compared to the 
private sector. Despite contraction in the public labour sector over the past three decades of 
neoliberal reforms, these expectations have not disappeared. Instead, job seekers are willing to wait 
until they get a job in the public sector. A survey conducted by Silatech, in collaboration with Gallup 
Inc., shows that more than 50 percent of the youth interviewed (aged between 15 and 29) still 
expressed preference to work for the government, despite their grim opinion of the job market 
(except in Libya).17 
In the Southern Mediterranean, the youth expectation that better job prospects can be reached 
through eduction are fruitless. Highly educated youth are finding themselves under attack from all 
fronts for being young and highly educated. Those who fall through the crack resort to informal jobs, 
where working conditions are often sub-standard, and the workers' social welfare is unprotected, or 
they decide to emigrate. Either way, for the state, this means a loss of taxes that could otherwise be 
added to public expenditure. On the other hand, the governments' inability to reform and transform 
their economies is not a question of political will alone. External competition has weakened the 
Southern Mediterranean domestic economic capacities to the extent that they are not benefiting 
much from globalisation, neither individually nor as an economy. Last but not least, Southern 
Mediterranean economies lack the regional integration and cooperation required to develop a 
supply-chain network, to support their market liberalisation programmes, and to proceed to real 
economic transformation. 
                                                            
16 See table A.2 in the Appendix. 
17 See footnote 2. 
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Appendix 
Table A.1. Trends in International Mathematics and Science Study 2011 Scores (Eighth Grade) 
 
 Mathematics Science 
Algeria^ 387 408 
Egypt^ 405 417 
Israel* 516 516 
Jordan* 406 449 
Lebanon* 449 406 
Morocco* 371 376 
Syria* 380 426 
Tunisia* 425 439 
Palestine* 404  
Southern Mediterranean**^^ 422 435 
Southeast Asia** 466 468 
East Asia** 595 554 
EU 28** 497 517 
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Global** 467 478 
 
Source: Author's own elaboration and calculations, Trends in International Mathematics and Science Study 2011 Scores, last accessed 28 
January 2014 at http://timssandpirls.bc.edu/data-release-2011/pdf/Overview-TIMSS-and-PIRLS-2011-Achievement.pdf, Salehi-Isfahani et 
al. (2011) as illustrated in Salehi-Isfahani (2012), pp. 855. Notes: * Scores from Trends in International Mathematics and Science Study 2011 
Scores. ^ 2007 scores from Salehi-Isfahani et al. (2011) as illustrated in Salehi-Isfahani (2012), pp. 855. ** Average. ^^ Includes Israel, 
Jordan, Lebanon, Syria, Tunisia and Palestine. (a) Data for Libya not available. (b) Southeast Asia refers to the 10 Association of Southeast 
Asia Nations (ASEAN) economies. Southeast Asia average scores excluding Singapore were 418 for mathematics and science 428. (d) East 
Asia refers to China (no data available), Hong Kong, Japan and Republic of Korea. 
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Table A.2. Public social security expenditure (percentage of the GDP) 
 
 2010 Latest data available 
Egypt 8.96 14.07 
Israel 17.21 16.54 
Jordan 12.53 12.56 
Lebanon  5.28 
Morocco 4.43  
Syria 3.22  
Tunisia 8.73 9.82 
Southern Mediterranean* 9.18 11.65 
Middle East & North Africa* 8.35 11.04 
ASEAN* 2.35 3.16 
East Asia* 8.34 10.18 
Latin America & the Caribbean* 7.91 7.58 
 
Source: International Labor Organization's World Social Security Report, 2010-2011, Table 25. Note: * Regional average. (a) Data for 
Algeria, Libya and Palestine not available. (b) Middle East & North Africa refers to the 21 economies according The World Bank's 
classification, which include all 10 Southern Mediterranean economies. (c) Southeast Asia refers to the 10 Association of Southeast Asia 
Nations (ASE8AN) economies. (d) East Asia refers to China, Hong Kong, Japan and Republic of Korea. (e) Latin America & the Caribbean 
refers to the 41 economies according The World Bank's classification. 
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